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Summary 
National parks are at the centre of debates around land use, conservation and broader 
discussions on the environment in Australia. These debates are formed by multiple 
voices. While some argue that national parks are unnecessarily ‘locked up’ natural 
resources, others emphasise the role that national parks play in preserving ecological 
sustainability, biological diversity, and protecting vulnerable species. 
Despite an acknowledgement that there are different views on the role of national 
parks, little attention has been paid to what exactly national parks are. In this thesis, I 
move beyond a common understanding of national parks as ‘containers’ for nature, 
created by, regulated, and controlled by human activities. Such an understanding is 
limited because it ignores the complexities and the capacities of nonhuman bodies, and 
leaves little conceptual room for thinking through encounters and transformations that 
are always creating the world anew. In response to this ‘deadening’ of difference in the 
world, I argue for a more fluid understanding of national parks as processual places 
that are at once constituted and constituting.  
Rethinking national parks as processual places calls for a reconsideration of the 
interconnectedness of the multiple human and nonhuman lives that inhabit and 
constitute national parks. These interconnections are usually understood as ‘ecologies’, 
and, within western academic thought, are almost universally apprehended through 
ecological sciences. Whilst the type of knowledge generated by ecological sciences is 
indispensable to management strategies, the scientific paradigm – like any approach to 
understanding the world – has its limitations. This thesis challenges the dominance of a 
scientific approach to understanding ‘the natural world’ by drawing on empirical 
research moments that highlight the importance of encountering and thinking about 
ecological processes of national parks beyond scientific modes of analysis. 
These reconsidered notions of national parks and ecology demand rethinking current 
modes of discussing and enacting environmental politics. Accordingly, I argue that we 
might begin to move past adversarial, subject-centred modes of environmental politics 
towards a politics of productive response to environmental problems.  
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This thesis is deeply embedded within an experimental research ethos and serves to 
challenge some of the methodological orthodoxies in the production of social scientific 
knowledge. The structure, style, and tone of the thesis is therefore somewhat 
unorthodox, and throughout I reflect on my own personal imbrication with the subject 
matter of national parks and nature, emphasising the processuality of the research 
experience.  
This thesis is not intended as a diagnostic or prescriptive tool for how to solve the 
‘problem’ of national parks in Australia. Rather, this thesis is offered as a ‘stepping 
back’, a reconsideration of some of the underpinning assumptions upon which national 
parks, understandings of nature, and environmental politics are founded. 
Challenging the systems of thought that sustain problematic attitudes to our role in the 
world is crucial to rethinking how we conceptualise and respond to environmental 
problems. This thesis takes up the challenge of articulating new ways of thinking about 
the complexities of humans and nature, opening possibilities for new terrains of 
environmental practices, ethics, and politics.  
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1. Introducing the thesis 
Imagine this:  
Your legs are burning, your face is hot and red, your breath is quick and your heart 
pounding fast. You are looking just in front of your feet, which are pushing, straining 
against the gravel track, the incline demanding more and more energy of your already 
tired body. Suddenly, gravel gives way to hard rock, which forces a final few upward 
strides before levelling out. Breathing hard, you lift your slightly throbbing head, 
gulping in cool, clean air.  
Congratulations! You have just summited Mount Tennent, the peak that rises behind 
the visitors’ centre in Namadgi National Park in the Australian Capital Territory. You 
turn north, surveying the steep incline you have conquered and gaze back toward the 
small city of Canberra nestled in between hills, the Telstra Tower a familiar beacon on 
top of Black Mountain. Turning to the south, you look out over undulating greens and 
browns and greys and blues. You know these colours are the amalgamation of trees 
and rocks and grasses and shadows, but in the distance they form a mottled pattern, 
individual elements impossible to discern.  
You feel thirsty and happy; your body simultaneously hates you and thanks you. You 
haven’t felt particularly fit lately, so you are pleased you made it to the top of the steep 
climb.  
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For much of my life I have associated moments like these, complex mixtures of 
sensations and emotions, with national parks. And I love them for it. National parks 
have been the site of many pleasures and pains in my life. I grew up in a house that 
backed onto a nature reserve. I scraped my knees on rocks and have felt the joy of an 
unexpectedly good time running up my favourite track. I went through periods when I 
spent less time in national parks or nature reserves, interested in different things. But 
they have been the sites of complex and formative experiences for me, as they have, I 
am sure, for many people. 
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These complex connections between landscape, memory, and affective intensities, 
however, rarely seem to be very prominent in debates around national parks. Instead, 
debates around national parks seem to focus on utility, whether to harvest the rare and 
valuable natural resources upon which extractive industries rely, or to mitigate 
declining biodiversity, or to preserve a particularly beautiful landscape, or an area of 
particular cultural significance (Flannery 2012). I have been frustrated and 
disappointed by debates around national parks, and these sadnesses were a key 
motivation for undertaking this research.  
Prior to starting this research, I held some broad sentiments to do with national parks: I 
agreed with most of the environmental arguments, but thought they were flimsy or 
flawed in their thinking; I felt ambivalent towards ‘conservation’ as the governing 
principle for national parks – I found this notion of human stewardship over the 
environment extremely problematic; I disagreed with most of the utilitarian arguments 
that national parks are pockets of natural resources, best put to use for economic 
development; and I was unsure what I thought about promoting national parks as 
tourist destinations for economic benefit.  
The primary empirical sites for this thesis are three national parks1 in the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT): Namadgi National Park, Tidbinbilla Nature Reserve, and 
Mulligans Flat Woodlands Sanctuary. The ACT is my home. I was attached to these 
places before connecting with them as empirical research sites, and my attachments 
have changed dramatically and in different ways during the course of this research. 
I note these personal imbrications with these national parks specifically, and Australian 
national parks more generally to articulate that I have not attempted to approach this 
research project as a neutral, or ‘objective’ researcher. Indeed, as I will elaborate 
further, one important contribution in this thesis is that I pay particular attention to the 
ways that the process of conducting research is a transformative way of connecting 
                                                      
1 A more accurate term for the ‘national parks’ I refer to throughout the thesis would be 
‘protected areas’. The places I refer to are, respectively, a national park, a nature reserve, and a 
wildlife sanctuary; it is important to note that these three difference types of protected areas are 
subject to different governance systems. However, these differences are not crucial in my 
discussions of the politics of these areas. I refer to ‘national parks’ as this term is most common 
in everyday speech. Furthermore, ‘protected areas’ feels to me quite a generic and sterile term 
that does not communicate the ‘parkiness’ of these vibrant places. 
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with the world (Dewsbury 2010). Accordingly, at several points throughout the thesis I 
lay bare the kinds of transformations that have occurred for me personally in 
undertaking this research. Claiming a detached and objective research subjectivity 
would be blatantly untrue and would, in fact, be counterproductive to the 
methodological and political arguments I make throughout this thesis. 
I am aware, as no doubt are you, that this is a quite unorthodox way to begin a thesis, 
and a quite unorthodox tone in which to write such a document. This is a deliberate 
methodological and political technique. At the heart of this work is a gentle critique of 
some of the scholarly habits (or orthodoxies) that, although impressive, tend to 
homogenise the ways in which knowledge is produced, rendered, and interpreted (J. 
Law 2004).  
Introductions to theses generally point to ‘gaps’ in current knowledge about a 
particular subject matter, then go on to explain that the purpose of that particular piece 
of research is to fill those gaps. In this view, the world is a puzzle, and research is the 
means through which we fill in the missing pieces. As will become apparent 
throughout this thesis, I argue that this notion of research is deeply problematic, as it 
ignores that the practice of research itself is a creative and productive endeavour, 
which does not simply interpret an already given world, but rather, creates the world 
anew (Dewsbury 2010). As such, I do not aim in this thesis to fill in the ‘missing’ parts 
of knowledge around national parks. Rather, I aim to create new and different 
connections to national parks, to nature, to being human, and to the politics of creating 
knowledge.  
My decision to resist the temptation to cleanse this work of all traces of myself – my 
shifting subjectivities, my experiences, my strengths and my shortcomings – is my way 
of pushing back against structures and conventions that attempt to prescribe how you 
and I can communicate with each other: me, the knowing scholar who (supposedly) 
effortlessly produced this thesis; and you, the reader, a rather passive consumer of my 
work. This, of course, is not the case. This thesis is the result of several years of effort 
on my part, and in encountering this work you bring your own expertise, memories, 
experiences, and sensations that will affect how you react to my words.  
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That national parks would figure so prominently in this thesis was a relatively late 
revelation in the research process, but I am very glad that the stars aligned in such a 
way that I have been able to spend several years thinking about these issues that I hold 
very dear. Such is the beauty of research – that a lucky few of us are awarded the 
privilege to pursue ideas, to form opinions, to make mistakes, to take risks and to try 
new things. 
In this thesis, I have attempted to do all of these things. I have tried to think differently 
and think creatively through problems to do with the environment. I have tried to be 
open, and advocate openness to experimental thought – a crucial yet difficult 
disposition when our habits of thinking the environment are so intensely ingrained. I 
have also attempted to make the process as enjoyable as possible for myself and for 
readers; this is out of a conviction that pleasure is a part of encountering research that 
is overlooked too often (Axtell 1999).  
I have taken great care throughout the following sections to be honest and clear about 
how different parts of the research were undertaken and produced, even when these 
undertakings don’t reflect particularly well on me, or my work practices.  
This thesis aims to accomplish two key tasks simultaneously. First (and foremost), I try 
to generate fresh insights into the practices that constitute national parks, the ecologies 
that drive them, and the politics that surround and form them. Second, I aim to do so 
by putting ‘nonrepresentational’ approaches (Thrift 2008; Harrison & B. Anderson 
2010; H. Lorimer 2005) to use in a variety of ways – in terms of theoretical, 
methodological, and presentation techniques. This approach is mainly inspired, but not 
strictly tethered to, the rising influence of the ontological and affective ‘turns’ in the 
social sciences (Goodman 2001; Gregg & Seigworth 2010).  
Influenced by thinkers such as Spinoza, Deleuze and Nietzsche as well as more 
contemporary scholars such as Jane Bennett, (whose monograph Vibrant Matter (2010) 
inspired the title of this thesis), Hasana Sharp (2011), and Mark Halsey (2006), the turn 
to ontology offers new ways of thinking old problems and is an important intellectual 
pursuit. This style of thought that attends to what things might be able to do more than 
what things mean, has caught my imagination. From an initial interest in the way the 
‘mobilities’ paradigm (Urry 2007; Adey 2009b; Sheller & Urry 2003; Sheller & Urry 
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2006) treats materialities in the world, to hours spent pondering whether it’s really ‘me’ 
writing this thesis, or a shifting, unidentifiable assemblage of organic and inorganic 
matter that, for the moment, constitutes my body (Bennett 2010), I am hooked.  
In order to appreciate the ways I put nonrepresentational approaches to work in this 
thesis, the ‘Contexts’ section provides an overview of how national parks are currently 
debated in Australia (in both the academy and mainstream media) and the types of 
problems associated with those debates (such as funding, resources, economic benefits, 
and so forth). These specific debates, of course, are enfolded within broader questions 
of how the social sciences have dealt with problems to do with human/nature relations, 
to which I also attend. As there are innumerable ways one might attend to these 
problems, I lay out the specific theoretical context of nonrepresentational approaches 
that are crucial to the contribution of this thesis, outlining the major concepts, thinkers 
and themes that have influenced me.  
Given the current fascination with the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
(Deleuze & Guattari 2004; Deleuze 2004; Deleuze & Guattari 1987) across the social 
sciences, I feel compelled to make a small disclaimer here: this is not a ‘Deleuzian’ 
thesis, and I do not identify as a ‘Deleuzian’ scholar in the strict sense of trying to 
somehow adhere to, or emulate his philosophy. However, there are some elements of 
Deleuze’s thought to which I am drawn in terms of ways we can go about making 
critiques in the world without being critics of the world. This ethos of affirmation is 
drawn out further in ‘Producing the thesis’, which attends most closely to 
methodological decisions, mistakes, twists and turns that I have made throughout this 
thesis.  
‘Producing the thesis’ is perhaps a little more ‘in-depth’ than most methodology 
sections, and this is because the second of my major aims in this thesis is to provide a 
critique of what I think is a problematic methodological direction in academic social 
research – the tendency to attempt to bolster claims by referring to representational 
logics (Bissell 2014a). Methods of posing and investigating problems that focus on 
similarities and sameness sideline emergent difference in the world. In undertaking 
more experimental, nonrepresentational work, I demonstrate that fresh insights can be 
made on stale problems – in this case, the problem of human/nature relations. This is 
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not to say that representational research has no place in the world, or is somehow 
‘doing it wrong’, but rather, that we2 should be wary of the increasing tendency 
towards social research basing its methods of enquiry on representational modes of 
thought. To do so limits the ways we can pose problems, and thus, the types of 
solutions (or further problems) we can conceptualise.  
As such, the ‘Producing the thesis’ section is not a list and explanation of the number of 
interviewees, or activities observed, or places visited. Rather, ‘Producing the thesis’ is a 
meditation on the methodological innovations possible in the design, execution, and 
presentation of social scientific research, if only we are willing to take some risks (Lash 
2009). I have deliberately taken some ‘risks’ in the structure, style, and arguments in 
this thesis. 
Moving on from the methodological focus, the first analytical section of the thesis, 
‘Encounters’, sets the scene for the type of exploration I undertake by offering a 
reconceptualisation of the constitution of national parks. Moving away from 
apprehensions of national parks as bounded places, cut out and separated from the rest 
of the world, I argue in ‘Encounters’ that national parks are constituted through 
dwelling practices of all kinds of bodies (Ingold 2005; Cresswell 2004). Crucially, I 
contend that mobilities are inherent in such practices and thus, that various 
movements and stillnesses are essential in the processual constitution of places (Bissell 
& Fuller 2011). In a series of short essays on different national park practices, I reveal 
and problematise the representational logics of typical approaches to practices of 
mapping, fencing, tracing, and discoursing national parks.  
Moving on from this reconceptualisation of national parks, I attend to the core stream 
of knowledge through which national parks are typically ‘known’ – ecological sciences. 
In ‘Ecologies’ I problematise the dominance of the scientific paradigm in how we think 
about nature (Halsey 2005). I argue that the dominance of scientific habits of thought 
that accompany this mode of enquiry can be hazardous and needs to be balanced with 
more-than-scientific modes of thought and analysis. Through questioning the 
                                                      
2 This broad figure of ‘we’ is used throughout this thesis. Although different references to ‘we’ 
call to mind disparate groups, the reader may like to keep in mind a figure of ‘we’ comprised by 
researchers, environmental advocates, or anyone with an interest in the continuity of life!  
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legitimacy of the ontological claims that underpin much of science (such as faith in 
scientific categorisations of bodies) in order to determine the place and capacities of 
various bodies, I argue that whilst science can be a joyful and experimental response to 
the world, we should be cautious with our reliance on the type of knowledge 
generated in this paradigm.  
Introducing new ways to apprehend nature beyond a scientific paradigm in turn 
demands reconsidering how we think about and enact environmental politics (Sharp 
2011; Bennett & Chaloupka 1993; Coole & Frost 2010). Rethinking national parks and 
ecologies in new ways provides new openings for political engagement with these 
complex material and semiotic assemblages. Thus, ‘Politics’ is an exploration of new 
terrains of environmental politics made possible through the reconceptualisations I 
offer in ‘Encounters’ and ‘Ecologies’.  
Sections of the thesis are peppered with photographs that I have taken throughout this 
research project. However, you will find that I do not refer directly to these images in 
the text, and there is no list of figures to which you can refer. It may have been more 
conventional to list these images and explicitly state their connection to the text. 
However, I have refrained from doing so in this thesis as I deploy these photographs as 
tools that allow “a certain trajectory of thought to happen” (Rose 2014, p.209). I 
certainly intend the images to be hooks that are connected with the text of the thesis. 
Yet I hesitate to be too explicit about the kinds of connections that you should make. 
Rather, I draw from Vannini and Taggart’s method of allowing images to ‘accompany’ 
my writing (2013, p.1079).  
The photographs throughout the thesis are therefore not intended to create a complete 
‘visual ethnography’ through “representations of ethnographic knowledge” (Pink 
2013, p.2). Rather, in a similar vein to Lorimer’s work on ‘moving image 
methodologies’, I have included photographs in this thesis due to their capacity to 
“provide a sensual shock to thought” (J. Lorimer 2010, p.241). Although these are still 
images, they have the capacity to create a more sensual experience of the thesis. They 
may encourage you to make different connections to the ideas presented – breaking 
through paragraphs and adding colour and shape to pages, perhaps sticking in your 
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mind more than sentences or subtitles, or enabling sensations that may otherwise be 
constrained through a purely textual thesis.  
Similarly, I have refrained from explicitly stating a ‘research question’ to which the 
thesis attempts to formulate an answer. Although research questions are no doubt very 
useful and productive ‘enabling constraints’ (Massumi 2009, p.15), at this early point in 
the thesis I also hesitate to be too explicit about providing an answer to a question. As 
will become apparent throughout the thesis, my goal here is more to do with re-
formulating problems than with prescribing answers to those problems. In particular, I 
aim to reformulate the problem of the ‘national park’ by gesturing to the ways in which 
national parks are constituted through processual flows and practices beyond their 
discursive and legal definition.  
My aim is to provide pathways to think through the political significance of moments 
such as summiting Mount Tennent. Such empirical moments have been of utmost 
importance in this thesis, guiding me to and from particular lines of enquiry, and 
prompting me to be more open, more creative, and more receptive to different modes 
of thinking. I hope that this thesis, in turn, is an empirical moment that provokes 
similar transformations for readers.  
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2. Contexts 
This chapter provides an overview of the three key contexts in which my thesis is 
situated. The first context is about the ways that national parks tend to be 
conceptualised in public and political debates. These public debates often focus on the 
utility of national parks as natural resources. Second, this chapter outlines the types of 
questions that social science has dealt with on the environment, which have arisen out 
of particular social and historical contexts. This context stresses how environmental 
social science began largely as a response to the environmental activist movement – an 
important historical context that still shapes contemporary social scientific debates 
around the environment. The third context is about the theoretical architecture of the 
thesis, which is best characterised as a nonrepresentational approach, situated squarely 
in the ontological turn of the social sciences.  
2.1 National parks in Australia 
I mentioned in ‘Introducing the thesis’ that this research is partly motivated by 
frustration and disappointment in mainstream debates around national parks in 
Australia. In order to understand what I see as the shortcomings of discourse around 
national parks, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of how national parks are 
currently understood and debated in contemporary Australian politics and society. 
This section will deal mainly with the more ‘public’ debate of national parks in 
mainstream media and politics; the next section will attend more closely to debates 
that have taken place in the realm of scholarly literature. Although these ‘sets’ of 
debates are by no means entirely separate, they focus on different issues, with more 
mainstream debates focused on practical problems and policy decisions, and academic 
debates more focused on conceptual problems. 
National parks are central in many politically and ethically charged public and political 
debates. The role of national parks and nature reserves generate considerable 
discussion, particularly in opinion pieces in the media in response to problems such as 
environmental protection policy (Kearney 2013; Lowe 2013; Bowman 2012), food 
resources (Radford 2011; McCausland & O'Sullivan 2013), climate change (Bridgewater 
2013; R. Law 2013), biodiversity conservation (Bowman 2011; Flannery 2012), and land 
use (Hockings et al. 2013; Ballard & Vernes 2013). These discussions call forth varied, 
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but interconnected issues of how we should respond to environmental concerns. As 
such, national parks speak to wider public debates on the environment in Australia.  
Recently, some members of farming communities in particular have argued that 
national park spaces are unnecessarily ‘locked up’ natural resources that could be 
utilised for grazing cattle struggling in widespread drought. Similarly forestry industry 
bodies have advocated for logging in national parks that have been deemed not 
“pristine” enough to retain national park status (Helbig 2012).  
Unsurprisingly, conservation advocates respond by arguing that the most important 
role of national parks is to preserve ecological sustainability and biological diversity, 
and to protect vulnerable species – and that grazing cattle or logging would be 
disastrous for these primary functions of national parks (Johnston & Bradshaw 2013).  
Without meaning to reduce the complexity of these public debates, the contention 
around national parks can generally be attributed to differing opinions on how to 
utilise reserve spaces (Commonwealth of Australia 2007). Although the arguments for 
advocates of different uses for national park spaces involve complex problems of 
animal welfare or economic benefit and ecological sustainability, these debates are 
often distilled into a battle between those who believe national parks are pockets of 
natural resources that can be better utilised, and those who maintain that the best use 
of national parks is, as per the National Reserve System (NRS) website, our “natural 
safety net” (Commonwealth of Australia n.d).  
Beneath the positions of both sides of national park debates, we can see that these 
alternate evaluations of national parks depend a great deal upon claims to truth of 
what the national park spaces actually are3. Are they pockets of valuable and useful 
natural resources, best utilised in industrial development and direct economic benefits? 
Or is their value in their role as the pinnacle of environmental stewardship and 
protection of ecological sustainability? These positions of utilitarianism or (utilitarian) 
conservationism have emerged recently as the dominant – and somewhat adversarial – 
positions on the role of national parks in Australia.  
                                                      
3 I challenge the underlying premise of these positions in ‘Encounters’ by reconceptualising 
national parks as processual places and pointing to their ontological multiplicities. 
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National parks have, of course, been discussed in more specific terms than these broad 
and oppositional positions in public and academic forums: Bridgewater (2013), for 
example has questioned the relevance of protected areas in the 21st century in the 
context of global environmental problems such as climate change; Buckley and Pannell 
(1990) have contended that national parks should encourage particular forms of 
‘contemplative’ or ‘naturalist’ travel rather than more ‘destructive’ practices involving 
motorised vehicles or the building of fixed structures (such as ski resorts, hotels, and so 
on); and Ballard and Vernes (2013) have argued that national parks may benefit from 
those same ‘destructive’ practices as they tend to attract more financial support for 
conservation programs. These are but a small sample of the diverse views on how 
national parks can be best put to use, but this is precisely the point – that use and 
utilisation is at the heart of arguments around national parks.  
Despite these examples of differing views on the utilisation of national parks, both 
‘sides’ are united in locating blame for perceived failings of national parks squarely on 
the shoulders of local, state, and federal governments. Tim Flannery’s analysis of the 
failings of Australia’s national parks to prevent significant loss of biodiversity, for 
example, puts forth an explicit accusation that the federal government is to blame for 
the loss of a particular species of bat in 2009 – the Christmas Island pipistrelle 
(Flannery 2012). Flannery argues that a lack of political will and funding for Australia’s 
NRS led directly to the loss of this species, and a marked decline in other mammal 
species.  
On the other hand, cattle farmers in Queensland have blamed the state government for 
allowing their cattle to starve in tough drought conditions instead of opening protected 
grasslands within national parks to grazing cattle. Although this decision was 
welcomed by conservation advocates, some animal ethicists have argued that allowing 
cattle to starve rather than allowing grazing in protected areas is tantamount to animal 
cruelty (McCausland & O'Sullivan 2013). Vested financial interests aside, this 
neoliberal argument complicates the issue for conservationists, many of whom would 
presumably be uncomfortable with such animal suffering.  
In both of these cases, it is governments that have been blamed for either ignoring or 
refusing to act based on scientific evidence. Ecological evidence is a powerful weapon 
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in debates on national parks and the politics of the environment. For example, ecology 
in central in defining particular environmental situations and transformations as 
ecological ‘problems’ and in formulating responses to environmental policy on climate 
change, biodiversity conservation or cattle grazing (Ballard & Vernes 2013; Bowman 
2011). Of course, this reliance on ecological science becomes problematic when the 
science is uncertain, or when there are contradictory lines of evidence (Pressey & 
Ritchie 2014). 
Despite these complicating factors, the fates of national parks are considered the 
responsibility of a scientifically informed government. The question of whether a park 
succeeds or fails in its aims of protecting vulnerable habitats, landscapes, or species, is 
understood as the result of competent or incompetent decision-making bodies. Various 
groups bemoan the failings of government: if only the government could loosen 
regulations and ‘open up’ some national parks to grazing and logging, we could utilise 
these natural resources to improve life through industry (Mercer 2000); if only the 
government could supply more money and resources to park management services, 
we could protect endangered species and preserve the iconic natural beauty of our 
national parks (Flannery 2012). 
The key point here is that on both ‘sides’ of these debates, the segments of land lying 
within the legal and infrastructural boundaries of ‘national park’ are figured as pliant 
spaces, which can be managed and manipulated to meet the needs of conservation or 
production. For both sides, then, the ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of national park spaces 
(whether the ‘problem’ is that they are too locked up or too vulnerable to invasive 
practices) has been located in formal political apparatus at local, state, and federal 
levels.  
With such intense debates occurring at the dizzying heights of federal government, it 
can be difficult to elide these dominant debates and formulate different interventions 
into issues around national parks, to make different cuts into discourse, and perhaps 
suggest some different mediations into how we can approach the complex and 
confronting issues around environmental degradation. And yet try we must, as some 
of the foundational categories and divisions (such as conservationists, developers, 
nature, humans) in these debates are extremely problematic. Indeed, these are the very 
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notions that this thesis unpacks. By focusing on how these groupings and divisions are 
conceptualised, this thesis aims to generate fresh insights into what seems to be a 
rather stagnant debate, trapped within conflicting sides of the same utilitarian coin.  
The current focus of debates in Australia around national parks is how national parks 
can best be used by contemporary society. This debate is characterised by functionalist 
questions that arise in public national park discourse. What purpose do they serve? 
Whose interests should be prioritised? How should different activities be regulated in 
order to balance enjoying protected areas, economic development, and the ecological 
goals of national parks in Australia? 
These utilitarian questions are in some ways reminiscent of the original motivations for 
establishing national parks. The Royal Australian National Park (originally titled, 
simply, ‘National Park’), was the first of its kind established in Australia and the 
second in the world, inspired by the Yellowstone National Park model. The statute that 
established Yellowstone stated its purpose as “a pleasuring ground for the people”, 
with the Royal Australian National Park being intended “for the use and enjoyment of 
the people of New South Wales” (Scott 2011). Although first conceptualised as 
recreational amenities, these early national parks were also central to the development 
of conservationist ethics4, which are central to contemporary disputes around national 
parks.  
Whilst political debates on national parks are important, and the passion of those 
involved is laudable, there are important consequences to do with how we understand 
what, precisely, a national park space is. The idea of national parks perpetuated 
through some utilitarian debates is of a fixed, bounded, defendable space, carved out 
from its surroundings. This is a problematic notion, particularly as Bridgewater (2013) 
has pointed out, in light of broader environmental concerns such as the pressing 
challenge of global climate change. These are not benign debates. Indeed, they speak to 
wider concerns around the environmental conditions and resources essential for the 
continuity of human life.  
                                                      
4 A fuller discussion of which follows in ‘Social science and the environment’. 
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Problematising the ontological claims made throughout national park discourse – of 
landscapes as ‘natural’, of the merit of a ‘scientific framework’ as the dominant mode 
of evaluation, of human capacity to rise above and protect nature – are the key issues I 
deal with throughout this thesis. In the following chapters I set out an argument that 
deliberately elides the dominant debates outlined above. I do so in an effort to move 
beyond the dichotomous, oppositional thinking that characterises these debates, and 
attend to some of the complexity that might be obscured by these utilitarian positions. 
Seeking to produce different insights into national parks should not be taken as an 
attempt to replace existing critiques, nor devalue their contribution to wider debates of 
environmental politics. Rather, I offer my arguments throughout this thesis as an 
enrichment of existing literatures on place, national parks, and the complex 
interconnection of humans and the environment.  
Balancing the demands and desires of a growing human population with ecological 
health, which is in turn fundamental to sustaining that population is undoubtedly an 
important project. National parks are understood as a fundamental component of this 
balance and national debates about Australia’s protected areas are underpinned by 
particular understandings of the relationship between humans and nature – a 
relationship which has long been the subject of the social sciences, and will be outlined 
in the following section.  
2.2 Social science and the environment 
Modern environmental sociology is generally accepted to have begun in the early 
1970s5, arising out of the environmental activism that sprung up from Earth Day in 
1970 (Hannigan 2014, p.18). The instant and widespread attention paid to the 
environmental movement challenged sociologists, as the discipline was still strongly 
influenced by the social structural thought of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max 
Weber (Hannigan 2014).  
Looking further back into the history of environmental thought in social science, 
Lidskog has argued that in the 18th century, there occurred a certain ‘denaturalisation’ 
of society, “where society was seen as a phenomenon with its own characteristics” 
                                                      
5 Reviewing nearly half a century of environmental sociology is impractical; this is a truncated 
overview. 
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(Lidskog 2001, p.114). Following this ‘denaturalisation’, classical sociologists such as 
Marx, Weber and Durkheim were preoccupied with the development of modern 
industrial societies and their effects on social life. Lidskog argues that for theorists such 
as these three ‘fathers of sociology’, “even if they saw nature as a precondition for 
social life, this dependency was not judged as important for the sociological analysis of 
society” (Lidskog 2001, p.114). In a time where natural resources were being utilised 
for industry, and before widespread environmental effects of industrial societies were 
understood, these theorists can perhaps be forgiven for overlooking nature as a 
fundamental part of society.  
However, their influence in sociological theory and methodology has been profound 
and long lasting, and still influences contemporary social theorists. That classical 
sociology developed alongside the industrial revolution can explain, at least in part, 
why sociology has historically had a certain ‘blind spot’ when it comes to 
environmental issues. Murdoch argues that social theorists in the second half of the 
twentieth century “almost unconsciously [accepted Durkheim’s] methodological rules 
to the extent that social phenomena must be explained in entirely social terms” 
(Murdoch 2001, p.55). Furthermore, theorists influenced by Marxism in particular 
“have tended to regard nature on only instrumental value, as an object to be evaluated 
and transformed solely in accordance with human desires” (Murdoch 2001, p.155), and 
as such “nature is reduced to a resource to be mobilized in order to feed those human 
needs… Nature becomes, in Weber’s term, disenchanted…it is ‘mere stuff’, a ‘standing 
reserve’ awaiting eventual transformation” (Murdoch 2001, p.51).  The understandable 
preoccupation of these influential thinkers with industrialised society clearly led to a 
tendency to conceptualise the environment as an inert resource, an “empty nature 
degraded into mere material, mere stuff to be dominated” (Horkheimer 1974, p.97). 
The environmental movement of the 1970s forced sociologists, in particular, to rethink 
their reliance on social structural thought and pay more attention to the material world 
at hand. Growing concerns around the environment – prompted in part by events such 
as the 1973-74 energy crisis – along with the establishment of environmentalist political 
groups spurred some sociologists in the early 1970s to evaluate how sociology had 
dealt with environmental issues (Dunlap & Catton 1994). Sociological enquiry into 
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energy and resource scarcity cemented the need for a subdiscipline of sociology of the 
environment. The emerging ‘environmental sociology’ moved away from traditional 
theories such as Durkheim’s ‘social facts’ (Durkheim 1968), and began to recognise “the 
role of physical-biological factors in shaping social structure and behaviours, that was 
aware of the impacts of social organization and social change on the natural 
environment” (Buttel 1987, p.466).  
Although regarding the environment as a factor in social change may seem obvious to 
contemporary social scientists, considering the environment in analyses of society was 
a significant challenge to classical sociological theory. Durkheim was particularly 
influential here, as, remaining faithful to Durkheim’s conceptualisation of social 
problems as only social ‘facts’, there has been a “traditional reluctance to acknowledge 
the relevance of the physical environment for understanding modern human societies” 
(Dunlap & Catton 1994, pp.5-6). In light of growing environmental concerns, however, 
Durkheim’s theorisations began to be out of step with contemporary social realities.  
Attempting to address these shortcomings, early environmental sociologists 
understood the environment as “socially constructed”, particularly after various 
environmental disasters, involving nuclear waste disposal and oil spills (Hannigan 
2014). This ‘constructivist’ approach focused on how our understandings of ‘nature’ 
are shaped by social processes of communication and knowledge production (White 
2004). Meanwhile, individualist, libertarian ideologies of the 1980s in North America in 
particular meant that “environmental sociology’s emphasis on the ecosystem-
dependence of modern, industrialized societies seemed particularly out-of-step with 
the tenor of the times” (Dunlap & Catton 1994, p.11).  
Furthermore, sociological investigations into the complex relationship between ‘nature’ 
and ‘culture’ were far from harmonious undertakings within the discipline. 
Environmental sociology provoked debates between sociologists who saw the 
biophysical world as an objective reality that influenced the social world, and those 
who argued that ‘objective’ environmental problems are “nothing else than a socially 
defined risk” (Lidskog 2001, p.118). These ‘camps’ were loosely divided into 
environmental realism (Dunlap & Catton 1994) and environmental constructionism 
(Dake 1992; Lakoff 2010) – perspectives driven by differing impulses and with different 
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goals. As Lidskog has put it, “[e]nvironmental realism is driven by the impulse of 
‘saving the Earth’, pointing to the ongoing environmental destruction and a future 
global catastrophe, whereas environmental constructionism is driven by a commitment 
to revealing the cultural construction of nature/environment” (Lidskog 2001, p.120).  
Of course, these distinctions are oversimplified, and the differences between 
environmental constructionists and environmental realists were largely differences in 
emphasis rather than significantly different views on the relationship between nature 
and culture (Murdoch 2001). Nonetheless, these distinctions raised important questions 
about the extent to which social scientists can justifiably define and draw boundaries 
between categories of the magnitude of ‘society’ and ‘nature’. Some theorists have 
asserted that human society differs from natural ecologies largely due to the 
responsibilities of conscious and intentional stewardship of the environment. The role 
of humans as carers for the environment has been seen as ‘proof’ that humans are at 
once part of nature, but also separate from it (Soper 1995).  
Conservation ideologies 
In light of this long-standing hierarchy where humans must juggle the roles of 
dominion over nature and a moral obligation to care for the natural environment, some 
of the underpinnings of environmental conservation become clearer. Recent work by 
prominent conservationists reveals a similar position of aiming to reap the benefits of 
managing natural resources for humans whilst caring for an ailing environment. For 
example, experts in environmental conservation stress that “conservation is 
fundamentally important to: (1) the maintenance of key ecological processes upon 
which human societies depend and (2) the health and well being of individual people 
and human communities” (Lindenmayer et al. 2010). Apparent here is a very utilitarian 
understanding of conservation, where maintaining ecological processes is directly 
linked to benefits for humans6.  
                                                      
6 Not all approaches to the environment are dominated by utilitarian humanism. Notions of the 
environment as merely a ‘resource’ is challenged in particular by several approaches best 
characterised under the umbrella term of ‘deep ecology’. Deep ecologists generally argue that 
the environment has inherent worth outside of its value as a ‘resource’ for humans (Levy & 
Wissenburg 2012). 
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This is further evidenced by the national conservation agenda in Australia, in which 
national parks are described as crucial (Commonwealth of Australia 2007). Although 
‘conservation’ can refer to many approaches – such as biodiversity preservation, or 
prevention of landscape degradation – national parks embody the general notion of 
conservation as maintaining healthy, sustainable ecosystems from generation to 
generation (Flannery 2012). The specific nature reserves I deal with here – Namadgi 
National Park, Tidbinbilla Nature Reserve and Mulligans Flat Woodland Sanctuary – 
all make significant contributions to conservation projects in Australia. Namadgi, for 
example, is a significant part of Australia’s alpine ecosystems (Higgins 2009). 
Tidbinbilla hosts breeding programs for various species, most notably the critically 
endangered Northern Corroboree Frog and the Southern Brush-tailed Rock-wallaby 
(ACT Government 2015a). Mulligans Flat is protected by a predator-proof fence, and is 
regularly used for reintroducing small native species such as bettongs and the Bush-
stone Curlew (Mulligans Flat Woodland Sanctuary 2012).  
Conservation of species and habitats for numerous plant and animal species is one of 
the primary justifications for protecting these spaces from development or invasive 
industries such as mining or logging (Flannery 2005). Conservation of biodiversity and 
habitats is the primary justification of the careful maintenance of the national parks 
that are the primary site for this research. The research project therefore requires close 
exploration of the practices and values of conservation, and the ideologies and histories 
from which contemporary notions of conservation arise.  
Developments in physical and particularly environmental sciences have also 
challenged conservation reserves. Increased knowledge of regional and global climate 
change, for example, dispels the myth that humans can delineate a space reserved for 
healthy ecosystems that would be unaffected by climate change. Indeed, as 
Lindenmayer et al. have pointed out, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
considers biodiversity to be “most at risk from the effects of rapid climate change” 
(Lindenmayer et al. 2010).  
Conservation is by no means a harmonious project. Indeed, ‘conservation’ is an 
umbrella term for numerous, often conflicting, views on what conservation priorities 
should be, and for whose benefit. Landscape conservationists, for example, are unified 
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in their project of monitoring and maintaining unique ecosystems, whilst biological 
conservationists are driven by a desire to maintain rich biodiversity by preventing loss 
of flora and fauna species (Lindenmayer et al. 2010). These conservation activities are 
not mutually exclusive, however, and there is much common ground in the deeply 
ingrained beliefs and assumptions within conservationist ideologies.  
The connections that others have drawn between the politics of national parks and 
wider environmental problems are undoubtedly valuable. Such research has provided 
the basis for decisions on numerous occasions, and provides a platform from which a 
range of people can engage with problems they feel passionately about – whatever 
their disposition. However, these existing analyses are, I maintain, founded on a 
limited view of national parks as inactive, infirm entities. Indeed, as Proctor and 
Pincetl have argued, the primary role demanded of national parks, of biodiversity 
conservation, is “based on a crude realist premise that nature is some biophysical 
entity under siege by humans” (Proctor & Pincetl 1996, p.683). 
Social scientists are acutely aware that theoretical perspectives such as critical realism 
shape how we conceptualise and frame problems. In terms of national parks, Marxist 
theories have highlighted that national parks can encourage notions that if nature is 
‘over there’, then industrialisation can continue undeterred by environmental concerns 
‘over here’ (Zimmerer 2000). In this light, criticisms are levelled at conservation spaces 
– that they are bound up in capitalist values and are merely “the production of 
commodified nature” (Zimmerer 2000, p.357). Meanwhile, feminist interventions have 
highlighted that the level of control asserted over national parks can be seen as an 
extension of the (masculine) trope of ‘conquering’ the environment (Pratt 1992), which 
has also been problematised in postcolonialist research focused on the disregard for 
long-standing relationships Indigenous Australians have had with the land (Papadakis 
1993).  
The Australian Indigenous notion of Country (Weir 2012; Altman & Kerins 2012) is 
indeed an important style of thought that is closely related to the reconsiderations of 
the relationship between nature and culture I offer here. Care should be taken to avoid 
a ‘noble savage’ understanding of Indigenous notions of land and culture (Waitt & 
Head 2002), but this system of thought that developed independently of the Western 
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philosophy has much to offer as an alternate (and in many ways nonrepresentational) 
ontology. What, precisely may be offered by these systems of knowledge is an exciting 
and pertinent area for further research, but an in-depth discussion of Indigenous 
epistemologies and ontologies falls outside the scope of this thesis which is dealing 
specifically with the problems of Western thought and nature.  
Although Marxist, feminist, and postcolonialist research interrogate different (though 
related) problems of national parks, they all adhere to a mode of social enquiry that 
foregrounds epistemological questions of how we know national parks; how such 
knowledge is constructed, transformed, and disseminated. It would be remiss to 
suggest that such lines of inquiry are unimportant or obsolete; epistemological 
investigations such as these are important. However, recent moves in the social 
sciences have highlighted that heavy focus on such epistemological questions can 
unintentionally obscure equally important ontological debates. In response to this 
shortcoming of social inquiry, theorists have begun to turn to ‘nonrepresentational’ 
theories in order to interrogate ontological problems.   
This ‘ontological turn’ has been particularly important to contemporary work in 
sociology’s cognate disciplines of human and cultural geography (Latour 2005; Coole 
2005; Bennett 2010; Whatmore 2006). Looking beyond the (admittedly porous) 
boundaries of sociology has been crucial in developing this thesis for several reasons. 
First, environmental sociology arose largely in response to the environmental activist 
movement (Dunlap & Catton 1994), and the terms of debates in environmental 
sociology are still largely influenced by foundational sociological questions of 
structure7 and agency. Second, human and cultural geography have a disciplinary 
history more rooted in the physicality and materiality of the world than in social 
structure, as is the case with sociology, and thus arise from a rich history of theorising 
the physical world (Whatmore 2002). While the project of attending to the significance 
of the environmental movement is indeed an important and worthwhile project, 
working within the framework of social structures and human agency constrains 
opportunities for creative and radical environmental thought, which is a core aim of 
this thesis. Accordingly, throughout the thesis I draw on the work of sociologists, 
                                                      
7 Albeit a ‘structure’ that now takes into consideration the limits of the natural world. 
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human geographers, cultural geographers, political ecologists, and continental 
philosophers, as this diversity is central to the core theoretical approaches in the 
‘ontological turn’.  
2.3 Nonrepresentational theories and the ontological turn 
National parks and nature reserves are central to how we conceptualise human 
interactions with nature in Australia; they are held as representative of Australia’s 
“iconic natural beauty” (Commonwealth of Australia n.d.). In turn, our social, political, 
and scientific successes and shortcomings are often told through stories of particular 
national parks. National parks have become embroiled in debates on capitalism 
(Zimmerer 2000), identity politics and colonial history (Lawrence 1996), and, as 
outlined above, management of the environment and use of natural resources. Each of 
these debates spring from various ideological, political and moral stances that are 
central to our imagined national identity. Given this, it is unsurprising that much 
research around national parks has centred on epistemological questions of how these 
places inform and are informed by ideological tropes. We can think here, perhaps, of 
the centrality of ‘rugged’ and ‘inhospitable’ Australian bush or desert in many of our 
colonial mythologies8. In Australia, many national parks preserve and perpetuate these 
histories through ‘cultural heritage’ sites (Higgins 2012), and relationships with the 
environment are largely investigated through cultural analysis that pays attention to 
the ways human generate and disseminate meanings around the environment 
(Hannigan 2014).  
Sociological work around encountering ‘nature’ (understood as contained within 
national parks) has largely been cultural analysis of how natural Australian landscapes 
inform various cultural identities and conflicts (Lawrence 1996). In response to the 
dominance of cultural analysis, many theorists have pointed out that focusing so 
exclusively on human meaning-making practices may obscure other ways we can think 
about problems of all kinds (Hynes 2013; Bennett 2010; McCormack 2010; J. Lorimer 
2007). This response has been characterised by a shift in focus to ontological questions 
of embodied experiences (Bissell 2007), pre-conscious affective relations (Clough 2008; 
                                                      
8 For example, ‘The Man From Snowy River’, the histories of the Burke & Wills expedition, and 
so on. 
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Clough 2009; Massumi 2002), and material capacities (Coole 2005), which has laid the 
ground for radical reconceptualisations of the empirical world, constituting a (re)turn 
to problems of ontological relations (Castree 2003a; Coole & Frost 2010; Adkins & Lury 
2009).  
In light of this empirical shift, and also in the face of an increasingly uncertain and 
volatile environment, social scientists are reconsidering long-standing questions 
around humans and the environment. Central to these investigations is an effort to 
question deeply ingrained assumptions to do with how we understand and value life 
as a process that may constitute human, nonhuman, organic and inorganic bodies 
(Coole & Frost 2010). In this understanding, the type of body (human, nonhuman, and 
so on) is not necessarily the most salient detail to attend to in thinking about material 
relations in the world. Rather, the ontological turn foregrounds thinking about what 
transformations those (relational) bodies are capable of effecting (Clough 2008; Clough 
2007). Recognising the capacities of all kinds of materialities in the world to effect 
change (that may or may not be harmful to humans), necessitates a ‘flattening’ of 
hierarchical understandings of humans as sovereign over nature.  
It is this notion of ‘flat ontologies’ (DeLanda 2002) that I have found very seductive and 
productive in thinking through national parks. Nonrepresentational theory, at its core, 
is about problematising common scholarly habits, beautifully summarised by 
Dewsbury as the “‘know-and-tell’ politics of much sociological methodology” 
(Dewsbury 2010, p.321). This principle underpins my entire approach to re-posing the 
‘problem(s)’ of national parks, and is dealt with in detail in ‘Producing the thesis’.  
The key theories I draw on in this thesis are affect theory (Massumi 2002; Clough & 
Halley 2007), Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari 1987), 
and ‘new materialism’ (Coole 2005; Coole & Frost 2010; Bennett 2010). These are all 
‘nonrepresentational’ theories in that they take materialities and affective forces as 
significant drivers in the constitution and transformation of the world as well as the 
representation and communication of those forces (Thrift 2008). Drawing together 
these three theories creates a conceptual framework that facilitates a move away from 
the dominant debates around national parks that I have outlined in ‘National parks in 
Australia’ and ‘Social science and the environment’.   
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Affect theory 
One of the significant moves away from Cartesian humanist paradigms of social theory 
has been the development of theories of embodiment that posit the body as a 
fundamental part of navigating and experiencing the world. Notions of corporeality 
and embodied experience have gathered significant momentum in the social sciences, 
thanks largely to theorists who have sought to redress Cartesian privilege when 
theorising the human subject. Phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty, for example, theorised 
the body as a central part of subjectivity (Merleau-Ponty 1962), and his thought laid the 
foundations for more contemporary theorists. Butler’s work on sex, gender, and bodies 
has explored the limitations of traditional, constructionist views of the body, and 
underpins much work that rethinks what bodies mean, and indeed, what bodies can 
do (Butler 1993). Haraway’s seminal work has emphasised that the human body is not 
a bounded, discrete entity, but rather, is always technologically engaged with the 
world (Haraway 1999), and Mol has beautifully illustrated that the body is always 
made in relation to other material and semiotic elements (Mol 2002). 
Scholars such as these are just a selection of those who have contributed to significant 
shifts within the social sciences, particularly in sociology and human geography, that 
try to apprehend the corporealities of lived experience. These shifts have necessarily 
moved away from Cartesian understandings of the body as an inert instrument guided 
by an external, rational mind. Rather, bodies are increasingly understood to be 
dynamic, relational formations, with the capacity to shape and be shaped by other 
bodies and nonhuman objects (Bennett 2010). For an example of the importance of 
affect in debates around the significance of national parks, we can think back to my 
opening vignette of summiting Mount Tennent. In this case, the embodied experiences 
(of heat, sweat, shortness of breath) are brought about through relation to other bodies, 
such as the steepness of the mountain, the heat and light of the sun. The significance of 
this moment is sensed and experienced corporeally through the body as well as 
through associated sentiments, such as pride, happiness, wonder, and so on.  
Theorising the capacities of the body as a knowing, physical entity has invited further 
thought on the constitution of the body through relation with other physical entities – 
both human and nonhuman. Recently, theories of affect have developed 
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understandings of the significance of relational, sensory, bodily encounters. There is no 
single, simple definition of ‘affect’ as it is a slippery, malleable concept (Stewart 2010). 
‘Affect’ in this body of work is not synonymous with ‘emotion’, but rather, following 
Deleuze’s reworking of Spinoza’s ‘conative bodies’ (Deleuze & Parnet 2002; Deleuze 
1988), affect can broadly be considered as the capacity to affect or be affected – 
capacities for activation that are in excess of conscious perception (Massumi	2002). 
Massumi’s theorisation, as Clough has put it, points to the significance of “a pre-
conscious ‘visceral perception’ that is the condition of possibility of conscious 
perception” (Clough 2009, p.48). Massumi suggests that a dogmatic focus on the 
symbolic system of ‘culture’ as the only way of encountering and knowing the world, 
or as the only transformative process, precludes conceptualisations of the potentiality 
of matter – including matter that constitutes the human body. These provocative works 
are part of a direction of social theory that increasingly recognises that “reflective 
thought is just one modality of thinking amongst many others that compose the body” 
(Bissell 2011, p.2649).  
Assemblage/assembling 
A central trope receiving much attention across social scientific pursuits is 
‘assemblage’. Deployed in various ways, there is no single, generalised definition of the 
term, nor can its emergence be pinned to a single theoretical tradition. In their review 
of the diversity in utilisations of ‘assemblage’, Anderson and McFarlane show that 
assemblage is employed in social scientific research both as concept and as a certain 
ethos of engaging with the world (B. Anderson & McFarlane 2011); both of these 
adoptions of assemblage are significant in this thesis. First, assemblage as a concept 
emphasises emergence, multiplicity and indeterminacy – precisely the approach I am 
taking in this investigation. Second, assemblage as ethos, as Anderson and McFarlane 
put it, “suggests a certain ethos of engagement with the world, one that experiments 
with methodological and presentational practices in order to attend to a lively world of 
differences” (B. Anderson & McFarlane 2011, p.126). An ethos of assemblage advocates 
openness and experimentalism in research, a playfulness that informs and shapes this 
investigation.   
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The various ways in which assemblage has been deployed across the social sciences are 
a testament to its flexibility as a concept that allows researchers to draw new 
connections, pose new questions, and notice new formations in the world that might 
have previously been obscured by modes of analysis that focus on formulated 
structures, rather than the process of formation. Indeed, assemblage operates in 
various works as both noun (an assemblage) and verb (the process of assembling). 
These uses result in different emphases in investigations. For example, attention to an 
assemblage, in the tradition of Foucault’s apparatus, might explore how a collection of 
bodies and ideologies governs (Legg 2011). Assemblage as a verb, and its orientation to 
“assembling and disassembling, as relations form, take hold and endure” (B. Anderson 
& McFarlane 2011, p.125), would attend to the emergence, dissolution, durations, and 
indeterminacies of the connections between the elements in the apparatus. Assemblage 
thus arises from the thought of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), and pays serious attention 
to, as Bennett has called it, “the style of structuration” (Bennett 2005, p.445). 
Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage takes seriously the forces of distinct material and 
immaterial elements to converge, coalesce, and form events of various magnitudes. 
Furthermore, assemblage pays attention to the composite force of the assemblage itself, 
not only its singular elements. Bennett explicates these important distinctions in her 
definition of assemblages as “ad hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant 
materials of all sorts” (Bennett 2010, p.23). However, these groupings are not inert or 
powerless; each of these ‘vibrant materials’ hold emergent qualities, assemblages 
themselves have emergent properties “distinct from the sum of the vital force of each 
materiality considered alone” (Bennett 2010, p.24). Assemblage and assembling attend 
to the immanence and emergence of the world. As such, ‘assemblage’ does not refer to 
an assemblage, a fully constituted, bounded gathering, but rather the process of such 
gathering. As Wise has put it, “an assemblage is not a set of predetermined parts… Nor 
is an assemblage a random collection of things” (Wise 2011, p.91). Rather, assemblage 
in the Deleuze-Guattarian sense is a constellation of elements “that have been selected 
from a milieu, organised and stratified” (Anderson & McFarlane 2011, p.125). As a 
theoretical device, then, assemblage frees us to explore elements of phenomena that we 
might not usually notice – the processes of selection, organisation and stratification, as 
well as the dissolution of these qualities.   
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Assemblage is by no means the only theoretical stance that pays attention to such 
indeterminate collectives. The capacity of various elements to effect and affect has been 
explored most notably in sociology by actor-network theory (ANT). ANT deals 
explicitly with the multiple relationships between objects by theorising the agency of 
nonhuman elements, and contends that relations are simultaneously material and 
semiotic (Latour 2005). Assemblage certainly resembles the ‘network’ in ANT. 
However, Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘assemblage’ makes fewer assumptions about power 
relations, form, and durations than ANT. The major difference between these two 
approaches is that ANT still recognises discrete ‘actors’ or ‘actants’ whose power is 
shaped by the ‘network’, while assemblage argues that ‘actors’ themselves are unstable 
entities, only brought into being through relations (B. Anderson & Wylie 2009). 
Furthermore, whilst ANT takes great care to avoid humanist assumptions of agency 
and capacity, assemblage is “more attuned to thinking the unstable and heterogeneous 
structuring of everyday life” (Dewsbury 2011, p.149). As such, assemblage “attends to 
the agency of wholes and parts, not one or the other…thinking with assemblage is also 
in part about the play between stability and change, order and disruption” (McFarlane 
& Anderson 2011, p.162), and it is careful attention to these processual relations of 
constellations that assemblage, perhaps uniquely, brings to contemporary social theory 
and investigation. 
That change and transformative potential is the product of assemblage poses 
significant challenges to core concepts in social and political sciences including will, 
intention, subjectivity and agency – qualities commonly apprehended as exclusively 
human qualities (Coole 2005). Assemblage thinking requires us to rethink these and 
other core concepts, due to the fact that, in discerning transformation, assemblage 
“gives due regard to the fact that change is not just willed by us humans but comes 
about equally through the materialities of the world in which we are just a part” 
(Dewsbury 2011, p.152). Attending to transformation in this way has revealed a need to 
reconceptualise agency as an emergent force of a distribution of various bodies rather 
than located within, and wilfully deployed by, a human subject.  
The move to acknowledge nonhuman agency appears in much contemporary social 
science: in an account of a major blackout (Bennett 2005); in the operations of IKEA 
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(Roberts 2012); in water assemblages in Australia (Gibbs 2013); and in charismatic 
nonhuman species (J. Lorimer 2007). This is a small selection of recent works that 
highlight “the conceptual and empirical inadequacy of human-centred notions of 
agency” and contribute to the project of investigating “some of the practical 
implications, for social scientific inquiry and for politics, of a notion of agency that 
crosses the human-nonhuman divide” (Bennett 2005, p.446). 
This ‘distributive theory’ of agency opens space for new approaches, but also raises 
significant questions about the constitution and role of human agency in events. A 
distributive theory of agency does not refute that human subjects are capable of 
evaluating situations, reflecting, and making judgments and does not reject the 
capacities of human agency. However, it does radically displace the locus of agency, 
casting its net wider than a sovereign human subject in order to discern the 
constitution of effective agency (Bennett 2010). Indeed, in assemblage thinking, agency 
can only ever be an assemblage. For example, my agency in writing this particular 
paragraph does not arise out of my sovereign decision to act, but rather, is the 
culmination and continuation of the coming together of heterogeneous elements that 
may be “human and non-human, organic and inorganic, technical and natural” 
(Anderson & McFarlane 2011, p.124). The coffee coursing through and being absorbed 
into my system, the knitted gloves protecting my hands from the cold August air, the 
complex set of components that constitute my computer, and a vast array of other 
elements – literature read long ago, conversations with friends, ephemeral moments in 
national parks, for example – co-constitute the formulation and presentation of my 
ideas at this moment (not to mention the array of elements yet to come together). This, 
according to Bennett, is the agency of assemblage: “the distinctive efficacy of a working 
whole made up, variously, of somatic, technological, cultural and atmospheric 
elements” (Bennett 2005, p.447).  
In the case of national parks, assemblage can help us apprehend the constitution of the 
territory of the national park, which is far more complex than a barrier or boundary 
around a selected chunk of inert land. Assemblage is a useful concept here, as “the 
time-space in which assemblage is imagined is inherently unstable and infused with 
movement and change” (Marcus & Saka 2006, p.102). I argue that assemblage 
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constitutes national parks, rather than being somehow contained within them. This is 
an important distinction, as it moves away from common understandings of national 
parks as static, bounded, managed spaces that contain ‘nature’ and towards a more 
‘evental’ conceptualisation of place that acknowledges complex spatio-temporal 
relations (Shaw 2012). The aim of the ‘Encounters’ chapter in particular is thus not to 
identify and analyse the constitutive parts of a national park, but rather to explore some 
of the constitutive processes of national parks. This is a crucial distinction, as 
understanding that national parks are always in a process of transformation destabilises 
understandings of national parks as fixed or given entities which are only transformed 
through human interventions.  
Opening national parks up to exploration through assemblage transforms the highly 
politicised problems of conservation discussed in ‘National parks in Australia’. Rather 
than a bounded, defined space where humans manage relatively powerless, inert 
nonhuman species, the national park becomes a site continually constituted and 
transformed by soil, politics, vehicles, language, fauna, climate, infrastructures, 
historical traces and visions of the future. That is to say, material and immaterial 
relations of different consistencies, durations, and capacities constitute national parks. 
Analysis of these spaces through conceptual tropes such as ‘assemblage’ should not 
disregard, and does not refute, the importance of the problems posed and discussed in 
other arenas as drawn out in ‘National parks in Australia’. Rather, evaluating these 
spaces as assemblages urges us to notice new realms of possibility and potential within 
these existing morally charged debates and extends the questions that we can ask of 
national parks.  
New materialism 
One of the most significant, and perhaps most contentious tenets of this thesis is a 
consistent effort to challenge enduring assumptions of human subjectivity and agency. 
The human subject, as theorised by much humanist research, is understood as 
possessing qualities of rationality, logic, will, and intentionality (Buttimer 1990). These, 
and myriad other skills, are often posited as exclusively human abilities, and form the 
foundations for epistemologies which envisage humans and their activity as unique 
from the rest of the natural world (Relph 1981). In humanist paradigms, human 
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subjects are commonly posited as rational actors; sovereign minds, exerting will over 
our bodies and our environments. Such humanism is often criticised in 
nonrepresentational theories, but we should remember that the humanist paradigm 
arose in response to a pervasive scientism within the social sciences, and was an 
important and admirable call to return to questions of the possibilities of human life 
(Relph 1977). 
Keeping this context in mind illuminates why the suggestion that the virtues listed 
above are perhaps not exclusively ‘human’ has been met with considerable backlash 
and confusion in some corners of the social sciences (Vannini 2015). Yet there is a 
significant and growing array of social theorists from diverse disciplinary backgrounds 
dedicated to taking seriously the powers, capacities, and activities of nonhuman 
elements in the transformation of the world. Researchers motivated by this broad 
pursuit walk different theoretical, methodological, and (post)disciplinary paths, and as 
such a single, overarching label for the work they do is awkward. Nevertheless, the 
overlapping themes of ‘new materialism’ (Coole & Frost 2010), ‘nonrepresentational 
theories’ (Thrift 2000) and ‘performative research’ (Dewsbury 2010) that have emerged 
over the past three decades have been the most inspiring and persuasive bodies of 
work for my research. They strive to attend to the problems of materiality, affect, 
corporeality and transformation that are central to my aims in this thesis.  
New materialism offers an opportunity for the widening ‘gap’ between the social and 
physical sciences to come together and theorise life pluralistically, drawing on the 
strengths of physical sciences (to experiment with matter at amazing scales) and the 
strengths of the social sciences, humanities and arts to engage with how we encounter, 
experience, and think life.  
We may be tempted to think that the line between living and nonliving is fairly 
obvious; cows are alive, sand is not. However, the scientific methods employed to 
distinguish between living and nonliving things are significantly more sophisticated 
than Aristotle’s categorisation of living organisms as either plants or animals, and even 
Linnaeus’ bionomial naming system which organises living organisms into their genus 
and species fails to capture the complexity of what, precisely, constitutes life (Fara 
2004). In modern biological understandings, in order to be identified as ‘living’, an 
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organism must fulfil all or most of seven criteria: homeostasis, organisation, 
metabolism, growth, adaptation, response to stimuli, and reproduction (McKay 2004). 
In these biological terms, there are many bodies in the world that meet these criteria, 
but still confound this complicated method of defining life.  
Some are relatively benign forms, such as the stromatolites9 lying in a few select parts 
of the world, straddling the divide between geological and biological formation (Lepot 
et al. 2008). Similarly, material forms such as viruses, which replicate, mutate, and 
transform, have been described, rather precariously, as organisms “at the edge of life” 
(Brussow 2009; Rybicki 1990). Debates around the categorisation of forms such as 
stromatolites and viruses tend to remain the purview of the physical sciences, and the 
controversies do not often find their way into sociological or political discussion. 
However, there are more politically and morally charged forms that do not neatly fit 
into a living/nonliving binary. Perhaps one of the most philosophically challenging of 
these is the stem cell, which is believed to be matter that, although not living, is “able 
to become any of the various kinds of cells or tissues of [a] mature, differentiated 
organism” but is not “able by itself to give rise to a fully differentiated organism” 
(Bennett, 2010, p. 85). Whilst this is not the place for in-depth discussion of stem cell 
science, it is crucial to understand that despite their complexities, stem cells are 
contentious in politics as they are bits of matter with the potential for life (Bennett, 
2010). 
Indeed, some of the most heated political debates are bundled by their connection to 
life. Following Foucault in particular, biopolitics has become a key theme of social 
scientific debate. These debates centre around arenas such as stem cell research, 
abortion, war, death penalties, and euthanasia and all revolve around human life. But 
‘life’ is by no means a uniform term. Even my humble desktop dictionary tells me that 
‘life’ can refer to the condition of living, the period of time between birth and death, or, 
in the context of these impassioned political debates, life can be the properties of an 
individual human (although a materialist might contest this assertion). These 
                                                      
9 Stromatolites are structures formed in shallow water by trapped and cemented 
microbiological sediments. They are thus not clearly either biological or geological material, and 
have been perennially difficult for scientists to define (Riding 1999). 
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differential qualities have spurred philosophers throughout history to explore exactly 
what constitutes life.  
Mechanistic materialism contends that matter is reducible to its composite parts – that 
any capacities, including life, are “ultimately or in principle explicable in mechanical 
or… “physico-chemical” terms” (Bennett, 2010, p. 64). Kant in particular was 
unsatisfied by such mechanical explanations, and insisted “on an unbridgeable chasm 
between life and “crude matter”” (Bennett, 2010, p. 65). Following Kant, Bergson 
criticised the notion that life was a divine ensoulment of particular living organisms 
(i.e. humans), and developed his own conceptions of an unquantifiable, immaterial 
impetus of ‘vitalism’. Deleuze draws heavily on Bergson’s ideas, in particular, of life as 
an impersonal, unquantifiable force, rather than an attribute of the body. However, 
Bergson did not make any significant movements towards an idea that nonliving 
matter might also possess such a vital drive (Bennett, 2010). 
Whether they ascribe to a vitalist tradition or not, new materialists call for an updated 
mode of social enquiry that acknowledges the potentiality of matter; a liveliness which 
is not only defined by biological definitions of organic ‘life’, but in terms of the 
capacities, forces, and trajectories of matter. New materialists do not all follow in 
vitalist footsteps, but Bennett explicates the point that once the “restless activeness” of 
matter is taken seriously, the jump from a vitalist to a vital materialist perspective 
which sees matter as possessing an immanent generativity is not so very far (Bennett, 
2010, p. 54). Such a vital materialism moves beyond a dialectical materialism which 
characterises materialism as mechanistic, and idealism as metaphysical, and 
reductively analyses nonhuman objects according to their utility in human life (Cheah 
2010). Vital materialism therefore has significant implications for how we think about 
the conventional dichotomy between idealism and materialism in philosophical 
traditions. 
Regardless of their stance on vitalism, new materialists are united in their view that in 
flat ontologies that consider the forces of all matter, the type of ‘life’ expressed by a 
particular body is not the most salient detail in distinguishing materialities and their 
powers. In conceptualising bodies as assemblages formed by motley confederations of 
assorted material forms, new materialism problematises the pervasive binary between 
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living and nonliving things. New materialists therefore eschew divisions between 
living and nonliving matter at the ontological level (Bennett, 2010).  
The new materialist paradigm is part of a significant shift across the social sciences, 
from epistemological questions to problems of ontology (Adkins & Lury 2009) through 
“a rethinking of bodies, matter, and life through new encounters with visceral 
perception and pre-conscious affect” (Clough 2009, p.44). Moving away from 
constructionist theories of ‘the social’ as the construction and interpretation of meaning 
(Nikander 2008), materialist theorisations commonly invoke parts of lived experience 
characterised by immediacy, immanence, and contiguity. In light of this lean towards 
emergent ‘newness’, it is unsurprising that new materialist work is largely directed 
towards decidedly contemporary themes such as climate change (Coole & Frost 2010), 
modern mobilities (Sheller 2007), mass consumption (Roberts 2012), modern medicine 
(Bennett 2010) and technological developments (Clough 2008).  
New materialism is a radical, and for some, uncomfortable turn in social theory. Where 
classical sociology in the traditions of Marx, Weber or Durkheim questions ‘how 
society is possible?’ (Lash 2009), new materialism poses the question: what, precisely, is 
‘the social’? As Law has argued, this is far from an abstract or unimportant problem; 
this is a profound methodological question across the social sciences (J. Law 2004). The 
answers new materialists are developing revolve primarily around the radical 
expansion of ‘the social’ to include nonhumans, and the implications for how we 
encounter and inhabit this newly co-ordinated, more-than-human world can sit 
uncomfortably with more traditional humanist paradigms (Whatmore 2006)10.  
This ‘newly co-ordinated’ world has significant impacts for how we might understand 
the constitution and ‘sustainability’ of national parks, particularly as new materialism 
rejects the notion that matter – any kind of matter – is inert. Thus, a central part of the 
new materialist project is to develop sensitivity to the trajectories and 
interconnectedness of material transformations, including the injury they may cause 
us. As Bennett has put it, we should “tread lightly upon the earth, both because things 
                                                      
10 Scholars such as Barnett (2011) and Leys (2011) are concerned that this style of theorising the 
social closes down the problem of normativity in social science. However, given the 
preoccupation of much social science with normative analyses, I would respond that there is 
ample space for alternate styles of theorising the world. 
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are alive and have value as such and because we should be cautious around things that 
have the power to do us harm” (Bennett, 2010, pp. 365-366). This cautionary message 
from Bennett immediately invokes issues of sustainability, which is normally discussed 
in terms of human systems of governance implementing (or not implementing, as the 
case may be) policies in the name of environmental sustainability (Pellizzoni 2004). In 
social and political discourse, we generally imagine a figure of powerful human agents 
looking after an increasingly needy environment; this is particularly apparent in 
debates around national parks, which, as I outlined in ‘National parks in Australia’, are 
considered rather frail entities, always in need of human intervention and protection.  
Paradoxically, ‘environmental sustainability’ is characterised by human actions. In the 
case of national parks we can think of various environmental management measures 
such as minimising litter, using demarcated walking tracks, or refraining from using 
motorised vehicles in ‘vulnerable’ habitats. And more broadly, we can think of the 
ways that practices such as cycling, turning off lights, recycling, shorter showers, or 
vegetarianism have been encoded as everyday human practices that characterise the 
sustainability of the material environment (Doel 2009).  
This anthropocentric view of sustainability is radically transformed within a new 
materialist paradigm. Bennett, for example, argues that one of the most significant 
contributions new materialism can make to contemporary politics is precisely through 
paying attention to the capacities of nonhuman bodies to effect transformation, thereby 
thinking the environment anew as more than a passive, inert field, populated and 
regulated by human activity, a “recalcitrant context for human action” (Bennett, 2010, 
p. 111). New materialists emphasise the self-transformative, generative capacities of the 
environment, capacities that significantly reconfigure how we might think about 
‘sustainability’. Sustainability is often imagined as a kind of human stewardship of the 
world, whereby the environment is managed and maintained by human ecological 
practices (Attiwill 2008). Along with Bennett, I wonder whether such humanist 
environmentalism is really the most persuasive argument against irresponsible and 
unsustainable practices. Given our increasing awareness of the delicacy and volatility 
of environmental assemblages, a more sensible rubric seems to be something akin to a 
new materialist paradigm.  
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Coole and Frost share similar sentiments, and their turn to materialism was spurred by 
the urgency of global concerns about climate change, finite resources, overpopulation, 
and various other material environmental issues (2010). Bennett suggests three 
injunctions in foregrounding the material in environmental politics: emphasising 
humans themselves as material configurations; inflecting a vitalism of matter in order 
to treat all materialities in the same regard as living things with different capacities for 
transformation; and understanding our own flesh as a confederate array of bodies. 
Bennett wonders, “if we were more attentive to the indispensable foreignness that we 
are, would we continue to produce and consume in the same violently reckless ways?” 
(Bennett, 2010, p. 113). While I hope for the same answer as Bennett, these suggestions 
fall back on human actions, and thus risk continuing humanist paradigms that new 
materialism aims to redress. 
Further attention to Merleau-Ponty’s notions of accompaniment of capable ‘other’ 
materialities may be one helpful line of thought here (Merleau-Ponty 1962) in that it 
develops an appreciation for the capacities of matter; paying attention to possible 
material trajectories urges an ethic open to the limits of the human while respecting the 
multiple forces of the material world. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s thought, Diprose 
has argued that “levelling out human agency as equivalent to that of many other 
multifarious elements in an assemblage…risks shifting responsibility away from 
humans” (Diprose 2011, p.67). Here, Diprose articulates a valid critique of new 
materialism; it reduces the significance of the human ‘doer’ in events, which may 
encourage a rather laissez-faire view of a human moral economy. This perspective 
reduces the incentive for responsible and sustainable conduct, and figures humans as 
powerless or apathetic inhabitants of an inflexible world. However, in light of new 
materialism as an expansion of the remit of social life to include matter, a workable 
response is that in a new materialist paradigm, moral and ethical engagement with the 
world becomes more pertinent, and far more complex. The complexity lies in the 
challenge to imagine a paradigm in which humans are more sensitive, and more open 
to the forces and trajectories of matter without resorting to humanist paradigms that 
render nonhuman materialities as passive and inert (Coole & Frost, 2010).  
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For in an assemblage of human and nonhuman elements, actions and decisions we 
usually associate with sovereign human agency are, in fact, never wholly our own, but 
the coming together of various elements. In this circumstance, the concept of 
‘responsibility’, which is so often associated with rational human agents, requires 
serious revaluation, particularly with regards to my implication that nonhuman actants 
are capable of responsibility (or, perhaps, literally response-ability?). This does not, 
however, render human agency entirely redundant or incapable.  
Bodies of theory that are generally considered to be part of the ‘ontological turn’ do not 
aim to offer us neat, bounded solutions to neat, bounded problems. Rather, they try to 
celebrate, rather than reduce or control, the complexity of life (J. Law 2004). 
Nonetheless, they pose significant challenges for social scientists both in terms of 
theorising and retheorising problems in new and creative ways, and they also require 
radical reconsideration of many scholarly habits to do with research methods. How can 
we attend to such slippery parts of life that elude concrete definitions?  The next 
chapter, ‘Producing the thesis’ is a reflection on the pleasures and pains of 
encountering the world as a nonrepresentational researcher, both in terms of how to 
perform research methods and put data to good use, but also the difficulties of the 
significant personal transformations that I have experienced by attending to the world 
and my research topic through performative, experimental research practices.  
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3. Producing the thesis 
As I noted in ‘Introducing the thesis’, one of the important contributions this thesis 
makes is its attention to methodological issues in nonrepresentational research. This 
chapter, therefore, is a slightly unconventional methodology chapter, which considers 
carefully the importance of the methodological elements of research practice. The 
empirical elements of this thesis included four expert interviews (including one 
interview with two people), several days of overt participant observation (Cho & Trent 
2009) with an ecologist and nature reserve volunteers, and approximately 40 trips to 
each of the three field sites, ranging from several hours to several days in duration, and 
documented through photography, field diary notes, and other autoethnographic 
materials (Spry 2001). This chapter discusses the importance of those, and other 
research activities that produced this thesis. First, I introduce and explore the empirical 
sites which have inspired the core arguments of the thesis. Second, I articulate how the 
thesis is situated in social science in terms of the key debates the thesis contributes to. 
Third, I return to the notion of ‘experimental research’ I gestured to in ‘Introducing the 
thesis’, and argue for the importance of experimentalism in research. Fourth, I outline 
the significance of interviewing as an affective and performative research practice. 
Finally, I point to the affective capacities of reading literature and the challenges and 
intensities of writing practices as important methodological elements of the thesis. 
3.1 Empirical sites 
Namadgi National Park, Tidbinbilla Nature Reserve, and Mulligans Flat Woodlands 
Sanctuary are all protected areas in the ACT. They are significant to me for different 
reasons. Namadgi has become a significant place for me in my adulthood, as my 
partner and I regularly head there for a day of bushwalking or trail running. 
Tidbinbilla was a favourite spot for family picnics and walks when I was a young 
child. Mulligans Flat has become significant to me more recently in the process of 
undertaking this thesis. Best described as a very large and very beautiful outdoor 
laboratory, Mulligans houses smaller fenced ‘paddocks’, each with different 
configurations of plants, animals, deadwood, rocks, waterholes, and soils. As I noted in 
‘Introducing the thesis’, I see my personal imbrication with these field sites as an 
essential part of my methodology.  
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Beyond my personal sentiments and connections to these places, though, they each 
emerged as important sites through which to explore the core themes of this thesis. I 
say that they ‘emerged’ in order to emphasise that we should resist thinking of 
‘Namadgi’, ‘Tidbinbilla’, or ‘Mulligans Flat’ as given, bounded spaces that I simply 
‘chose’ to be fieldwork ‘sites’. It is crucial that we remember that in this thesis, places 
are understood as constituted through practices11 (Cresswell 2004). That is to say, these 
places are, for the purposes of this thesis, effects of practices of naming, mapping, 
bordering, and so on; they are also effects of enacting them as ‘empirical sites’ for this 
thesis. It is also important to note here that while throughout the thesis I connect these 
empirical sites to broader debates around protected areas as a national level, that I do 
not intend for these sites to become representative of protected areas in Australia more 
generally. Had I selected different protected areas then this thesis would have taken a 
very different shape and line of analysis, so while I play with general concerns around 
Australia’s protected areas, I also aim to maintain the integrity of these three empirical 
sites, while not discrete, as special and unique nonetheless.  
This is a very different way of conceptualising empirical sites than we might be used to 
in qualitative research design and requires some unpacking.  
A more common understanding of ‘fieldwork sites’ might involve a methodical order 
of deciding upon and finding phenomena to be researched. Indeed, Devons and 
Gluckman have suggested five ways of demarcating a site for fieldwork, the first of 
which involves delimiting a certain place and time in order to circumscribe the 
already-defined research topic. As they have put it:  
When an anthropologist [or sociologist] circumscribes his field, he cuts off a 
manageable field of reality from the total flow of events, by putting boundaries round it 
both in terms of what is relevant to his problems, and in terms of how and where he 
can apply his techniques of observation and analysis (Devons & Gluckman 1994, p.28) 
 
Aside from my obvious problem of not being a ‘he’, Devons’ and Gluckman’s advice 
does not bode well for me and this research project, as they assume a research problem 
conceived a priori, theorised before any empirical encounters. This deductive approach 
requires a researcher to “[deduce] a hypothesis (or hypotheses) that must then be 
subjected to empirical scrutiny” (Bryman 2012, p.24).  
                                                      
11 This argument is elaborated throughout the following chapter, ‘Encounters’ 
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As should be apparent throughout, this is not the approach I have taken in this thesis. 
Here, I employ a more inductive empirical approach, which calls for researchers to 
“begin from sense-impressions. Then you reason synthetically and make judgements” 
(Lash 2009, p.176). This a posteriori empiricism is an iterative process, weaving between 
empirical data and theory. This approach celebrates the insecurity and instability of the 
empirical world, and attempts to describe the uncertainties of research rather than 
reduce or hide them (J. Law 2004). This can feel like a freefall, and on several occasions 
during this project I have looked longingly at positivist handholds (such as 
‘objectivity’) in order to steady myself and clarify my research. Because, as Dewsbury 
has noted, “[any] methodology is troubled by the imperative to capture and then 
evidence the empirical sites of research” (2010, p.330).  
This ‘know and tell’ imperative of empirical research is problematic for 
nonrepresentational methodologies, which aim to acknowledge and celebrate affective, 
uncertain registers of the world that always exceed understanding, that always exceed 
‘knowing’. As Bissell has put it: “There is so much going on…that cannot be squeezed 
into knowable or representational form” (Bissell 2010a, p.81). What this translates into 
in the context of this thesis is that the innumerable forces and trajectories that rendered 
Namadgi, Tidbinbilla, and Mulligans into ‘empirical sites’ will always exceed what I 
can represent here. Any methodological story I tell will be partial, incomplete, and 
contingent. Despite these complexities, the empirical sites of Namadgi, Tidbinbilla, and 
Mulligans have been essential in the formation of this thesis, and as such, I want to 
outline how I understand the story of their part in this thesis.  
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If I were to name a ‘starting point’ for the role of Namadgi, Tidbinbilla, and Mulligans 
in this thesis, then it is certainly my personal connection to Namadgi. Prior to deciding 
to focus on national parks for my doctoral research, I spent many hours of my life 
exploring Namadgi with friends, family, and my partner. Through repeatedly visiting 
Namadgi, it has become a place I associate with happiness and peace. So, when it came 
to discussing fieldwork options for this research, I felt I would be happy to spend 
several years thinking about and regularly visiting Namadgi, and I am lucky to have 
had a supervisor who recognised and encouraged these joyful passions as a research 
direction. 
After a few tentative trips to Namadgi (some with friends, some alone), combined with 
focusing on a healthy diet of nonrepresentational theories and environmental 
sociological literature12, I began to think about some more defined questions around a 
problematic tendency to associate ‘nature’ with the absence of humans (Dunlap 2002). 
Deliberately taking trips to Namadgi also raised questions to do with the importance of 
mobility and movement in the constitution of place13. As Clifford has argued, 
“location… is an itinerary rather than a bounded site – a series of encounters and 
translations” (Clifford 1997, p.11). 
                                                      
12 Both of which I overviewed in ‘Contexts’. 
13 To which I attend in ‘Place, practise, mobilities’. 
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Friends who had accompanied me to Namadgi suggested we take a trip to Tidbinbilla, 
and we ended up walking around the Tidbinbilla Sanctuary14, a large enclosure of 
mainly birdlife, with educational signs about Tidbinbilla’s breeding programs. It was 
here that one friend, an ecologist himself, told me of some of the darker sides to 
breeding programs15, bringing blurry thoughts of animal ethics to my mind.  
Not long after this trip, I organised with a volunteer organisation associated with 
Tidbinbilla to spend a day with their volunteers, talking to them about their 
motivations and experiences as they went about counting species and providing 
information to members of the public who visited the Sanctuary. I spent the day with 
two long-term volunteers, an event that does not feature in the thesis at all. I fell into 
some uncomfortable conversations with the volunteers about some of the problematic 
aspects of conservation programs that I explore throughout this thesis, and some form 
of that discomfort persisted any time I attempted to include that particular event in the 
analytical chapters of this thesis16.  
                                                      
14 Not to be confused with the Mulligans Flat Sanctuary.  
15 Such as the killing of some native species in order to improve breeding numbers for 
endangered species. These are discussed further in ‘Beyond scientific evaluation’. 
16 This was not an attempt to ‘edit out’ this event. Rather, this was a conscious decision not to 
pursue this line of fieldwork in order to emphasise more joyful empirical moments in line with 
my research ethos of affirmation. 
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This trip to Tidbinbilla also led me to ask my ecologist friend if I could interview him 
about his experiences of his work at Mulligans, to which he generously agreed, inviting 
me along for an afternoon of work with him17.  
These are the early, tenuous connections between Namadgi National Park, Tidbinbilla 
Nature Reserve, and Mulligans Flat Woodland Sanctuary. 
 Each of these places has lent itself to different types of questions that arise throughout 
the thesis. Thus the ‘use’ of three empirical sites is not intended as an exercise in 
revealing, comparing, or contrasting them. Rather, this thesis is a way of enacting these 
sites in a new way, forming new connections through the performance of research.  
The key methodological point here is precisely what is involved in this process of 
enactment. Certainly, I decided to explore these places further, largely based on the 
imbrications and connections I outlined above. But the question of precisely how these 
places come into being as sites for ‘fieldwork’ is far more complex than a few simple 
decisions on my part. Precisely how Namadgi, Tidbinbilla, and Mulligans emerged as 
important empirical sites during the formalised period of this research project will 
always elude me. But my experience of conducting this research has been a formative 
experience, where ‘experience’ can be understood as “a kind of distributed, immanent 
field of sensible processuality within which creative variations give rise to 
modifications and movements of thinking” (McCormack 2010, p.202). Repeatedly 
visiting each of these places with ‘fieldwork’ or ‘research’ in mind, or conducting 
interviews18 within, or about these places was not a matter of travelling to and from, or 
talking about already-given ‘sites’. Rather, these comings and goings, conversations 
and repetitions cemented these places as empirical sites (or, “creative variations”) as 
much as any formal methodological decisions I have made (or my “movements of 
thinking”).  
This thesis does not aim to quantify the significance of national parks to proportions of 
different people in different ways – these are answers to different questions than I ask 
here. I am more interested in questions to do with the kinds of transformations that are 
afforded through encountering these places in a variety of ways. That is, I am 
                                                      
17 This afternoon features in ‘Fencing’, in the upcoming ‘Encounters’ chapter. 
18 Which I elaborate upon shortly, in ‘Interviewing’. 
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interested in the capacity of national parks to produce such “creative variations”. These 
variations may be transformations of ideology – such as views, attitudes and opinions 
about native and invasive species, for example, but I am also interested in bodily 
transformations and moments of intensity such as the opening vignette of summiting 
Mount Tennent in ‘Introducing the thesis’. That particular story is meaningful to me as 
it is a retelling of part of my own struggle to regain fitness and strength after a long 
recovery from a back injury and subsequent weakness and inactivity. For me, the 
intensity of summiting the mountain was a constellation of physical tiredness and 
emotional elation, as well as complex memories of pain and frustration at my own 
body’s vulnerability to damage. 
Although I aim to decentre ‘the human’ in this thesis, moments such as these, powerful 
moments that enrol bodies (human bodies, animal bodies, landscape bodies) as sites of 
transformation, reach into the past (memories of pain), and endure into the future 
(through a retelling in a thesis, and the creation of new memories and new 
connections). As such, the empirical work I have undertaken for this thesis – 
interviews, participant observations, and authoethnographic accounts – are all 
underpinned by this core theme of transformation, and are all (including myself) 
understood as fieldwork ‘sites’ in much the same way as Namadgi, Tidbinbilla, and 
Mulligans are sites.  
This understanding has significant implications for how empirical data has been 
collected, interpreted, and presented. For example, I have deliberately kept the number 
of interview participants very low (five people, with two in a joint interview), as 
participants are not intended as ‘representatives’ of national park users. This 
representational understanding of interview participants assumes the importance of 
their ‘molar’ lines of identity, along axes of difference such as age, gender, profession, 
and so on. As Bissell (2014) has pointed out, we can attend in different ways to more 
‘molecular’ lines that constitute individuals (Deleuze & Guattari 1987), and these 
molecular, or ‘supple’ lines, concern “the differences that do not coincide with rigid 
segments of the lines that are ‘more visible’” (Bissell 2014a, p.193).  
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Rather, my unstructured interview with each participant19 is important as both a 
recollection of their own individual experiences of national parks and the interviews 
themselves create new encounters with national parks, albeit an encounter occurring 
‘outside’ the spatial dimensions of what we might usually think of as a specific 
fieldwork ‘site’. In other words, interviews, like visits to empirical sites, are understood 
as experiences and, as McCormack has put it, “experience is of this world: it is not a 
secondary reflection of the world apprehended from a distance” (McCormack 2010, 
p.203).  
Understanding participants and interview encounters as ‘sites’ means that it makes no 
more sense to interview 50 or 60 people than it does to conduct fieldwork in 50 or 60 
national parks; my interest is in the difference of experience, and the ways those 
experiences can help us to evaluate change in ourselves and the world. I have tried to 
notice smaller, subtle differences in myself or participants in the course of carrying out 
this style of research, rather than trying to find sameness and patterns across 
interviews, participant observations, or autoethnographic reflections. To butcher a 
phrase from the greatest of social commentators, Dr Seuss: ‘A change is a change, no 
matter how small’. 
Interviewing 
The interview quotes and reflections I have chosen to retain in the thesis are not 
necessarily included for their evidentiary qualities or because they bolster my 
arguments (Bissell 2014a). On the contrary, these reflections are included because, in 
concert with my longstanding interest in nonrepresentational theories, they formed my 
arguments (Nash 2000). This may be because they were particularly noteworthy at the 
time, or because they have stuck with me, popping into my mind seemingly randomly, 
or jumping off the page of transcriptions during the writing process. These sections 
changed relations throughout the entire process of this PhD, making me think 
differently about my own past encounters, and making me ‘notice things differently’ 
(Coleman & Ringrose 2013) in various parts of my life.  
                                                      
19 Really, they have been much more active in the production of this thesis than the term 
‘participant’ implies. I prefer to think of them as quiet collaborators. 
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The importance and power of refrained empirical data is present throughout the thesis, 
as I return to the same empirical sites multiple times. Attending closely to a select few 
empirical moments is a deliberate methodological decision in order to emphasise the 
powers and capacities of seemingly meaningless or ephemeral events to coalesce, 
sometimes in unknown or unexpected ways, continuously creating parts of the world 
anew.  
The term ‘interview’ implies a process of tapping a participant for information, paying 
little attention to other elements of communication outside of words uttered. Much 
attention has been paid to the common methodological technique of recording an 
interview, transcribing the words, and re-presenting them as enfolded text within a 
research publication or thesis (Holstein & Gubrium 2003). Theorists have attempted to 
capture the elements of interaction that are lost in such a process – the changes in 
voice, tone, body language, atmosphere, and so on – that are difficult to capture 
through text (J. Anderson et al. 2010). Others have attended to the interview as an 
emotional process, emotion that is often cleansed in the presentation of interview ‘data’ 
(Ezzy 2010). Others still have discussed the problematic situation where a researcher 
and participant simply do not like each other, and Kong et al. (2003) discuss the ethical 
and methodological implications of sexual attraction in the interview encounter.  
Although much of this work laments what is lost in the process of recording and 
transcribing, we should also attend to the productive capacities of this technique. 
Transcribing does tend to deaden atmosphere, laughter, mistakes, or awkwardness 
that occur during research interviews – but other possibilities are afforded. In this 
thesis, I have tried to control the pace of reflection on interview encounters by 
interspersing interview text with my own words, or returning to the same part of an 
interview. Following many contemporary qualitative researchers (Ellis & Berger 2003; 
Gubrium & Holstein 2003; Anderson et al. 2010), I blur the boundaries between 
authoethnography and interview by reflecting on my own experience of the intensities, 
anxieties, and complexities of interviewing. 
The interviewing process was equally fraught and enjoyable for me. I relished the 
opportunity to listen to people talk about what they loved about national parks, or 
how they encountered them. However, each interview I conducted was certainly 
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coloured by a deep sense that I was out of my depth. This, I have later discovered, is a 
common symptom of conducting nonrepresentational research (Vannini 2015). In 
contrast to my participants, who were all incredibly knowledgeable and generous, I felt 
extremely uncertain about my approach to this research project, how their interview 
contributions would ‘fit in’ to the thesis. I felt overwhelmingly guilty at some points 
where a participant would offer an opinion that I knew I would end up problematising 
in my thesis, and I experienced significant anxiety when thinking through problems of 
how to respect participants’ time, expertise, and generosity whilst also critiquing some 
of the assumptions that underpins such expertise20.  
‘Auto’ethnography 
As is already apparent, my own reflections on walking, reading, and interviewing for 
this thesis form a significant proportion of the empirical work here. Although this 
technique is well-documented under the umbrella term of ‘autoethnography’ 
(Ellingson & Ellis 2008; Spry 2001; Ellis & Berger 2003), I problematise how we 
understand the ‘auto’, in that many of these reflections have been prompted by 
noticing repetitions or intensities that have occurred nonconsciously (remembering 
certain quotes without trying to, or particular words jumping off the page). Crucially, 
we should not forget that I (the ‘auto’) has been significantly transformed over the 
process of research – by paying sustained attention to particular happenings in the 
world. Thus, mine is a shifting subjectivity and the ‘auto’ has not endured unchanged 
throughout the research. This, of course, indicates that the ‘auto’ in any 
autoethnographic research is not a fixed, bounded or immutable ‘auto’.  
Gannon points to this poststructuralist problematisation of autoethnography, arguing 
that “although autoethnographic research seems to presume that the subjects can speak 
(for) themselves, poststructural theories disrupt this presumption and stress the 
(impossibilities) of writing the self from a fractured and fragmented subject position” 
(Gannon 2006, p.475). We therefore need to remember that the ‘auto’ethnographic 
work I present here rests upon an understanding of ‘auto’ as constantly composed 
differently, as constantly happening. In my case, such shifting composition has affected 
                                                      
20 This is a particularly fraught issue given the emphasis placed on ‘harm minimisation’ in 
research ethics processes. 
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my perception of particular moments, my ability to produce work at different times (or 
not be able to for sustained periods of time), and indeed, countless other abilities that I 
will never be consciously aware of. This is in line with a reconceptualisation of ‘the 
human’ as an assemblage, that I first raised in ‘Nonrepresentational theories and the 
ontological turn’, and is drawn out most explicitly in ‘Nonrepresentational theory, the 
environment, and me’ in the ‘Politics’ chapter. 
The complexity and dynamism of subjectivity is rarely addressed in autoethnographic 
scholarship (although Gannon’s work noted above is an important exception), but 
there have been numerous moments throughout the empirical work for this research 
project where the ‘shift’ has itself been a significant transformation. Perhaps the most 
pertinent example in this thesis occurs in ‘Discoursing’ in the ‘Practices’ chapter, in 
which I reflect on my experience of the 2014 World Parks Congress in Sydney. 
Although I paid attention to the behaviours and interactions of other conference-goers, 
I reflect more closely on the transformations that took place within my own disposition 
as a result of many elements – only a few of which could honestly be called conscious 
decisions.  
A key methodological distinction of this thesis is that while what we may think of as 
‘traditional’ autoethnography pays more attention to consciously registered emotions 
of researchers, and how those emotions shape research direction (Jones 2005; McMillan 
& Price 2010), I have tried also to attend to pre-cognitive affects (as discussed in 
‘Nonrepresentational theories and the ontological turn’) and forces, those 
“imperceptible, sometimes minor…differences that script the world in academically 
less familiar but in no less real ways” (Dewsbury 2003, p.1907), such as sensations, 
repetitions, passions, and refrains of thought. Although foregrounding these rhythmic 
forces may seem a little abstract, I reflect on the power of these forces throughout the 
thesis in relation to different empirical moments.  
3.2 Situating the thesis in social science 
Situating this thesis within the looping and overlapping development of theoretical 
and methodological traditions within social science is, of course, essential to clarifying 
the aims and methods of my thesis. However, before I move into a review of these 
literatures, I think it is also important to acknowledge that the theoretical and 
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methodological techniques I develop in this thesis are decisions based on my interests, 
my ethics, and my experiences. I do not want to present this section as a recollection of 
an objective, impartial, smooth or unproblematic research process that always made 
sense or that I have always been confident of. This is far from my experience of the 
research process, and I have made every attempt to provide a faithful account of how 
this particular research project has emerged.  
I got my first taste of nonrepresentational, materialist approaches to social science in 
2009 in an undergraduate qualitative research methods course. When the notion of 
‘nonhuman agency’ was first presented in the course, I reacted swiftly and strongly. I 
remember being completely closed to the idea, until a few persuasive empirical 
examples were given such as a train crash resulting from a combination of sunlight and 
a faulty sign (J. Law & Mol 2002). Slowly, slowly I began trying to think about events 
without automatically attributing responsibility or blame to human agents. These 
events were often ‘tragedies’ or ‘accidents’, such as earthquakes or plane crashes, and 
most memorably, the collapse of a wall on Swanston Street in Melbourne that sadly 
killed three people in 2013.  
But I was also thinking about how Australian history is positioned in terms of 
competing and overlapping human agencies, and gave a departmental seminar in 2012 
on rethinking the colonisation of Australia as an assemblage of human, animal, and 
landscape bodies. Although I am lucky enough to be in a very supportive department, 
I received some harsh criticism. This was partly due to some members of the audience 
being closed to these ideas (as I had been only a few years before), and partly because I 
failed to articulate precisely how this materialist approach contributes to sociology 
specifically, and the social sciences more broadly.  
This particular experience has helped me understand what it is about 
nonrepresentational, materialist social science that irks so many social scientists. Of 
course, nonrepresentational, materialist research challenged core sociological concepts 
such as human subjects or agents, and disrupts long-held dichotomous thinking to do 
with the relationship between (exclusively human) social agents and social structures. 
Even more conciliatory approaches such as Giddens’ structuration theory – although it 
combines structure and agency – retains this divide as a core analytical structure 
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(Giddens 1986). However, sociology has long touted itself as the discipline which 
questions the taken-for-granted, so rethinking these core concepts should, ideally, not 
cause us too much discomfort. However, despite its popularity and influence in some 
social science, nonrepresentational theory remains, as Vannini has put it, “controversial 
and often poorly understood” (Vannini 2015, p.2).  
In addition to challenging more mainstream social science, there is also a semantic 
problem of the ‘non’ to be addressed. Although Thrift explicitly states that 
‘nonrepresentational’ need not be anti representation (Thrift 2004), the ‘non’ indicates a 
dismissal, at some level, of representational research. Lorimer has expressed similar 
sentiments, arguing that ‘more-than-representational’ might be a less antagonistic way 
to think about nonrepresentational work, as the primary focus of nonrepresentational 
research is to apprehend experiences and encounters in and of themselves, rather than 
always conscripted by processes of conscious interpretation and reaction to codified 
symbols (H. Lorimer 2005). We could also perhaps think of transrepresentational, or 
postrepresentational, or any other prefix which softens the divide whilst still signalling 
a very different approach to social science. We could also employ the discourse of 
affect, neomaterialism, or the ontological turn. In this thesis, I have stuck to 
‘nonrepresentational’ in keeping with the dominant terminology in geographical 
thought, from which I draw heavily, not as a thumbing of the nose at production of 
representational social science – as Dewsbury has put it: “The representational is not 
the enemy” (Dewsbury 2010, p.322).  
Positivism and objectivity 
The twists and turns of social scientific methodologies seem, to me, to pivot upon how 
we as researchers understand ourselves, and the role we have in producing 
knowledge. Positivist sociology understands researchers as impartial and removed 
experts, encouraging a sense of sociology as though it is a science like any other: social 
phenomena are observed by an external, objective expert, experiments are performed 
to prove or disprove hypotheses, and the establishment of ‘social facts’ is a central goal 
of classical sociologists (Crotty 1998). These measures arose out of the afterglow of the 
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Enlightenment, whose spirit valued rationality and reason, exemplified in the scientific 
method21 (Scharff 2002). 
It is very tempting to position positivist or classical sociologists as outdated or 
misguided in their modes of enquiry. Personally, I take issue with the notion of a 
separate, discrete, and impartial expert who, through scientific methods of observation 
and testing, can reveal social facts. I certainly align myself more with feminist (Shope 
2006), queer (Kong et al. 2003), and postmodern (Gubrium & Holstein 2003) critiques 
that challenge this understanding of the roles of ‘researcher’ and ‘researched’. In 
particular, I have been moved by postmodern interventions such as Foucault’s 
expositions of the operations of power (Foucault 2012; Foucault 2002), and how these 
have been turned inwards in order to address the hypocrisy of appraising the 
operations of the world without sparing a thought for the operations of our own 
modes of research. But my position on such issues does not mean that positivist modes 
of enquiry are not suitable for the kinds of questions they pose, or have contributed 
nothing to the social sciences22. We can think here, for example, of Macpherson’s 
argument for the value of weaving between the complexity of postmodernism and the 
‘strategic essentialism’ that is closer to positivist perspectives (Macpherson 2011).  
Performative research 
                                                      
21 I elaborate upon the scientific paradigm at length in ‘Beyond scientific evaluation’. 
22 Nor should we dismiss realist perspectives hastily. Harman’s object-oriented ontology (2013b) 
can be understood as another strand of new materialist theory, in that it argues that nonhuman 
relations are on the same ontological footing as human relations (2013a). 
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A more productive way to distinguish myself and my work from more purist or 
positivist sociological tradition is that I simply understand what research does very 
differently. Whereas the dominant mode of enquiry for more positivist traditions 
might rest upon a logic of revelation (What is happening here, and how can it be 
uncovered?), I tend more towards a logic of production and transformation (What is 
happening here, and what can be produced in order to respond to and transform it?). 
In this I am heavily influenced by the nonrepresentational approach to research which 
views academic research not as a representation of events in the world, but rather as a 
way of producing new problems and enacting new realities (Dewsbury 2010).  
Understanding research more ontologically, as a way of being in the world, necessarily 
shifts how we understand our ethical responsibilities. Researchers must be aware of 
the extent to which the knowledge they produce can be manipulated, used, and abused 
by wider interest groups. Given that this thesis walks a delicate line, critiquing 
intensely political concepts such as conservation, sustainability, and environmental 
ethics, I am acutely aware of the ways these ideas may be used to justify actions I 
would never advocate23. However, I am passionate about the lines of critique I offer in 
this thesis, and I accept that this is a risk I take.  
Reflexivity and empiricism 
Reflecting on such responsibilities has motivated postmodern and poststructuralist24 
social scientists to be reflexive in their methodologies, and transparent in their 
motivations, execution, and presentation styles of research (Cho & Trent 2009; 
Gubrium & Holstein 2003). Although there is a strong temptation to appear certain of 
our research and our expertise, postmodern researchers often take great pains to make 
particular caveats explicit: we acknowledge how our own subjectivity might affect our 
interpretations25 (Jones 2005); we make clear that findings are partial or incomplete by 
almost always pointing to the need for further research (J. Law 2004); and we 
                                                      
23 Such as environmentally destructive mining activities, coal port expansions in sensitive 
marine environments, wide-scale logging of precious and precarious habitats, and so on. 
24 Although postmodernism tends to be understood as a theory of society and history, and 
poststructuralism tends to be understood as a theory of knowledge and language (Agger 1991, 
p.112), these are common concerns across postmodern and poststructuralist thought. 
25 One way of thinking about this tendency to acknowledge our own subjectivities is as a 
positivist echo in which we attempt to ‘control’ for such subjective ‘variables’. 
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acknowledge the emotional elements of conducting research, particularly in 
emotionally sensitive issues (Ezzy 2010). Maintaining such reflexivity in research 
whilst also defending the status of social science as credible and important research has 
been a difficult task, and opinions on objectivity, subjectivity and reflexivity in research 
remain contested. 
Although reflexive thought challenges problematic power dynamics between 
researcher and research subject, the notion of ‘reflexive thought’ has also encouraged 
dichotomous thinking of the research subject as being ‘out there’, enduring and 
unchanged. Similarly, the researcher is understood as a stable figure which has the 
capacity to reflect upon itself. Reflexivity thus pays little attention to the 
transformations – in researchers and research subjects alike – that arise from the 
process of research. 
Enfolded into these contests is an underlying ambiguity about what, precisely, the 
object of social scientific research is, or what it should be. Broadly speaking, sociology 
holds the empirical world to be a cluster of materials, interactions, and problems to be 
investigated through existing sets of social theories and methods (Denzin & Lincoln 
2005). Different theoretical and methodological approaches will yield different 
knowledge and perspectives on phenomena, and the job of the methodologist is to 
craft a new understanding of a part of the social world through the empirical materials 
available to them. Traditionally, those ‘materials’ are other humans, engaging in 
conversation (or interviews) or demonstrating particular behaviours or practices for 
the benefit of the researcher (as in participant or covert observation). Despite a 
professed ambivalence towards positivist approaches in contemporary social science, 
this view of empirical research reflects a positivist belief that social experience can be 
observed, and, through the scientific method of observation, experiment and 
comparison, can be confirmed as some kind of social “truth” (Crotty 1998).  
Such claims of knowledge as certain, objective truth have, of course, been challenged 
through constructionist and subjectivist approaches, particularly those styles of inquiry 
informed by feminist critique (Shope 2006). However, there remains a pervading 
conceptualisation of ‘the empirical’ as a relatively fixed, inert entity ‘out there’, 
awaiting human discovery and interpretation. This understanding is in contrast to a 
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nonrepresentational approach which foregrounds the transformative capacities of 
research to bring new realities into being (Dewsbury 2010; McCoy 2012).  
New empiricism 
Lisa Adkins and Celia Lury have begun the task of revaluating empirical social science 
by posing the fundamental question: what is the empirical? (2009). Although exploring 
the empirical world is the calling of the social scientist (Reed & Alexander 2009), this 
most fundamental question of what, precisely, constitutes ‘the empirical’ has often 
been set aside in favour of the seductive pursuit of ‘social justice’, particularly in 
contemporary sociology (Denzin & Lincoln 2005). However, the goalposts of social 
justice are forever changing, as the empirical world is characterised and constituted by 
flux, flow, and transformation (Buscher & Urry 2009). These characteristics of change 
are precisely the aspects of the empirical world that contemporary theorists have 
argued have been overlooked or taken for granted in traditional sociology (Adkins & 
Lury 2009). This is not a criticism of classical sociologists, or a cheap attempt to 
emphasise the innovative qualities of my own work, but rather an acknowledgement 
of the need to continually reflect upon the relationship between the social, and the 
social sciences. As Lash has put it, “we in the twenty-first century are faced with an 
entirely different set of questions than were the late nineteenth-century classics” (Lash 
2009, p.180). And so, in order to address these questions, and continue posing new 
questions and re-posing old ones: what is the empirical? 
In order to address this question, nonrepresentational approaches call for us to rethink 
the worlds beyond our skin, but also require an inward reconceptualisation of us, of 
humans, and of the foldings between and within these not-so-distinct realms.  
As the social world changes, so too must the social sciences. Sociological methods are 
continually reviewed, renewed and debated. This thesis challenges some core aspects 
of sociological enquiry in order to investigate those problems that lie, perhaps, outside 
of the ‘normal’ realms of sociological enquiry. I must emphatically state that this is not 
a ‘rejection’ of sociology, nor its history, but rather, a pushing of boundaries, an 
expansion of sociology that takes place through rethinking some of its core concepts 
including agency, subjectivity, and, perhaps most pertinent in this section, empiricism.  
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Post/trans/multidisciplinary research 
There are many sociologists from whom I draw throughout the thesis (such as Celia 
Lury, Brian Massumi, and Patricia Clough) who have made significant contributions to 
this expansion of sociology. But other cognate disciplines, such as political ecology, 
philosophy, human geography, and cultural geography have much to offer here, and I 
draw extensively on these traditions. Of course, much contemporary social enquiry is 
enacted in a post-disciplinary manner, and situating my own work as ‘sociological’ 
more than, say, ‘cultural geography’ is largely a semantic habit, arising out of several 
years of being located in a School of Sociology. 
Nevertheless, I do intend for this thesis to contribute to, and improve upon, 
sociological approaches to the environment that I outlined in ‘Social science and the 
environment’. In light of the vast accumulation of theoretical and methodological 
genres in sociology and the social sciences more broadly, this is to provide guidance as 
to the specific debates this thesis speaks to – namely, nonrepresentational approaches.  
I hesitate to separate nonrepresentational theories and nonrepresentational methods, as 
performing research in this vein necessarily means eliding that traditional division 
between theory (what is being thought by the researcher) and method (what is being 
done to or with the researched). A core tenet of nonrepresentational methodology is 
paying careful attention to the productive capacities of research. Emphasising that 
research does not only reflect or represent the social, but is integrally involved in 
creating the social, nonrepresentational approaches directs attention towards both 
theory and method as performative practices, in that method “helps to produce the 
realities that it describes” (J. Law & Urry 2004, p.397). In this view, social research no 
longer involves developing differing perspectives on one social reality (or, theorising), 
but rather the enactment of different realities, as demonstrated in Annemarie Mol’s The 
Body Multiple (2002).  
This shift in the social sciences from questions of epistemology to problems of ontology 
is “a shift that moves us from a single world to the idea that the world is multiply 
produced in diverse and contested social and material relations” (Law & Urry 2004 p. 
397). Building on the work of theorists such as Latour (2005), bodies of research are 
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developing an associational sociology, “one which refuses to treat social relations as 
deep ontological realities but ones which are made up through processes of 
assemblage” (Savage 2009, p.161). This move towards associational sociology is 
challenging, as it involves resisting making normative value claims on realities 
explored through social research (Latour 2012; Latour 1999).  
This has been a very difficult temptation to resist in researching a topic about which I 
am so passionate. But rather than attempting to advocate for new norms around 
human/environment relations, the challenge here is to describe those associational 
relations (Harman 2006)26. The descriptions I offer in this thesis are, of course partial 
and contingent, and are continually transformed by other events and enfoldings in the 
world. But we should not regret this contingency, as in an incessantly mutable world, 
the events I describe here transform always and immediately through their relations to 
other events, including the event of producing new knowledge in this thesis. That is to 
say, this thesis is not an account of a social reality that has ‘happened’, but rather, an 
exploration of the continual ‘happening of the social’ (Lury & Wakeford 2012).  
Thus, the aim is not to provide a complete account of the empirical sites I outlined 
earlier, as that would contradict the very image of the world in flux I am trying to 
emphasise here. The accounts I draw on here are not meant to represent any 
unequivocal truths about the nature of national parks. Rather, I am employing them 
here as provocations of new and creative ways we may allow our understanding of 
these places to unfold. Nonetheless, I should make clear that in utilising the empirical 
moments I focus on in this thesis to open up new modes of apprehension, I also 
acknowledge there are myriad ways in which this could be done, and I am excited by 
the unknown world of future possible alignments to do with national parks.  
Furthermore, these empirical accounts and reflections are not just different 
perspectives, or lenses, on the same object, informed by differing subjectivities. This 
‘social constructionist’ (Nikander 2008; Potter & Hepburn 2008) style of analysis 
foregrounds mechanisms of meaning-making and distribution amongst human 
                                                      
26 As I have already discussed in ‘Nonrepresentational theories and the ontological turn’, my 
preferred conceptual lure to perform associational sociology is closer to Deleuzian assemblage 
than Latourian actor-network theory. 
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subjects and societies. Such perspectivalism (Mol 2002) is a return to a constructionist 
notion of national parks as fixed entities to be ‘read’27, rather than spaces of becoming 
that are continuously enacted in multiple ways. That is to say, the empirics of this 
research project are at once reflections on different enactments of national parks and 
new enactments of national parks as research sites (Dewsbury 2015).  
3.3 Experimentalism and affective research 
It would be remiss of me to write a thesis dealing analytically with the slippery realm 
of ‘affect’ without thinking about and discussing how affect has operated in the 
production of this thesis. Indeed, this thesis is the result of affective intensities that are 
important in any scholarly research project – yet rarely acknowledged. For me, 
envisaging the vicissitudes of research as the expression of affective intensities has 
been a productive and affirmative way to try to think about my research process. This 
has been a particularly important attitude, as there was a period of around four 
months of my candidature during which I undertook virtually no research work.  
This may seem a strange admission to make in a doctoral thesis, but this methodology 
is, as I intend it, the honest story of how this thesis came into being. This period of 
inactivity is an integral part of that story, and opens up some space to explore the force 
of the affective intensities of doing research. This thesis came out of false starts, about-
turns, second-guessings (and third, fourth, and fifth guessings, for that matter), 
misplaced uncertainties, misplaced confidence, and a good deal of inner turmoil that I 
suspect will not be resolved at the time of submission.  
This is not a caveat or a misguided confessional to garner some sympathy from 
readers, but a celebration of these messy intensities that are as integral to this thesis as 
are more traditionally acknowledged components such as the literature review or 
qualitative techniques. I emphasise these experiences due to a deep conviction that this 
section is where I should display some honesty about the (sometimes impersonal) 
motivations, processes, and difficulties in producing this work. I do not position such 
‘honesty’ in terms of ‘reflexivity’, nor as a revelatory moment, but as an 
acknowledgement of the contingency of claims to ‘truth’. Specifically, I am pointing to 
                                                      
27 And utilised, as I argued in ‘National parks in Australia’. 
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affective powers operating around and throughout me that enabled or reduced the 
production of this thesis. In short, suggesting this work arose smoothly from an 
entirely rational, organised, and certain individual mind would be a fallacy that 
ignores the complexity of what it is to be a researching human28.  
Cleansing the ‘human’ from academic products may be a useful technique in 
establishing some kind of scientific credibility in some (or most) corners of the social 
sciences that measure themselves by that particular yardstick (Law 2004). However, in 
a research project such as this that aims primarily to raise questions and to (re)pose 
problems more than offer definitive answers, and that relies on ‘unscientific’ methods 
such as autoethnography and a small interview sample size, striving for acceptance 
from those corners is redundant. Rather, I seek here to establish this research as 
‘credible’ via an effort to communicate the contradictory, complex, and conglomerate 
forces that constituted this thesis as faithfully and as openly as possible. 
I tend toward acknowledging and addressing complexity and uncertainty, rather than 
try to smooth over it. I have tried to avoid some of the methods employed by some 
researchers to make their work more ‘convincing’ or ‘scientific’: I tend to write in the 
first person, in the hope that my audience will remember that this is work authored by 
someone with a differentiated (although shifting) subjectivity; at various points I 
acknowledge uncertainties, rather than glossing over them or sending them to that 
land of purgatory – “areas for further research”; and where significant, I make explicit 
some ‘false starts’ or mistakes I have made in producing this thesis. Having been 
influenced by a number of key texts advocating experimental approaches in research 
(McCormack 2010; Bissell 2010a; Dewsbury 2010), these are deliberate decisions made 
in the hope of revealing the process of the work presented here.  
This emphasis is partly to do with trying to create a document whose style is enjoyable 
to write and read. But experimenting with techniques at all stages of research is also a 
politically charged motivation, and I employ it “in anticipation that such 
experimentation can contribute to the elaboration of an expanded space of ethical and 
                                                      
28 I believe the tendency to make this suggestion in academic work is unfortunate, and 
potentially harmful for researchers as we continually measure ourselves against the apparent 
ease with which other researchers accomplish their work.  
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political potential…that might modify and work against the problematic tendencies of 
contemporary cultural and political life” (McCormack 2010, p.202). Following scholars 
such as Cresswell (2012) and Lorimer (2015), I have done this primarily through 
methodological experimentation that revolves around a style of memoir, or even life-
writing, which has been put to work in other authors’ accounts of their experiences of 
doing research nonrepresentationally. The aim here is purely to disrupt ingrained 
research habits that, although valuable in many ways, also work to restrict how we can 
pose and respond to problems productively through research.  
The ethos of experimentation, performativity and openness is largely indebted to the 
increasingly influential work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Of particular 
significance in this section is Deleuze’s reconceptualisation of empiricism, from which 
key thinkers to this thesis have fashioned their own styles of thinking about the 
empirical. This is not to say that this methodology is exclusively ‘Deleuzian’, but 
rather, that the body of contemporary social theory I draw from throughout this thesis 
has undoubtedly been influenced by Deleuze’s radical thought. Although Deleuze 
transformed the way many of us think about a dazzling array of issues, we can 
perhaps distil the influence of his work on empiricism to a seemingly simple, but 
complex task. I draw on Coleman and Ringrose here, who have articulated precisely 
one of the motivations of my own Deleuze-infused research:  
that putting to work some of Deleuze’s ideas about the world and ways of studying it 
might help to shed light on other ways of knowing, relating to and creating the world, 
‘noticing’ different kinds of things that might be happening, or things that might be 
happening differently (Coleman & Ringrose 2013, p.4) 
 
This methodology section has not consisted of an inventory of sites visited, participants 
interviewed, or questions asked by an individual researcher in order to establish 
‘truths’. Rather, I have tried to outline how and why I have attempted to notice 
different things, or to notice things differently. 
This ‘ethos’ rests upon a belief that common imaginings of ‘research’ being conducted 
by a discrete, entirely rational, entirely conscious human are fallacious. If this were the 
case, would we not all be able to harness and control our productivity with ease? It 
would, after all, be disingenuous to suggest that this thesis and I are somehow exempt 
from a world of assemblage, or that this particular ‘thesis event’ did not arise and will 
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not continue to resonate through bodies and heterogeneous constellations of material 
things and immaterial forces. 
Remaining faithful to this ethos, calling this chapter ‘Producing the thesis’ is intended 
to point to the messiness of how this thesis has come into being. This contrasts with a 
more traditional ‘methodology’ chapter, which serves to outline and justify the 
researcher’s choice and execution of research methods that defend the stance of the 
researcher, and explain a thesis as a finished product. Research within other realms of 
social science that attends to different problems from different angles employs this 
style effectively in order to explain why a particular problem was conceived and how 
the solution to that problem has been justified. This is invaluable in ‘applied’ sociology 
in particular, which seeks to solve well-defined social problems (Irwin 2013). However, 
given the focus of this particular thesis on process and becoming, and the significance I 
place on experimentalism in method and presentation, it would be hypocritical to gloss 
over the sticky parts of the materialisation of this thesis. Rather than positing the 
process of this thesis as a smooth, linear accumulation and rational analysis of 
information, I have instead tried to attend to the emergence of this thesis – including its 
insecurities and bumpy false starts.  
As I suggested earlier, the precise genesis of this research is difficult to discern. I never 
sought out a particular problem to solve, and I cannot pinpoint any specific decisions 
on theoretical or methodological approach. This thesis is the congealing of notions 
borne out of ephemeral flashes and trickling, slow connections, and the process of 
thickening these ideas through experimental, performative methods. Although this has 
been an iterative process, there was a definite ordering of theoretical before empirical 
interests. I came to appreciate the conceptual themes coursing throughout this thesis – 
of nonhuman agency, assemblage, affect, and nonrepresentational theories, for 
example – well before the empirical sites of national parks emerged.  
In paying attention to the emergence of this work, it is significant that this thesis has 
not evolved as a parochial ‘ethnographic account’ of national parks. Instead, Namadgi, 
Tidbinbilla, and Mulligans emerged as ripe empirical sites through which conceptual 
themes could be drawn out. This does not mean, however, that this is an abstract or 
purely theoretical exercise; the empirical is essential to the ethos of this thesis. But, as I 
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have noted in my earlier discussion of deductive and inductive research styles, this 
research project did not begin with an empirical problem that then demanded a 
particular set of established theories or methods through which the ‘problem’ could be 
solved.  
This is a significant change of direction from traditional sociological methodology, 
driven in large part by a desire to attend to some of the complexities and contingencies 
in the empirical world that are often obscured in favour of solving a well-established 
social or political problem such as the role of national parks in Australia. 
These tensions have not arisen in rational, organised, conscious modes. I have not 
relied entirely on systematic research to convince myself that this thesis pursues 
valuable lines of thought. Rather, to remain faithful to the ethos of experimentalism, I 
have tried to be guided by paying attention to affects induced by different lines of 
enquiry: Does this interview transcript excite me in a way that produces new thought? 
Does this publication make me excited about pursuing the author’s ideas? Does 
drafting this section of the thesis feel good, or does it induce anxiety? What are the 
material and semiotic elements inviting these affects?  
It might be that this is a misguided experiment; only examiners’ reports will tell. But 
attending to these oft-obscured elements of academic practice is an important part of 
the nonrepresentational ethos that I have tried to employ to inform this thesis. Affects 
have played a large part in guiding this faith in nonrepresentational approaches, both 
in terms of joyful passions of intrigue and intellectual challenge and sad passions of 
boredom and apathy towards more traditional approaches to social research. Perhaps, 
in the interest of honesty I should include a kind of critical arrogance in that list – 
although I’m unsure as to whether this is more an active or reactive quality (Deleuze 
1983).  
Whatever the case, I see this faithfulness to nonrepresentational research as a highly 
political and ethical challenge – in being so persuaded and excited by methodological 
renegades such as John Law and Celia Lury, I think that revealing the ‘tricks of the 
trade’, so to speak, can only lead to productive and creative change in the academy, 
rather than relying on somewhat stale (and problematic) tropes of rigour, validity, and 
impact.  
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In emphasising that affects, as well as more systematic academic research, have guided 
me in the creation of this thesis, I acknowledge that I am not a discrete, bounded, 
entirely rational human agent, authoritatively creating knowledge. Rather, as should 
be clear by this point, this thesis is the result of assemblage thinking. That is, that 
thinking is the activity of an assemblage of multiple bodies, of blood and desk and 
electricity and unreliable internet access and innumerable other bodies. Thinking of 
thinking in this way transforms my work practices and directions of my thought in 
numerous ways.  
As I outlined in ‘Nonrepresentational theories and the ontological turn’, 
nonrepresentational research seeks to disrupt dominant habits – of thought, of 
encounter, and of research practices. Experimenting is crucial to these disruptive drives 
in nonrepresentational projects – experimenting with empirical sites and research 
techniques, with thought, and with the way in which research is (re)presented to 
audiences. Some notable instances of such experimental nonrepresentational work can 
be found in the social sciences, such as Richardson-Ngwenya’s work on sugar crops in 
Barbados through a series of videos of muddy boots and embodied practices 
accompanying more conventional publications (2013), or McCormack’s ‘Paper with an 
interest in rhythm’, which is “a performative effort to move with and through the 
expressive and theoretical spaces of an interest in rhythm” (2002, p.469). These, and 
many other works (Cousins et al. 2009; Gross 2003; S. Kirksey 2010; E. Kirksey 2014) 
seek to go beyond orthodox empirical methods and presentational practices.  
Nonrepresentational experiments take place through art (particularly abstract art that 
aims to evoke affects rather than represent a part of the world) and literature 
(particularly poetry which aims to give rise to more affective resonances over the 
conventional goal of text as conveying a message directly from author to reader). 
Furthermore, some truly interesting pieces have been written on elements of popular 
culture that also attend to affective intensities of events as diverse as Miley Cyrus’ 
twerking body and smart technologies (Kennedy et al. 2013), rather than the cultural or 
symbolic values and meaning, such as some analyses that focus on the racial 
implications of a white pop star appropriating a dance move (Richter 2015) or effects of 
technologies on social practices (Lupton 2014). Thus, the focus and scope of issues is 
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also experimental nonrepresentational work, which often opts to pay attention to less 
obvious and less-discussed elements of events in the world.  
There are various ways in which this thesis is experimental. The tones of writing in 
different sections of the thesis are intended to match the significance of the section. In 
the sections that build context, for example, my writing is what we might think of as 
‘standard scholar’ – plenty of passive voice and detachment of information from 
author. In other sections (such as this one), however, my tone is closer to how I might 
talk with interested friends or colleagues – more casual language, plenty of first-person 
reflections, and, in some sections, a deliberate decision to avoid the temptation of 
polishing my writing into ‘standard scholar’ style and searching for relevant 
references. In these more casual sections, I have consciously decided to leave more of 
myself peppered throughout the text than is conventional in scholarly work.  
The term ‘style’ is significant here, as Nigel Thrift describes nonrepresentational work 
as a ‘style’. As he has put it “[nonrepresentational research] is not a new theoretical 
edifice that is being constructed, but a means of valuing and working with everyday 
practical activities as they occur” (Thrift 2000, p.216). Thrift goes on to articulate a 
deficit in social and cultural theory in that it fails to address transformation, and is thus 
essentially unprocessual. So rather than rejecting representational cultural theory, 
Thrift argues that nonrepresentational theory “attempts to compensate for this deficit 
through the serious consideration of what [he calls] the push that keeps the world 
rolling over; the energy that fuels change; the work of transformation” (Thrift 2000, 
p.216). In illuminating the processual parts of the world, then, nonrepresentational 
theory can be thought of as an oft-forgotten part of a duet; it is not the melody we 
usually hum, but is essential to the fullness of the piece.  
Nonrepresentational theory is not a theoretical perspective claiming to know, interpret, 
and explain all aspects of the social. Rather, nonrepresentational research is a creative 
and performative endeavour. Building on Thrift’s work, Dewsbury persuasively puts 
the case for nonrepresentational research, in that it “asks what practical engagement 
we as a researcher have with the world” (Dewsbury 2010, p.328). This ethos may not 
seem on the surface to be ‘practical’, as performative research is not necessarily geared 
towards the type of political intervention we have come to associate with the social 
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sciences. However, it is practical “as it engages precisely with thinking and 
experiencing thought itself, and as such can make important interventions in the 
world” (Dewsbury 2010, p.328). These interventions are enacted from a distinct ethos 
that aims to “disrupt research habits and pare things down to the immediate and the 
embodied” (Dewsbury 2010, p.322). Nonrepresentational, performative research 
tangles and breaks down the orthodox ordering of ‘theory’, then ‘method’ in that “this 
ethos of disruption by striving to think the unthought has to take place at every step of 
the research” (Dewsbury 2010, p.322). 
Despite the ever-growing body of nonrepresentational social theory, there is a 
perception that qualitative research methods such as interviewing and participant 
observation have failed to ‘keep up’, so to speak, with important reconceptualisations 
of the empirical world (J. Law 2004). That is, although many theorists have developed 
the case that the social world is not merely comprised of social facts that can be 
observed, analysed, and rectified, qualitative methodologies largely remain based 
upon a perception that evidence for a theorised truth can be accessed through methods 
such as interviews and participant observation (Flick 2008). The role of the researcher 
in this understanding of qualitative research is as the ‘expert’ who truthfully and 
faithfully represents the evidence offered by participants (Clough 2009). The lived 
realities of performing qualitative research are, of course, much more complicated than 
this reductive perception; such orthodox methodology sits uncomfortably with the 
energy invested in reconceptualising the social and the human in contemporary social 
theory. Nonrepresentational theorists have therefore turned their attention to the 
implications of sociological theories and methods more oriented to questions of 
ontology and process over epistemology and outcome (Coole & Frost 2010).  
3.4 Interviewing 
I have already touched on interviewing in ‘Empirical sites’. Although this was a very 
deliberate methodological decision to conceptualise research interviews themselves as 
empirical encounters, I want to return to the issue of interviewing in the social sciences 
in a broader sense. Interview participants are subject to a similar kind of ‘know and 
tell’ politics as is fieldwork, and the imperative on researchers is often to focus on 
issues of participant selection and recruitment. Participants are selected based on their 
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‘molar’ lines that I have already alluded to – their age, gender, employment, socio-
economic status, ethnicity, and so on (Bissell 2014).  
These were, indeed, the lines of identity that led me to recruit three of my interview 
participants – Matthew, John, and Sam. Matthew is a well-respected local historian of 
cultural heritage, and author of several books on the cultural and environmental 
heritage of the ACT high country. John is a prominent member of the Canberra 
Bushwalking Club. John also regularly introduces novice walkers to the pleasures of 
bushwalking through guided walks, and he runs a fantastic bushwalking blog which I 
often turn to when looking for a nice walking itinerary. Sam is an ecologist, whose 
name and a few other details have been changed at his request. Sam is a ‘hands on’ 
ecologist, specialising in the reintroduction of species to areas from which they have 
been extinct.  
Matthew, John, and Sam all seemed to be obvious interview participant choices based 
on their profession. My rationale behind speaking to all of them was to get a feel for 
the different kinds of knowledge they brought to their experiences of national parks: 
Matthew, with his encyclopaedic knowledge of local history; John, because of the 
practical knowledge he has acquired through the sheer amount of territory he has 
covered on his feet; and Sam, with his understanding of the role of ecological sciences 
in national parks.  
After these three initial interviews, however, I began to realise that I was attempting to 
utilise their accounts as representative of their different kinds of knowledge – historical, 
practical, and ecological. This ‘sampling’ method (Flick 2008) felt rather out of kilter 
with the ethos of this thesis, and I weaved back to nonrepresentational methodologies 
literature in order to rethink my approach. This feeling of unease, together with 
encountering methodological literature which felt more aligned with the forces of the 
interviews themselves as important empirical encounters, rather than just recollections 
of empirical encounters (Dewsbury 2010), moved me to rethink precisely why I was 
conducting interviews for this research; the reasons for fieldwork (and thus, the 
significance of interviews) changed significantly during the process of research. 
I reflected at length upon the moments in these initial interviews that really excited me 
– which gave rise to the most interesting questions, and, which moments I could not 
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stop thinking about, even if they seemed somewhat outside my research topic. This is 
perhaps most apparent in ‘Tracing’, which focuses on interviews with Matthew and 
John, and how moments in those interviews affected me, and significantly shaped my 
research direction. Rather than looking for representatives of different knowledges, I 
was more interested in emotional and affective connections that people make with 
national parks. 
Pursuing this line of enquiry, my next interview was a dual interview with my partner 
Sophie, and her long-term bushwalking companion Julia. Sophie is a climate scientist 
by trade, Julia is a hydrogeologist, and both are avid bushwalkers and self-professed 
nature lovers. However, what I was most interested in for this interview were details of 
the part that walking together in national parks plays in their friendship. Furthermore, 
as Sophie and I frequently walk together, and she has accompanied me on many 
fieldwork trips for this thesis, I wanted to hear more about her experiences on walks 
where I have not been with her.  
Each of the four interviews I conducted for this thesis were incredibly moving 
experiences, and these encounters continue to move me to rethink my own connections 
with national parks in various ways. I draw out the practicalities and intensities of 
these encounters throughout the analytical chapters. 
3.5 Reading 
“Read more!” is perhaps one of the most common pieces of advice doctoral students 
receive from colleagues, supervisors and friends. And yet, despite the importance of 
reading in research, the ways through which we encounter and are transformed by 
literature seems to be a taken-for-granted part of research. This seems to me a telling 
lacuna in social methodology literature indicating how we apprehend that core part of 
research – reading – as a natural and unproblematic activity.  
We might in our mind’s eye imagine a researcher, searching journal databases or 
reference lists for materials, methodically taking notes on relevant readings and 
making rational decisions about which texts are relevant to a piece of work and which 
are not.  
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And yet, finding, encountering, absorbing, and interpreting literature are like other 
events – shaped by affective intensities and resonances. Some readings give rise to 
excitement and energy, some make you labour over a single sentence, some feel as 
though they are holding your hand, gently guiding you; others shove you in the back 
and you must crawl, face first through the proverbial mud.  
As well as paying attention to the histories and genealogies of the body of work I draw 
upon in this thesis, I have also been strongly guided by my own affective reactions to 
different literature. I have read quietly and rationally, I have read furiously and 
passionately, wounding innocent unsuspecting pages with red pen profanities. I have 
tried to read generously, but have probably been too hasty in my judgement of some 
papers, flung aside because of a disagreeable turn of phrase, or a pompous criticism of 
work I admire. I have taken methodical notes, but so too have I scrawled in back covers 
of books, hurriedly stashed a quote in my phone, or stumbled across an important 
article on my Twitter feed.  
I have perhaps read more intensively than extensively (Lash 2010) – sometimes reading 
the same work several times over the duration of my candidature. The texts which I 
draw upon more heavily than others are works to which I have been drawn 
repeatedly. This is not necessarily because of the intellectual stature of the author or 
because these are works that are somehow ‘better’ than others. Rather, they are works 
that have given rise to productive thought for me. As Paul Theroux has put it so 
beautifully: 
Reading alters the appearance of a book. Once it has been read, it never looks the 
same again, and people leave their individual imprint on a book they have read. One of 
the pleasures of reading is seeing this alteration on the pages, and the way, by reading 
it, you have made the book yours (Theroux 1997, p.363). 
 
By the same token, I make no distinction in my reading between ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ sources – what does it matter if the work makes you think? Of course, this 
should not mean that we overlook the different ways through which knowledge is 
produced and the different modes of analysis available to researchers of all kinds.  I 
have drawn on sociologists, geographers, political theorists, philosophers, as well as 
novelists, travel-writers, colleagues and comedians – anyone whose work has spurred 
me to action, whether that action has been thinking or writing.  
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3.6 Writing 
Similar to reading, the writing process of research is relatively absent from sociological 
methodological literature29. Why do you suppose that is? I know that for me, my 
intellectual insecurities emerge most forcefully in the practice of writing, urging me to 
write and delete and recover and write again30. The writing of this thesis has been a 
shambles of fits and starts. I have deleted at least twice as many words as are presented 
here. It’s a short, brutish life for an ill-formed sentence, and I hope I have left the best 
ones in.  
Writing has at times given me vitality, at other times, drained my energy in ways I do 
not experience with any other activity. Even now, towards the end of the writing of 
this thesis, I do not fully understand what forces give rise to me having a ‘productive’ 
day and what cruel powers clear my mind so completely of thought that my fingers 
have nothing to do on a keyboard.  
After obsessing over trying to predict and harness whatever it is that makes me write 
well, I found an inspiring quote on writing in a surprising place. American comedian 
Amy Poehler, on her own insecurity in writing her memoir asks: "How do we move 
forward when we are tired and afraid?" Poehler describes the anxieties of writing for 
an audience beautifully, as well as the arresting effects these anxieties have on 
productivity: 
And then you just do it. You just dig in and write in. You use your body. You lean over 
the computer and stretch and pace. You write and then cook something and write 
some more. You put your hand on your heart and feel it beating and decide if what you 
wrote feels true. You do it because the doing of it is the thing. The doing is the thing. 
The talking and worrying and thinking is not the thing (Poehler 2014 p xv) 
 
So, I have just done it. I have leaned over and leaned back and tossed and turned. I’ve 
hammered keyboards and I’ve caressed them. I’ve written vast numbers of words in 
short periods of time, and I’ve taken hours to craft a single sentence (which has then 
been deleted anyway).  
                                                      
29 However, the field of research education deals extensively with writing productivity 
practices. See, for example, Helping doctoral students write (Kamler & Thomson 2014) 
30 In order to overcome this rather unproductive habit, the majority of this thesis has been 
generated in intensive writing groups; the process of developing the thesis has been shaped by 
these intense affective atmospheres. 
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Structurally, I have experimented with different writing techniques. Whereas the 
‘Practices’ chapter is constituted through several distinct short essays, ‘Ecologies’ felt 
better suited to a long-form arrangement, and ‘Politics’ lent itself to separate, but 
contiguous and related sections.  
I have needed breaks between constructing these sections, outlets for ideas that have 
been important to me, but that don’t fit neatly into the flow of the thesis. These ‘lines of 
flight’, to borrow from Deleuze & Guattari (1987), have been vital in keeping sight of 
the value of the empirical and the experimental in producing this thesis, so I felt 
uneasy keeping them to myself. As such, I have included some as Interludes, including 
‘Conversations with a climate scientist’, which is partly written by Sophie Lewis31 on 
how her proximity to the production of this thesis has affected her. These are 
opportunities for you and I to surface and catch our breath together, before 
submerging ourselves back in the substantive parts of the thesis; I do hope you enjoy 
them.  
Outside of pleasure, though, the Interludes are a reflection on the importance I place 
on experimenting with diverse scholarly writing techniques. By explicitly including 
pieces of writing that are not, strictly speaking, essential to my arguments here, I am 
commenting on the persuasive role that ephemeral events in our day-to-day lives have 
in compelling us towards certain research practices over others. Indeed, there are many 
events in my lifetime that are still guiding me in certain directions, although my 
awareness of what, precisely, the effects of these events are, is limited.   
The point I am making here, is that this thesis – in all its stages of production – has 
been profoundly influenced and shaped by impersonal forces in my lifetime and 
beyond as much as more well-known habits of scholarship. 
  
                                                      
31 Given my signed declaration that this thesis is all my own original work, I should emphasise 
here that including Sophie’s connections to this research is an important part of the 
experimentalism that underpins this thesis.  
71 
 
[ Interlude one: the rabbit proof fence ] 
Southwestern Australia has been in the throes of a severe drought since the 1980s, 
albeit with a brief respite in recent years. Food production, agriculture, ways of life, 
and communities have been threatened by the persistent dry seasons and the 
unsatisfying rains that do little more than dimple the top layers of soil.  
I admit I have not spent a great deal of time thinking about the problems faced by the 
farming and agricultural communities in the area. Food scarcity is certainly a concern, 
but has never elicited excitement in me. But the Southwestern region of Australia has 
been a constant refrain in my mind since a relatively innocent conversation with my 
partner about a scientific project investigating the regional climate called the Bunny 
Fence Experiment, or BuFEx (Pitman et al. 2004).  
This conversation, and subsequent research into the BuFEx project revealed an unlikely 
antagonist of the regional climate of Southwest Australia: the rabbit proof fence. Amid 
the rumblings of politics and protests and calls for funding and support stood this 
infrastructural feat – silent in the debates, and yet revealed as perhaps the most 
significant element in the commotion of concerned farmers, activists, of sun, dirt, and 
water.  
The rabbit proof fence, completed in 1907, is comprised of three sections of wood and 
wire fencing, totalling approximately 3,253 kilometres crawling across the vast 
landscape of Southwest Australia. Since its construction – as its name suggests, in 
order to restrict the spread of rabbits throughout the area – the rabbit proof fence has 
played many significant roles in Australian society (Broomhall 1991). In primary school 
we learn of the hard men who toiled in the outback heat. We may think of how the 
fence generates income in the form of a tourist attraction, particularly for those inclined 
towards encountering landscapes in a four-wheel drive (Bishop 1995). Recently, the 
fence starred as the hero that reunited a family in one of Australia’s most acclaimed 
films of the same name (2002).  
Compared to these feats, the fact that after World War II the fence was utilised as a 
barrier between farmland and native scrub seems perhaps rather dull. Between 1945 
and 1984, however, the fence became the boundary of what has been described as one 
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of the most brutal land clearing projects in the world (M. Williams 2002). Native scrub 
was burned in favour of productive food crops, and the fence composed a sharp 
distinction between heterogeneous scrub and relatively homogenous, uniform crops.  
Of course, there are many complex processes in any climatic events, many of which we 
do not understand. But in this case, research has found that the rapid and radical 
change in vegetation – including the harsh delineation between scrub and crops – 
changes the texture of the landscape in a way that affects wind patterns, which in turn 
impinges on cloud formation processes. Metal and wind and dust and promiscuous 
bunnies and flora coalesce and transform, and result (amongst many other effects) in a 
dramatic drop in rainfall in the region. 
In this way, the rabbit proof fence played a part in bringing about the drought in 
Southwest Australia, and it has also played a part in turns I am taking in my life; the 
bunny fence has swayed me from previous research interests, and indeed, from 
previous beliefs about human control over nature.  
The rabbit proof fence has been a recurring companion in my journey of thinking about 
things like material agency, transformative potential, and complex historical arcs and 
durations. 
Once I started thinking about fences, I couldn’t stop. Friends would take photos of 
fences and post them to me on social media or by text message. It was a very fencey 
time. On early fieldwork expeditions to national parks and nature reserve spaces 
around the ACT, I took many photographs and wrote many field notes on the entry 
points of reserves, or the work that fences were doing in and around places.  
On one of these trips, I was accompanied by three friends who, being physical (or 
‘natural’) scientists, found my style of research hilarious. At first, their comments on 
fences were facetious, pointing them out like rare animals in their natural habitat. 
However, throughout the day their observations became more astute.  
Paying attention (or ‘noticing things differently’) changed their minds. They still think 
my research is a bit silly, but now they also find it interesting. Moments like these have 
helped me feel more certain that paying attention to things that often go unnoticed is 
an important thing to do. The subtle transformations in the world – such as a bunny 
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fence that affects not only rainfall, but also, the disposition of scientists – are a delight 
to explore. We cannot all do research that will ‘save the world’, but we can do research 
that introduces something new, something enriching – what a wonderful thing to do.  
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4. Encounters 
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4.1 Introducing encounters 
With remote wilderness experiences, a wide range of natural environments, an 
abundance of native wildlife, and Aboriginal and European cultural sites, there are 
many reasons to visit Namadgi National Park. Namadgi was declared a national park in 
1984 and covers 106,095 hectares, with 160 kilometres of marked walking tracks. 
Walking is the most popular way to explore the park (ACT Government, 2015).  
 
Thus reads the blurb on Namadgi National Park on the ACT Government’s website. 
Similar passages can be found for Tidbinbilla and Mulligans Flat. This short 
description reveals much about typical understandings of national parks as spatially 
measurable and temporally defined places, containing natural beauty, wilderness, 
cultural heritage, and recreational activities. Here, Namadgi is configured as a specific 
place, a declared place, a boundaried place, a place that is well defined and whose past 
and present are known. This is how we tend to think about place in day-to-day usage, 
where a ‘place’ is understood in Euclidian terms as being spatially defined and 
ontologically unproblematic (Cresswell 2004). However, these apprehensions arise out 
of a specific set of assumptions about the constitution of the world, and our place in 
that world as embodied beings.  
In this chapter, I problematise such typical understandings of national parks as 
discrete, bounded, measurable and quantifiable places. Following contemporary 
human and cultural geographers in particular (Bissell & Fuller 2011; Cresswell 2011; 
Wylie 2007), I challenge this notion of places as fixed entities, arguing instead that 
place is processual, continually constituted and reconstituted differently through 
practices of dwelling, through movements and stillnesses, and connections forged 
through encounters between bodies of all kinds. Despite this more contemporary 
account of place, current debates around national parks – around their uses and 
abuses, their perceived values and their intended futures – still rest upon a parochial 
understanding of national parks such as Namadgi as ontologically given – a fixed 
biophysical entity. But is this the only way we can theorise place? Is this a way of 
thinking through which we can attend to the vibrant landscapes of places such as 
Namadgi, Tidbinbilla, or Mulligans Flat?  
I would answer these questions with a resounding ‘no’, and I argue that apprehending 
national parks as measurable, fixed places relies on spurious claims that obscure or 
ignore the complexities, flows, and liveliness of the material world.  
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This chapter responds to contemporary understandings of national parks as 
biophysical, social, and cultural entities that exist in relatively unproblematic terms, in 
a specific location with well-defined boundaries. Thinking about national parks in this 
way affords thinking that the ‘problems’ to do with national parks are political 
problems of where and how to invest resources or what kinds of practices and 
industries are appropriate to take place in and around national parks (Buckley 2004). 
But through drawing on qualitative data from interviews, participant observations, 
and autoethnographies of how national parks are encountered, I argue that the starting 
point for these debates – the constitution of the national park itself – is far more 
complex and contested than is generally acknowledged, and thus requires 
reconsideration.  
The national park is a mutable assemblage of material and immaterial (or discursive) 
elements (Bennett 2010; Castree 2003b). The administrative naming and bounding of 
these places is just one part of how national parks come into being; the question of how 
national parks endure through time, and how they transform, calls for renewed critical 
thought.  
Throughout this chapter, I rethink what it is to encounter these shifting, dynamic 
places, and argue that such encounters themselves are important sites of 
transformation.  
The key theorisations of place on which my arguments are founded are reviewed in the 
following section on ‘Place, practice, mobilities’, which explores the ways that places 
are constituted through mobile practices of bodies. Extending these lines of thought, 
the chapter moves on in the form of short essays exploring different national park 
encounters. Each essay is based around particular empirical moments and to a key 
concept, closely related to those particular encounters. (As you peruse these essays, it 
may be helpful for you to keep these conceptual lures in mind, which are indicated 
below in bold.) 
‘Mapping’ problematises the common notion of maps as representations of 
ontologically given areas. Although maps are usually understood as either accurate or 
inaccurate representations of a particular reality, this essay is based on an interview 
encounter in which Julia and Sophie articulated the ways in which maps can 
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significantly transform how landscapes and landmarks are perceived. This interview 
led to the development of the argument that maps and mappings help bring the world 
into being by shaping encounters and events in multiple ways.  
‘Fencing’ invites us to rethink assumptions to do with hierarchical understandings of 
materialities in the world in which human-constructed, inorganic infrastructures are 
understood as inert or functional technologies, with no capacities outside of those 
intended by their constructors or maintainers, by emphasising their capacity to effect 
various transformations in places. Arising from my long-standing interest in fences, as 
well as a particularly fun and memorable fieldwork experience at Mulligans Flat 
involving a high security ‘predator-proof’ fence, this section also reflects that scientific 
research can enable a playful mode of encountering national parks.  
‘Tracing’ reflects on two interviews with Matthew and John, and draws on Tim 
Ingold’s beautifully creative taxonomy, Lines: a brief history (2007). Bringing together 
my own encounters with John, Matthew, and Ingold’s work, I reconceptualise ‘tracing 
encounters’ that are common in national parks (such as hiking) in terms of the lines 
they trace and how those tracings may fold into multiple pasts, presents, and futures.  
‘Discoursing’ is a reflective piece on my frustrations with debates around national 
parks in Australia, which, as I noted in ‘Introducing the thesis’, has been a core 
motivation for undertaking this research. In particular, I reflect on my experience of 
attending the 2014 World Parks Congress, and the challenge of witnessing that process 
well (Dewsbury 2003) through paying attention to the affective intensities of 
discourse.  
Although each essay attends more or less closely to a particular kind of national park 
encounter, this should not be taken as an indication that these practices (or their 
associated conceptual lures) can in any way be separated completely from each other. 
Rather, I have arranged them in this form as they speak more or less closely to 
empirical moments that have stuck with me throughout production of this thesis. They 
are not intended to be complete accounts of their subject matter, but rather, a reflection 
of the ways my thought has changed about these practices during the course of my 
research. That is, they are meant as indicators of the changes that have taken place in 
terms of my own thought, and that of some of my research participants. This section 
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thus attends to the transformations that take place through empirical encounters – 
whether they take place at the top of a mountain in a national park, in my office, or 
during a participant interview in a quiet cafe.  
In order to try to produce a different kind of knowledge around national parks and 
enter into relations in different ways, these essays are deliberately experimental32. They 
range from explorations of the relationship between nonrepresentational theories and 
other more established sociological approaches such as constructivism (in 
‘Discoursing’), to more casual and creative responses to my own experiences of 
entering into the world of national park research (also in ‘Discoursing’), to completely 
experimental approaches (in ‘Tracing’), thinking about interview encounters through 
deliberately open and indeterminate explorations of conceptual lures such as Tim 
Ingold’s taxonomy of lines (2007).  
Each essay contributes to an understanding of national parks as lively, mutable places 
that are always in flux, constituted by multiple relations and encounters between and 
within human and nonhuman bodies. This in turn is a contribution to understandings 
of humans and environments that do not assume the dominance of the former over the 
latter. This aim is deeply political, and is founded upon a sense that common 
understandings of landscapes and environments rarely acknowledge a world that is 
always in transition, and that the processual transformation of the world takes place 
through encounters such as those I discuss throughout this chapter.  
Remaining faithful to this focus on process and transformation, these essays are 
designed primarily as prompts or provocations for thinking events and encounters 
anew, and will hopefully give rise to new transformations – however small – in you. 
4.2 Place, practice, mobilities 
In the methodologies section, I introduced the three main ‘sites’ of empirical work for 
this research: Namadgi National Park, Tidbinbilla Nature Reserve, and Mulligans Flat 
Woodlands Sanctuary. Various practices of management and governance (such as 
                                                      
32In a nod (actually more of a bow) to Celia Lury and Nina Wakeford’s excellent collection of 
methodological explorations in Inventive methods: the happening of the social (2012) each essay has 
been titled as a verb to indicate the ongoing and transformative nature of the matters they deal 
with. 
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naming, bordering, and mapping) encourage us to think about these places as 
bounded, discrete, and in some ways separate from their surrounding suburbs, 
farmlands, or other parts of the world.  
Contrasting this rather static understanding of place, I conceptualise the encounters 
explored in this chapter as constitutional of these places – that is, that protected areas 
are brought into being as places through encounters between bodies of all kinds, and 
take place at all levels of magnitude. I argue that these encounters are not enacted 
exclusively by human subjects, and that constitution of national parks can never 
entirely be tethered to human management practices33.  
On the contrary, I argue in the following essays that places are constituted through 
mobile practices of all kinds of bodies and all kinds of forces. As this is a very different 
way of thinking about place than we might be used to in day-to-day usage, it is 
important to briefly review how the social sciences (in particular, human and cultural 
geography) have conceptualised these core concepts – place, practices, mobilities – and 
how understanding the complexities of these concepts can help us begin to understand 
encountering national parks in ways that encourage the more ontological questions 
with which this thesis deals.  
If we are to better appreciate and apprehend the complexities of encountering national 
parks, we must begin with how we conceptualise place. In everyday use, we tend to 
think of places spatially – that is, in order to describe a place we might refer to its 
location in terms of its boundaries or its proximity to other landmarks, or we might 
point to a map to show where the place is (Ingold 1993). It might seem obvious to point 
out that we think of places spatially, but there are many far-reaching implications for 
how we think and feel about different kinds of encounters that occur in those places 
(Massey 1995).  
Although we think of place spatially, in social scientific literature dealing with place, it 
has been important to distinguish between ‘space’ and ‘place’. Cresswell expresses the 
importance of this distinction, arguing that whereas ‘space’ is generally understood as 
                                                      
33 Although this ‘Encounters’ chapter may seem to focus on ‘human’ encounters this is due to 
the particular empirical methods of this thesis, and should not be taken as a reification of 
humans as ‘active’ over a passive environment. 
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“a ‘fact of life’ which, like time, produces the basic coordinates for human life” 
(Cresswell 2014, p.10), ‘place’ is a far more slippery term, exceeding space as its 
measurable physical properties. To begin with, emphasising the spatiality of place 
tends to obscure that places transform over time, and are thus also temporally 
constituted. Forgetting or ignoring the temporality of places, as Massey has pointed 
out, encourages “a deeply essentialist and internalist way of thinking about a place and 
its character” (Massey 1995, p.183), which leads easily to conflict between competing 
desires for the practices, uses and futures of particular places.  
This static way of thinking about places becomes particularly pertinent in conflicts 
between different stakeholders in national parks. The claims to the legitimacy of 
certain modes of encountering national parks, such as camping or hunting are often 
tied to essentialist (and idealised) notions of what that particular national park is, 
largely ignoring what it might have been, or what it might become. As such, place is 
also constituted temporally (Crang 2012; Ingold 1993), but the temporality in the 
constitution of place is often overlooked or simplified in public debates around 
national parks34. 
The spatial turn in the social sciences has aimed to redress some of these essentialist 
assumptions about place through investigating how practices are fundamental to the 
constitution of place (Wylie 2005; Wylie 2004; Sheller & Urry 2003). In doing so, 
questions about placed practices: “which practices should be permitted in this place?” 
become questions of creation: “what kind of place might be/is being made through 
these practices?” Over the past two decades, scholars have emphasised the formative 
nature of practices of, for example, dwelling (Ingold 2005), walking (Wylie 2005), 
cycling (Spinney 2006), photographing (Crang 1997) and building (Diprose 2011). 
These works, among others, have helped to develop a framework through which we 
can understand place as much more than the inert backdrop to human activity. Rather 
than conceptualising these practices as occurring within an already defined and fixed 
space (of, respectively, hills, coastal paths, roads, landscapes, and the Australian bush), 
these and multiple other accounts emphasise that places are processual, and are 
constantly transforming and constituting through encounters of all kinds.  
                                                      
34 I problematise the framing of such debates later in the thesis, in ‘Representational 
environmental politics’. 
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Theorising national parks as processual places calls for some unpacking of what it is to 
‘encounter’ such places. 
If we think back to my opening vignette of summiting Mount Tennent as an 
‘encounter’, we may think of this as a relatively banal act of a person deciding to walk 
up a mountain. But this seemingly simple memory is teeming with complexity and 
possibility. Through beating feet and pumping heart, my very physiology was 
transformed by Mount Tennent’s topography. And, at another level, Mount Tennent’s 
topography was receiving my movements and stillnesses (along with many other 
people’s), and was also transformed, albeit in a different, less noticeable way. If this 
seems a grandiose claim, consider that transformation of the world happens through 
secretions of difference, which are often imperceptible. As Bissell puts it “How we 
affect and are affected is changed through duration… each experience in time alters the 
constitution of bodies and milieus. This challenges us to grapple with how the past 
continues to live on through the present and into the future” (Bissell 2014b, p.1950). 
In this case, one way my encounter with Mount Tennent is living on through the 
present and into the future is through producing this thesis and now, how you are 
encountering that event in your own way. These arcs of encounter continually change 
the milieu of this one ‘everyday’ experience of a national park. And we should 
remember that this is one experience in an incalculable field of relations, too excessive, 
too complex, and too dynamic to ever be fully representable (Herzogenrath 2008).  
Thinking encounter in this way helps elucidate the importance of the problematisation 
of human agency, a notion which has been called into question through the 
development of materialist, nonrepresentational redefinitions of agency as multiple 
and diffuse. As I have noted in ‘Contexts’, affect theory, new materialism, and 
Deleuzian assemblage are all approaches that challenge assumptions that humans are 
always the primary agents of transformation in events (Bennett & Chaloupka 1993; 
Bennett 2004; Allen 2011; Legg 2011).  
Nonrepresentational theories conceptualise agency as diffuse, arising from shifting, 
dynamic relations between multifarious elements. Thus, it would be remiss to deny any 
agency whatsoever to a human subject, for this only favours the ‘other side’ of a 
human/nonhuman binary that new materialism in particular seeks to dissolve; it is 
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precisely this splitting of human and world that is problematic. In other words, a 
complete rejection of human agency would serve only as a reversal of an illusionary 
binary, rather than a contribution to its dissolution (Halsey 2005). Nonetheless, 
diffusing the locus of activity away from the flawed idea of a sovereign agent allows us 
to conceptualise places such as national parks as mutable without resorting to blunt 
notions of these landscapes as merely a blank canvas or palimpsest of human activity 
(A. Taylor 2000), that deny any formative capacity to nonhuman bodies. 
Places are multiple and overlap, and are “composed of influences, contacts, and 
connections which, over time, have settled into each other, moulded each other, 
produced something new” (Massey 1995, p.183). Despite the continual ‘newness’ of 
place through mobile practices, we still tend to think of places as landlocked – as fixed 
upon a particular section of the earth. But if we are to come to grips with the 
complexity of places in general and national parks in particular, we must embrace that 
places are fluid and open, not contained within arbitrary spatial or temporal 
boundaries. 
Mobilities 
The practices that constitute national parks are inherently mobile practices, and the 
emerging ‘mobilities paradigm’ (Sheller & Urry 2006; Urry 2007), that takes the 
movements and flows that constitute life as its object of enquiry, is central in rethinking 
places we might usually think of as discrete and separate as constituted through 
mobile connections of all kinds. The mobilities paradigm attempts to reveal and refute 
static, rigid notions of place by contending that places and lives are characterised by 
movements of various scales. Places don’t exist in isolation, but are constituted through 
mobile practices of varying speeds, durations, and feedback loops. The mobilities 
paradigm is a very broad umbrella for all kinds of enquiry, but as Vannini has put it, 
“most would agree that the study of mobilities encompasses social processes centred 
upon the material movement of people and objects, as well as their imaginative and 
virtual movement” (Vannini 2010, p.111). 
The breadth of the mobilities paradigm makes it a seductive mode of exploring social, 
spatial, mobile lives (Elliot & Urry 2010). I put the mobilities paradigm to work in this 
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research project because, as I will argue, national parks are constituted through mobile 
processes – of movement and stasis, flows and stillnesses – as much as through 
systems of governance or practices of mapping and maintenance. The mobilities 
paradigm (or just ‘mobilities’) has been crucial in moving our understandings of 
relations between humans and landscape beyond thinking about the environment as 
mere static matter, awaiting meaningful human encounter and interpretation. 
Although the mobilities paradigm is perhaps best known for its work on more urban 
mobilities of cars (Sheller 2004), goods (Urry 1995), or air travel (Adey 2009a), modes of 
analysis in the mobilities paradigm lend themselves well to thinking about the mobile 
processes that constitute national parks. Indeed, the movements of all kinds of things – 
humans, certainly, but also flora and fauna species, weather patterns, water, dust and 
pollutants – are central to national parks. Think, for example, of the emphasis on 
management of ‘invasive’ plant and animal species, whose defining characteristic is 
that they are not ‘native’, that they are somehow in the wrong place (Atchison & Head 
2013; Gibbs et al. 2015)35. Even more politically loaded is the management of 
‘introduced’ species such as rabbits, foxes, or cane toads that have been deemed ‘pests’ 
due to their effects on other species or due to their effects on our natural resources base 
(Head 2012). These issues are particularly contentious in national parks, which we 
prefer to be inhabited by iconic native Australian species; the mobilities (or 
immobilities) of particular plants and animals cause us significant vexation.  
Being able to think through these processes in terms of movements allows us to pose 
different problems and ask different questions. For example, rather than asking which 
species should be allowed to take up residence in national parks, we can ask instead 
how such movements can create different ways of belonging in an environment that 
does not rest upon problematic, temporally constricted, nationalistic (and arguably 
racist) prescription of authenticity and ‘Australianness’ of particular plants and 
animals. Disrupting the sedentarist logic that informs such ideologies is a cornerstone 
of the mobilities paradigm (Wylie 2012), and thus also attends to the way specific 
imaginaries of national parks are on the move, both politically and spatially, by 
                                                      
35 Or at least, they were not native in the narrow band of time in which taxonomies of 
‘Australian’ plants and animals were developed. 
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looking at the ways ideas move throughout material and virtual communities (Vannini 
2010).  
For the purposes of these essays, then, ‘place’ is not defined by spatial dimensions. 
Rather, place is understood as an emergent, immanent crux of encounters. Far from 
inert places bound by human administrative infrastructures (such as fences) that only 
transform through human systems of governance, national parks are dynamic places 
constituted through the capacities of diverse human and nonhuman materialities. To 
encounter these places is at once to affect and be affected by their mottled pasts, 
presents, and futures. The following essays attend to what it is to enter into the 
complex constitution of national parks, and how encounters of all kinds can give rise to 
transformation in the world.  
4.3 Mapping 
The state does all it can to subdue wildness, and, primarily, wildness is subdued by 
giving it a place, by ascribing it boundaries, by giving it dimensions (Halsey 2011, 
p.228)  
 
On my very first fieldwork outing for this research project, I wanted to head to the 
Namadgi National Park visitors’ centre, just to see what I could see. It had been some 
time since I had driven out there and I was uncertain which route would be best. From 
where I live in Canberra, you drive south through the city until the amusingly definite 
boundary between Banks (a southern Canberra suburb) and farmland. You follow 
Tharwa Drive, which takes you past an historic homestead, and to the visitors’ centre.  
I looked up the route on Google Maps (who, surprisingly, did not sponsor this thesis in 
any way). Scrolling through the images helped me recall the sizes and shapes of the 
roads, and some of the traffic lights, intersections and roundabouts that were part of 
the trip out to Namadgi. The precise area of Namadgi is indicated on the screen in 
gentle beige. Shading indicates the scrunched topography of the area, which is encased 
mostly by a dotted line indicating the border of the ACT. Namadgi is a fair distance 
from the southern Canberra suburbs, and adjacent to several nature reserves in the 
ACT and New South Wales (NSW) as well as private properties. This place, this beige 
place, was my destination.  
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This brief event is an example of the dominant understanding of what maps are and 
how they function: they are images or representations of a material reality in the world, 
and they help us physically, digitally, or mentally navigate and understand that 
material reality. We look to maps for routes to specific locations, or for guidance when 
we have lost our way. We look to them for advice on what the contours of a particular 
section of terrain might be like to ascend or descend in car, on foot, or on bike. We look 
to maps to plan our next move on our backpacking journey, to find a particular 
building on campus, or to analyse the fluxes and flows of air travel across our skies.  
These are all fabulous things – to not be lost, to see patterns, to create new ways of 
dividing up and understanding our complicated geopolitical world – and maps are 
essential to this. But maps only allow us to make these uses of them through a 
particular logic of representation that I want to draw out in this section. Maps are, 
ostensibly, images of discrete, and ‘known’ parts of the physical world in which we 
live. They represent realities that are lived through feet and heat and motion and 
stillness. As such, maps operate through representative logic – that there are distinct 
parts of the world, and that we can faithfully represent them through images, videos, 
GPS, or other types of navigation.  
In this essay I explore these logics of representing the earthy (and usually not beige) 
national parks that I find so seductive. How do representations (particularly maps) of 
national parks encourage us to think about the ontologies of national parks? How are 
these productive or destructive ways of thinking through issues that arise through 
national parks – of human/nature relations, of governance decisions, of movements 
and stillnesses, of lives and deaths and evolutions and extinctions?  
Maps encourage a rigid sense of place that cultural geographers have been challenging 
for decades. Where maps attempt to pin down, connect, or disconnect geographically 
defined areas, cultural geographers have been arguing for a more fluid understanding 
of place that attends more closely to the flows and fluxes that constitute place 
(Cresswell 2004; Bissell & Fuller 2011; Massey 1995). As part of this project, critical 
cartography studies attempt to “decouple maps and mapping from any sort of 
ontological security” (Gerlach 2013, p.22). This involves a conceptual move from 
thinking of maps as accurate visual representations of fixed spatial, geographical 
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realities to nonrepresentational understandings of maps and mappings as “emergent 
processes and performances” (Gerlach 2013, p.22). Conceptualising maps in this way 
also signals a disruption of politics of place so commonly tied to imperialisms, a 
disruption in which a “more subtle micro politics concerned with affective 
dispositions” (Gerlach 2013, p.22) takes hold of our imaginings of place, and challenges 
more dominant macropolitical lenses associated with globalisation.  
This critical understanding emphasises that places are made through connections and 
movements of bodies of all kinds. Such movements are replete with difference: 
different bodies, different milieus, different temporalities, charged with different 
stillnesses (Bissell & Fuller 2011; Vannini 2012). Places are connected through 
movements of people, goods, animals, winds, pollen, ideas, money, memories, and so 
forth. Places constituted through such mobile practices are thus never the same, but 
constituted through difference. Can this shifting, dynamic web of relations be pinned 
down, represented, and known? Questions such as these have driven a reconsideration 
of “the ontological foundations of cartography, moving from a representational to a 
processual understanding of maps, from ontology (what things are) to ontogenetic 
(how things become)” (Caquard 2014, p.5). 
I am not arguing that maps always produce destructive encounters in (and with) the 
world. On the contrary, maps give our world a great deal: maps have performative 
capacities to act, to inspire, to create, to reimagine, and so on. One of my own most 
memorable encounters with maps during the production of this research, in fact, had 
very little to do with the production of this research. I attended the National Library of 
Australia’s excellent exhibition Mapping Our World (November 2013 – March 2014). 
This exhibition, perhaps more than most of the literature on maps I have scoured, 
showed me the power of maps to generate affects and give rise to all kinds of 
emotional resonances, to connect distant times and places in powerful ways, and to 
imagine new or different configurations of the world. I saw maps of religious beliefs, 
maps of temporal understandings, celestial maps, and a tiny scratch representing far 
north Queensland, no more than a few centimetres, that is one of the earliest attempts 
to map the eastern spire of my home country. Seeing this ancient scratching of a map 
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gave me pause and elicited a certain kind of confrontation of my own short history and 
my own short future. 
Maps play meaningful roles in much social research, highlighting issues that are not 
always thought of as spatial: maps can map economic inequality (Kosiba & Bauer 
2013), access to sanitation (Giné-Garriga & de Palencia 2013), the infrastructures of the 
Internet (DeNardis 2012), flight paths across the world (Abrams & Hall 2006), and so 
on. In this way, maps are essential in exploring and understanding the world, and are 
beautiful, important creations.  
Maps are tools that allow many diverse forms of dwelling in the world and generate 
particular connections to the world that would not be possible without the kinds of 
definitions, divisions and connections that are involved in mapping. Perhaps the most 
obviously ‘political’ of these would be the concept of territory, to which mapping is 
key. But as Elden has pointed out, “[c]artography is a key political practice that both 
represents and produces political space” (Elden 2013). While we are well versed in the 
representative powers of maps, I would argue that we are less able to articulate 
precisely how it is that an image on paper or a screen can produce political realities. 
Despite their beauty and their navigational functionality, we need to exercise caution 
in terms of the understandings of the world that maps encourage. Maps bring 
particular realities to the fore, and inevitably obscure other realities. Most 
contemporary maps, such as the one described at the start of this section, name the 
territory of Namadgi national park as Namadgi national park – part of the Australian 
Capital Territory (a territory within a territory), sitting just south of the capital city of 
Canberra. What such contemporary maps usually obscure, though, is that this same 
area, this same land, at this same time, is also Ngunnawal country, and Ngambri 
country, and indeed, the country of other Indigenous nations who travelled and lived 
the same lands which Namadgi now claims as its own to protect (Jackson-Nakano 
1994)36.  
This is not to say that contemporary maps erase the plural realities of the area 
designated as Namadgi, but rather, that in repeatedly representing the area as 
                                                      
36 I should acknowledge here that the managers of Namadgi have gone to great lengths in 
recent years to emphasise the importance of Aboriginal histories and cultures. 
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Namadgi and not Nugunnawal or Ngambri land37, this repetition of imagery, this 
refrain, changes relations, legitimising particular understandings of place over others. 
At stake is the ability to appreciate the spatial and temporal pluralisms of place that 
maps, as representations of fixed realities, tend to erase (Caquard 2014). While maps 
are often read as a symptom of such problematic power relations, they also act as 
important agents in causing, refraining, and reifying politically charged and culturally 
damaging claims to place. A pertinent example here are maps of Indigenous Australian 
language groups by anthropologists such as Norman Tindale and David Horton. 
Although the colourful arrays clearly show a different and important political reality of 
the Australian landmass, they also obscure that many of these territories were 
temporally constituted through different seasonal use by different Indigenous nations 
of the same location (Blackburn 2002; Sutton 1995). 
In excess of geopolitical implications, mapping as a practice can yield extremely 
pleasurable and productive affects. I have been trying to learn better navigation skills, 
practicing setting and walking bearings in different terrains, feeling increasingly 
comfortable that I could, if necessary, navigate routes without resorting to established 
                                                      
37 An important caveat here is that a Ngunnawal or Ngambri ontology of land would be 
somewhat different to the dominant (western) ontologies I am dealing with here. See, for 
example (Law 2004). 
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paths. This is a freedom and a pleasure that is shared by several people with whom I 
spoke in the production of this research, and the pleasures and pains of navigating 
with maps should not be underestimated. A particular sense of triumph and 
frustration comes from reading or misreading a map, and these affects are important 
encounters in terms of their capacities to effect transformations of bodily skills and 
habits.  
Maps are crucial to many national park practices. Maps are used to designate national 
parks, as tools for navigation, as devices for regulating certain activities in certain 
areas, and so on. Hikers in particular use maps in order to navigate terrain, plan their 
next day’s hiking and check their progress before that all important time – sundown. 
This significance of maps was central in my conversations with Julia and Sophie about 
their hiking experiences. Discussing their navigation techniques, Julia and Sophie both 
articulated how important maps were in making decisions when they became 
uncertain or unsettled during their week-long hike through the ACT and NSW high 
country, which began in Namadgi in March 2014. Their maps reassured them, or set 
them back on their way if they had lost it.  
Becoming ‘lost’ was a repeated concern throughout the interview, so eventually I 
asked: “how is it that you come to realise that you’re lost?” Sophie described events 
such as not seeing landmarks they should have seen by now, or realising they were on 
the wrong side of a particular mountain range, but interestingly, Sophie also described 
how maps enter into slow-building sensations that give rise to the threshold moment 
of feeling lost: 
And then it just kind of, I dunno, things don’t make sense… like they only make sense 
retrospectively. And then you can see all the mistakes that you’ve made. Like this 
unavoidable landmark that we didn’t see, but we forgot that we were supposed to see 
that, or you just, like what I said about you’re interpreting what you’re seeing without 
realising it. It’s like, I kept saying that we were looking at ruins the last time, because 
we had to be looking at ruins because that’s what the map said. But of course if you 
looked at something you’d know whether it was ruins or a ski lodge, and it’s a ski 
lodge. But layering that interpretation on… just convincing yourself that things are right 
because they have to be. I mean I guess it’s the way you, maybe what’s problematic is 
the way we view maps. Because you know, a map is like a bible kind of thing. That 
[map] is the truth. But then a landscape’s not a map. (Interview, 25/04/2014, my 
emphasis) 
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As an avid walker, I tend to think of maps as crucial tools in recovering my bearings 
once I realise I am lost, or preventing getting lost in the first place. And yet here Sophie 
is describing that maps have also entered into her experiences very differently: that 
maps themselves have contributed to mistakes she has made in interpreting the 
landscape around her. However, it seems that Sophie and Julia are hesitant to ascribe 
blame to the map and more to their shortcomings in perceiving the landscape around 
them: “the map is like a bible”. The assumed skills of the map to faithfully and accurately 
represent the ‘on-the-ground reality’ led Sophie and Julia to make particular 
evaluations of their own bodily skills against the bodily skills of the map.  
In representational terms this is a fair analysis: that a map is an accurate representation 
of a given landscape that experienced hikers should be able to discern for themselves 
and navigate through. But I would argue that something more is at play here: that in 
relation to Sophie’s body and Julia’s body, the map changes the landscape, as the 
landscape is always co-constituted through movements of (hiking, mapping) bodies 
through it (Wylie 2005). Here the map less a representation of a given landscape, and 
more a part of the enactment of that landscape that can guide hikers home, or, in this 
case, lead them astray. 
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After a few minutes of discussing getting lost and navigating with Julia and Sophie, I 
noticed that Julia regularly gestured to her stomach. I asked, “I don’t know if you 
noticed, but you gestured towards your stomach. Is that because you’re recalling that 
that’s part of the feeling of stress or….?” 
Julia responded, “yeah, yeah absolutely”. This part of the interview has stuck with me, 
because the recollection of their feeling of loss and panic was palpable. It felt much 
more powerful than a recollection of a past feeling, but that feeling of being lost was 
renewed and repeated in our interview encounter. The encounter itself was changing 
all of our relations to these experiences: I felt concerned at what might have become of 
my partner and my friend. This interview encounter changed my understanding about 
Sophie’s trips with Julia, and will continue to inform my feelings on them into the 
future.  
The interview has also folded into Julia’s and Sophie’s experiences of being lost. This 
highlights the dimensions of place that cannot be captured or represented by any map: 
the immateriality of memory is too complicated for that, and such complex, nonlinear 
temporal experience is an essential constitutive factor in encountering place. Why, 
then, does the idea that maps are an accurate and whole representation of the world in 
which we dwell still have such a hold? What comfort is gained from this 
understanding?  
Perhaps maps assuage some fears of the knotty feeling in the gut of being ‘lost’, of 
being somehow out of place.  
I want to share another vignette of how this came to the fore for me personally.  
Taking a holiday from researching national parks, I spent a considerable amount of 
time hiking and trail running in the national parks of Tasmania. I am a relatively 
inexperienced overnight hiker and rely heavily on Sophie for navigation. On a three-
day walk around the Freycinet Peninsula in Tasmania, though, I was trying to improve 
my navigational skills, paying more attention to our map than I normally would.  
This was a particularly hard trail, which takes hikers almost to the summit of Mount 
Graham, a considerable climb when carrying a heavy pack on already tired legs – not 
to mention the energy-sapping but exhilarating close encounters with large, venomous, 
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and (almost definitely) ferocious snakes on the peninsula. My leg muscles burned from 
the effort and my knees, weakened from years of wear, tear, and neglect, were not 
holding up well under the steep inclines and descents. In anticipation of relief from my 
increasing pain, I checked the map to see how much further we had to go before we 
could set up camp. My stomach dropped and my throat tightened. According to the 
map, we were walking away from Wine Glass Bay, our campsite for the evening. Guilt, 
panic, pain, mixed with the heady joy that comes to me with a few days of getting out 
‘into nature’ is a complicated assortment of bodily reactions, and these forces brought 
me to a sudden stop.  
We hadn’t seen a track marker for a kilometre or so. We were definitely walking the 
wrong way. Or was the campsite behind us? Either way we were done for. We would 
perish atop the ridge and be remembered as the hapless hikers who somehow got lost 
on a tiny peninsula.  
As it turned out, none of these imagined catastrophes came to pass. We were on the 
trail, which shortly curved around on itself, following a sublime ridgeline down to the 
Bay. We were fine. We were a couple of hours walk from our campsite. No rescue 
teams required! Relief mixed in with residual panic until the former compelled the 
latter to quiet its unhelpful rush of adrenaline and blood.  
This encounter can be apprehended quite simply: I made a mistake, which I realised 
quite quickly, and nothing more came of it.  
But this does not even begin to describe the intensities of the moment of feeling lost, 
albeit an ephemeral one. This instance of feeling lost was the effect of multiple bodies 
relating and interacting in very particular ways, but central to this experience was the 
disconnect between the map’s guidance and my assumptions about the lie of the land 
(I was right that we were walking away from the campsite, but we did so in order to 
follow a ridge down the peninsula). Here, the map as a representation of the ground I 
walked on was a disturbing element that gave rise to quite destructive affective 
resonances between my already-tired body and the landscape. But the map also 
operated as a material body – clasped in my shaking hand – that entered into and took 
part in this particular event as a powerful actor.  
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Thinking beyond the superficial explanation above (I made a mistake and jumped to a 
catastrophic conclusion), though, this encounter discloses that the capacities of maps to 
shape relations to the landscape are not limited to their representational power, as they 
are not always encountered and interpreted through a representational framework. 
Indeed, maps are materialities with powerful possibilities to lead bodies astray, to give 
rise to powerful affects of nervousness and relief. These events – Julia’s and Sophie’s 
explorations, and my own anxious relations with maps – are but two examples of maps 
performing as creative materialities, entering into and transforming relations between 
bodies of all kinds.  
While these two examples focus on brief personal experiences, the formative capacities 
of maps also operate in broader, more conceptual aspects of national parks as places in 
which ‘nature’ can take place (Zimmerer 2000). 
Although maps may reduce hazardous relation to landscapes by providing hapless 
hikers with navigatory guidance, they give rise to hazards of other kinds: what kinds 
of events and activities are permitted to occur outside of national parks, if the activities 
inside national parks are understood as sheltered from those activities outside? What 
acts are permitted outside of these designated spaces based on this separatist 
understanding (Halsey 2011)? 
Maps create adjacencies of places (Howitt 2001). These adjacencies can give rise to both 
destructive and productive encounters. But how we think about ‘productive’ and 
‘destructive’ is critical. We may think of ‘destroying’ nature in order to ‘produce’ 
commodities, which brings us back to the stale and utilitarian debates this thesis is 
trying to move beyond. How might things change if we were to think of ‘productive’ 
and ‘destructive’ encounters in more Spinozan terms, which refrain from moralistic 
judgements (such as nature is ‘good’ and commodities are ‘bad’) (Deleuze 2004; Halsey 
2006). Thinking in these terms would require us to expand the base of our arguments 
around national parks on what kinds of capacities are being enabled or disabled in the 
defining and differentiating work that maps do.  
In this, maps are formative elements of the world and play a significant role in 
important encounters and events. But caution should be exercised with respect to how 
maps encourage us to think about places such as national parks. Maps encourage us to 
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think national parks in terms of their boundaries and limits, their separation from, and 
connection to other parts of the world. But there is no thick red line around the 
boundaries of Namadgi national park. Namadgi is connected to its surroundings in 
ways that human activities can never fully grasp or control. Boundaries marked on a 
map lead us to think that protected areas such as national parks can be, and are 
protected from the potentially destructive human activities that surround them.  
Maps assist in the continuity of a deeply ingrained, yet problematic assumption that 
humans can, in fact, create (protected) parcels of the world that are separate from, 
adjacent to, connected or disconnected from other (industrial) parcels of the world. 
Territories and borders are at the heart of the organisation of the world (Elden 2013). 
However, in the context of national parks, this logic encourages understandings of 
protected areas as exceptions to industrial capitalism which relies on the use of natural 
resources for economic development with little or no consequence. The hazardous 
conclusion of this exceptionalism is that as long as there are protected parcels of 
nature, capitalism may continue unashamed (Zimmerer 2000).  
The ontological attitudes that go along with the notion that humans can and do 
segment the world into defined and knowable parts reveal much about our 
understanding of the constitution of the world and the place of humans within it. 
Apprehending the world as a cake to be sliced, diced, and shared between nature on 
one hand and humans on the other reveals the modernist modes of thought that still 
dominate our understandings of the world. The claim to ontological legitimacy of these 
parochial notions of place is reified by the measuring, dividing, and connecting 
functions of mapping. As such, maps encourage ascribing dimensions to place: maps, 
for example, tell us that Namadgi national park is 106,095 hectares in the south of the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT Government 2015 But what does it mean to ascribe 
dimensions to a place? What kinds of relations are subdued, denied, or ignored 
through such actions? Can a place really be named, drawn on a map and declared that 
it is measurable and knowable within those measurements?  
The representational story of maps is familiar: that they are an easily accessible picture, 
or representation, of the physical world – as though the physical world is an 
unproblematic, given entity.  
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That maps are also materialities of their own is significant, as they fold into relations, 
shaping experiences and encounters, and bringing certain realities to the fore and 
obscuring others. Jane Bennett’s (2005, 2010) work on ‘vibrant matter’ has persuasively 
argued for acknowledging the significance of recognising the capacities and powers of 
materialities of all kinds. This includes representational tools such as maps. Although it 
can be difficult to resist the reality that maps are an attempt to represent our world, 
maps are also vital materialities with the capacity to effect change in the world, not 
merely to reflect a world which is already complete, knowable, and ontologically 
given.  
The plurality of maps is central here: that while they are useful and often beautiful, the 
ways in which maps are utilised bring hazardous encouragement to view the world as 
if it can be segmented, as if it can be bordered, as if it can be protected from potentially 
harmful relations with other parts of the world. Asking whether maps are always and 
essentially ‘good’ or ‘bad’ devices in the world makes no sense. A more pertinent 
question, one I have drawn out here, is of the capacities and potentialities of maps: 
what can maps do?  
Maps can shape interpretations of landmarks, which, as Sophie’s and Julia’s 
experiences have elucidated, can have significant effects and can give rise to significant 
affects. Maps can tighten stomachs and generate nervous sweat, maps can shape what 
eyes see and what feet feel, and maps can elicit wonder and stir imaginations of new, 
different worlds. In short, maps do more, much more than represent realities – they 
help bring those realities into being. Problematising the representational tendencies of 
mapping by thinking through affective relations in encountering maps and landscapes 
affirms that we do not know what maps can do – indeed we do not know what any 
materiality can do (Massumi 2002).  
4.4 Fencing 
In the early days of this research, before the importance of national parks emerged, I 
was hooked on the idea of writing a thesis about fences. I often had to repeat the 
“topic” of my thesis to friends: “I’m not 100% sure what it’s about yet” I would 
venture, “but something to do with fences”. Smiles faltered and brows furrowed. 
“Forensics?” one friend misheard, “Cool!” When I reiterated my topic, it was clear that 
96 
 
fences were not commonly regarded as “cool”. But the lack of enthusiasm is, I 
maintain, part of the mystique of the ubiquitous, but often ignored fence. Just a little 
prodding would yield stories of frustration with neighbours over poorly maintained 
yard fences or detailed descriptions of alternative travel routes due to construction or 
roadwork fences. If the conversation survived long enough, friends would bring up 
fences of international fame such as the Berlin Wall, the USA/Mexico border, or the 
Gaza fence.  
These responses reflect the dominant modes of inquiry through which fences make 
their presence known in scholarly literature. Fences are most apparent in research to do 
with borders and boundaries in various social, political and spatial contexts. There is a 
large and varied body of literatures across many disciplines that we can loosely 
identify as ‘border literature’ (Madsen 2011; Dear 2013; Newman & Paasi 1998). Much 
of this literature has come out of the widespread focus on forces of globalisation in the 
1990s (Newman & Paasi 1998). For geographers, sociologists and political theorists 
dealing with borders, “the role of boundaries has been closely connected with the ideas 
of territory, territoriality and sovereignty” (Newman & Paasi 1998, p.187). Along with 
increasing pace and intensity of processes of globalisation such as trade and 
immigration, the delineations of national territories have become increasingly rigid, 
with nation states constructing physical border infrastructures such as fences and walls 
where divisions were previously ideological and administrative (Shapira 2013). Thus, 
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border fences have been conceptualised in globalisation literatures as material 
reflections of contemporary political will to distinguish nations in a time of increasing 
fluidity and mobility. As Shapira has pointed out, “[g]lobalization has been marked by 
a proliferation of borders” (Shapira 2013, p.249). 
The fence is commonly theorised as a reflection of contemporary attitudes towards 
immigration, trade, and national security. Much literature has figured the fence as a 
functional technology, deployed in the interests of particular stakeholder groups, and 
as reflections of cultural apprehensions of otherness (Madsen 2011).  Pullan’s work, for 
example, focuses on the fences and walls around and within Jerusalem as political tools 
of conflict. Pullan focuses on the ways these infrastructures change mobile relations 
and enforce asymmetrical affordances, as “in Jerusalem borders and mobility are not 
planned or deployed in the same way for [Palestinians and Israelis]” (Pullan 2013, 
p.126). In this highly politicised, embattled space, Pullan’s insistence that “these [walls] 
are essentially one-dimensional barriers with a single purpose: to divide” (Pullan 2013, 
p.127) is unsurprising. And yet the ways these ‘one-dimensional barriers’ affect and 
shape life around them are multiple. Fences in Jerusalem have also become significant 
sites of protest, and artistic engagement through forms such as graffiti and 
photography. Photographs of Jerusalem fences refrain and refract around the world, 
effecting transformations quite apart from the intended purpose of division.  
I have not always been interested in fences, but I started paying them more attention, 
particularly after encountering Lesley Instone’s work theorising the fence as a 
technology of colonialism that endures today. Through practices of backyard fencing, 
the logic of erecting a fence around a patch of land and claiming ownership is 
distinctly colonial (Instone 2009). Indeed, postcolonial theorists (Young 2001) have 
pointed to the fence as fundamental to the settlement of land – citing stories of early 
colonists erecting fences and claiming ownership of the land within the boundary. 
Research in this field has emphasised the imperial ideology that accompanied such acts 
of asserting ownership, and the ways these ideologies endure in Australian society 
today. But it was Instone’s work emphasising the fence as an agent through which to 
understand the production of landscape that made me a little obsessed with fences for 
a number of months. Instone took the fence as “divider and mirror…as discursive and 
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material object, [which] is used to explore the ways in which the land was 
appropriated, privatized, divided, transformed, and bent to the pattern of colonial 
relations” (1999, p.372). 
Partly through their use of fences as boundaries, national parks are bound up in the 
fraught politics of land ownership in Australia. Some have argued that national parks 
have sometimes been established in order to preclude or prolong returning particular 
parts of the country to traditional owners (Lawrence 1996). National parks can 
therefore themselves be considered technologies of colonisation.   
Focusing on the functional capacities of fences to enforce colonial ideology, culture and 
laws necessarily folds into important conversations on global, national and identity 
politics. Australian postcolonial scholarship is a body of work that focuses primarily on 
human politics and identity formation (Eagleton 1998; Reynolds 1998; Reynolds 1999). 
While postcolonial research from Australia and elsewhere does attend to the fraught 
relationships between landscape, environment, and colonisation (see, for example, 
Adams & Mulligan 2003; Taylor 2000), typically the landscapes against which these 
social and cultural processes occur, including the fences that inhabit those landscapes, 
are backgrounded in favour of analysing human activities of colonisation or 
contemporary postcolonial politics. This is precisely the kind of ‘dead geography’ 
(Thrift & Dewsbury 2000) contemporary cultural geographers argue renders the 
material world falsely as secondary to, and less lively than, human culture and actions. 
Whilst human activity is no doubt lively, the material world is lively too, and is much 
more active in the transformation of the world than we usually give it credit for.  
To attend to this liveliness, we can turn to work within the mobilities literature (Sheller 
& Urry 2006), which takes care to emphasise the transformative capacities of 
materialities – particularly infrastructures. In this understanding, the fence is not only 
an inert, functional technology, imposed upon pre-existing landscapes for the purposes 
of enforcing political decisions about the movements and flows of certain bodies – 
human and nonhuman. This is certainly one way of understanding fences, and the role 
they play in human lives and societies. However, in line with the emphasis of this 
thesis on avoiding the centrality of humans in events, I want to put forward here some 
other ways of thinking about the fence and its capacities to effect transformations quite 
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apart from those changes intended by the humans who construct and maintain the 
fence.  
Exploring the power relations brought into being by segmenting and claiming 
ownership of the land – in the way colonialism has done so in Australia through fences 
– has, I feel, created an ambivalence to fences in the literature; it is difficult to associate 
a tool of colonialism with productive change in the world. In this literature, fences are 
seen as a representation of the violence of Australia’s settlement frontier (Reynolds 
1981), and the continued violence (albeit through socio-economic tools) in 
contemporary Australia (Power & Somerville 2015). This is certainly a story worth 
telling.  
However, part of the challenge of this thesis is trying to look beyond the 
representational qualities in different elements of the world, and so I find myself 
desiring to explore the nonrepresentational, material capacities of fences. I have 
demonstrated my love of fences in ‘Interlude one: the rabbit proof fence’, but I want to 
explicate in further detail what kinds of material and immaterial relations fences can 
enter into; move from thinking through what fences mean in certain contexts, to what 
fences can do. The most common obstacle to thinking about the capacities of fences to 
effect change in the world is the inescapable fact that they are inorganic structures, 
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built by humans for specific purposes, and thus are most easily apprehended in those 
functional terms (as in border literatures).  
But is the genesis of the fence really the only pertinent factor we can consider? I 
contend that eliding the utilitarian and human origins of fences can open new 
pathways for thinking about the capacities of fences beyond their intended function. 
This is precisely the type of elision that Jane Bennett calls for scholars to be more 
attentive to the ways materialities of all kinds have the capacity to effect 
transformations (Bennett 2010). Attending to ‘capacity’ is a tricky business that requires 
a shift in thinking that places less emphasis on observed evidence – a most 
uncomfortable notion for the scientifically inclined! Observations cannot tell us 
everything about possibilities for the future, for example; the future never fails to 
surprise. Or what of “imperceptibles elided by representation [such as] emotions, 
passions, and desires, and immaterial matters of spirit, belief, and faith”? (Dewsbury 
2003, p.1907). Whether we perceive capacities or not (of, say, a fence) is secondary, and 
in some senses, unimportant in this exploration; so much of what constitutes the world 
eludes perception, grasp, and representation (Dewsbury 2003).  
In terms of national parks, we might think of fences as the infrastructural enforcement 
of human decisions around precisely which areas are to be ‘included’ in a national 
park, decisions which, of course, necessitate the exclusion of other areas. But there is an 
increasing recognition that simply erecting boundaries cannot ensure the desired 
functions of protected areas. Indeed, critics of contemporary conservation practices (as 
embodied by national parks) argue that nature reserves are possibly detrimental to the 
goals of environmental conservation by reinforcing perceived distinctions between 
nature and society, as “[b]oundary making for conservation runs the risk of simply 
walling-off [urban] landscapes from the prized places whose ecological value is 
deemed worthy of special conservation-style treatments” (Zimmerer 2000, p.362).  
These schisms are precisely what a large body of work in human geography has 
sought to address through theorising urban ecologies through practices such as dog 
ownership (Instone & Sweeney 2014) and urban community gardening (Ghose & 
Pettygrove 2014). Other scholars have pointed to the different ways the human and 
nonhuman are embedded together in practices such as invasive weed management 
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(Atchison & Head 2013), and the vexed politics of encountering nonhumans (namely, 
sharks) in the distinct habitat of the sea (Gibbs & Warren 2014). 
What these works, among others, point to is the fact that humans encounter and take 
part in ‘ecologies’ of all kinds, and that the politics of nature are present everywhere, 
whether we are closely attuned to them or not. The concern is that if conservation is 
understood as an activity that takes place exclusively in bounded places such as nature 
reserves, this will perpetuate a feeling that environmental considerations are secondary 
or unnecessary in urban areas, because there is a protected part of ‘nature’ elsewhere. 
In this way, conservation reserves have been criticised as “merely as a way to reconcile 
conservation with development” (Batisse 1997, p.33), as distinct boundaries between 
‘urban’ and ‘natural’ environments “are creating anew the schisms of nature and 
society in terms that are legal, discursive, environmental, and political-economic” 
(Zimmerer 2000, p.363). 
These arguments fold into criticisms often levelled at the efficacy of protected areas – 
that they are not fulfilling their intended function of protecting nature, because 
destructive human activities outside of these areas are too pervasive, are too invasive 
for areas to be protected from, and in some ways permit the most damaging of 
activities to continue guilt-free (“if nature is over there, and humans are over here, then 
humans may do what they wish with these areas”). Advocates of protected areas, 
respond to these criticisms primarily through arguing that environmental degradation 
would be much worse if we did not at least attempt to protect certain areas, habitats 
and species (Lockwood et al. 2012). 
In addition to these epistemological effects of fences, we can also question the 
legitimacy of the ontological claims the practice of fencing implies: that the world can 
be segmented; that infrastructures only have their intended effects; and that those 
effects can be known and controlled. However, in line with new materialist and 
affective theories, we need to be more open to possibilities and capacities of 
materialities (such as fences) that may take place in excess of our intentions, or indeed, 
in excess of our grasp altogether.  
We therefore need to rethink the question: what can fences do in national parks? What 
kinds of events can fences give rise to?  
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The predator-proof fence at Mulligans Flat seems to be fulfilling its intended purpose 
of preventing predator bodies from entering its territory38. But we may begin to ask 
ourselves, how else do border and boundary infrastructures such as fences operate? 
Surely they become more complex – making connections, creating and disrupting 
alignments – not merely a partition between two compressed chunks of land. As 
Ingold has argued, “such boundaries are not a condition for the constitution of the 
places on either side of them; nor do they segment the landscape, for the features with 
which they are identified are themselves an integral part of it” (Ingold 1993, p.156).  
The fence could constitute a thesis of its own (as was my early intention), but for the 
purposes of circumscription, I will focus here on different ways we can understand the 
fence in the context of Australian national parks outside of the cultural symbolic 
paradigm in which it is usually interpreted (Gill 2005). 
I am asking readers to consider the possibilities and capacities of ‘fencey’ affects – that 
is, the power of fences to effect transformations in the world – even at the ‘micro’ scale 
of embodied encounters. Perhaps my fenciest research encounter during this research 
was an early visit to Mulligans Flat Woodlands Sanctuary. Mulligans is a relatively 
new nature reserve in the ACT, established in 1996 (although the fence was only 
completed in 2009). For readers unfamiliar with the area, it is best imagined as an 
expansive outdoor laboratory that also happens to be a very nice grassy reserve to 
walk in. The Sanctuary is unusually organised by many internal segmenting fences. 
Each segment mimics different ‘natural’ environments – different types of grass, 
different amounts of dead wood (an important habitat for little critters), but animals 
roam as they see fit, either leaping over, scrabbling under, or popping through the 
internal fences. Where the animals choose to reside is an important indicator for 
rangers at Mulligans, as their preferred habitats help management prioritise certain 
projects (such as increasing dead wood in paddocks preferred by smaller marsupials).  
While the internal fences are relatively porous, the predator-proof perimeter fence is 
another matter entirely.  
                                                      
38 Unfortunately it is also preventing vital movements of native animals, an issue I deal with in 
depth in ‘Ecologies’. 
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Entering Mulligans feels like what I imagine walking into a minimum security prison 
would be like. This isn’t a bad thing – the extent of security at the main entrance is 
comical. A 10-foot predator-proof fence topped with barbed wire, multiple security 
cameras and warning signs, heavy gates on springs and a second internal fence 
welcome you into the prison Sanctuary. On this visit to Mulligans, I was in a perpetual 
state of hyper-attentiveness to fences, to the point where friends would post photos of 
fences to me on social media. This singular focus probably contributed to my being 
generally overwhelmed by the infrastructural feat that is the entrance to Mulligans 
Flat. I remember briefly imagining that I was entering a prison, and that the kangaroos 
and bettongs inside would be wearing little prison uniforms with numbers sewn into 
their shirts (“their crime? Being native!”). The metal and mechanics, along with the 
sense that I was “doing research” should, perhaps, have engendered slightly more 
serious feelings in me, but I was, instead, moved to quite a silly disposition.  
The silliness persisted throughout the afternoon’s activities. Sam, an ecologist working 
on the reintroduction of various species to the ACT, had invited me to come and 
accompany his team around the Sanctuary. We started with a cup of tea and a chat 
with some of the staff about working at the Sanctuary. Perhaps due to my nervous and 
excitable state, I cannot precisely recall the conversation over tea, but I do remember 
one staff member telling me about when protestors cut holes in the fence to free 
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kangaroos that had been scheduled for culling in 2012. The ranger told me that each 
hole took him approximately 90 minutes to repair, on top of his usual maintenance 
duties around the Sanctuary. While cutting holes in the fence may have allowed a few 
kangaroos to escape, these holes also risked letting predators such as foxes and cats 
into the Sanctuary.  
After talking for a while, we began preparing cages to be used for catching bettongs39. 
They are regularly trapped to monitor their health. We prepared peanut butter and 
sesame oil sandwiches as bait for the traps – apparently this combination is their 
favourite, as it emulates the flavour of native truffles. This was not what I was 
expecting “Science” to be like at all. We jumped in four-wheel drives and began 
locating bettongs by waving around a very cool looking antenna, searching for the 
radio signals of the collars attached to different bettongs, beaming different signals. 
When we found the general location of a bettong, we placed several traps in a wide 
circle around it, hoping the delicious faux-truffle smell of peanut butter and sesame oil 
would lure them in when they awoke at sunset.  
We spent the afternoon repeating the process, sometimes jumping fences in order to 
get to the section of the Sanctuary housing the lucky bettongs.  
I don’t know what I was expecting this experience to yield, but it was very different to 
what I thought it would be like: I had an admittedly uninformed notion of ecological 
science as a very serious, very precise exercise – yet here we were making sandwiches 
and getting stuck in fences, chasing after weird little marsupials.  
It was an utterly ridiculous, and utterly joyful experience that was intricately linked to 
encountering the fence.  
The fence is also creating new organisations of place, constantly engaged in creating 
connections and striations in places which would be smoother, adjacencies less 
discernible without it (Halsey 2011). This is not to say that this process is necessarily 
bad or good – indeed, we should resist the urge to evaluate such processes according 
to rigid environmental moralisms, as attributing normative values to such processes 
                                                      
39 Bettongs are small wallaby-like marsupials being reintroduced to the Canberra region after 
being extinct from mainland Australia since the 1920s. 
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closes off possibilities for radical thought. Rather, we can try to attend to such 
organisations or striations of place as a change in material relations that may give rise 
to events of all kinds. Thanks to the fence, there are lines of flight to and from the 
sanctuary that exceed its boundaries, undertaken by various bodies – human and 
nonhuman.  
Perhaps the most adorable line of flight was performed by Rowena, the Bush Stone-
curlew. The story of Rowena’s brief escape, is summarised on the Mulligans Flat 
website as follows, from the point of view of the Canberra family who found her: 
Rowena [our ecologist has named each curlew] was first seen looking into our front 
window in Forde at about 11:30am. We thought the bird would go away so we left her. 
On our return home, about 5 hours later, we found her still in the front garden resting 
next to our drive way. We thought she may be injured, noticed the leg flag, and caught 
her. We then contacted a wildlife carer who came around and took Rowena away. 
 
This was not just a simple escape from, and return to the distinct, bounded territory of 
the Sanctuary. In this view, the fence functions as a regulatory technology – prevent 
movements of bodies in certain places, but allowing movements in others – through 
gates, steps, cattle grids and so on. While this may be the intended use of fences – that 
they perform more or less well – thinking beyond the genesis of fences allows us to ask 
further questions about what else fences do (Newman & Paasi 1998). How do the 
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materialities of fences interact with other bodies? What kinds of territorialisations and 
deterritorialisations become possible around fences?  
Through her adventures, Rowena, in exceeding its limits, deterritorialised and 
reterritorialised the Sanctuary, showing the fluidity of place – even places protected by 
a fence befitting a minimum-security prison. Through her feathered mobile body and 
its relation to other bodies (fences, windows, driveways, cars, families, and so on), 
Mulligans Flat exceeded its fenced boundary, entering into the encounters and 
experience of many individuals. Even when Rowena returned safely to the Sanctuary, 
Mulligans continues to be a place constituted within and outside of its boundaries, 
through material lines such as Rowena’s journey, and more ephemeral, unstable, and 
immaterial lines that take place in the foggier realms of memory and experience. 
The Mulligans Flat predator-proof fence enters into relations with bodies of all kinds, 
eliciting all kinds of responses. Whether we are focusing on Rowena’s brief bid for 
treacherous freedom, or my own afternoon of playful scientific pursuits, the point here 
is that the full extent of the fence’s capabilities in these events can never be fully 
known. I did not know at the time, for example, that this essay would take this form, or 
take this position in this thesis. I did not know the pleasure I would get from recalling 
and re-presenting these events. 
4.5 Tracing 
As walking, talking, and gesticulating creatures, human beings generate lines wherever 
they go (Ingold 2007, p.1) 
 
One cool spring morning in 2013, Sophie and I headed to the very southern edge of 
Namadgi national park to attempt a challenge for me: my first ten kilometre run and 
my first ‘proper’ trail run40. We had selected Settlers’ Track, a well-known historical 
trail that runs through a few old homesteads from the time when Namadgi was used 
for grazing. We drove into the national park, broke from the sealed road to dirt, and 
trundled to the car park for Settlers’. I don’t remember many details of the run – I was 
concentrating on not falling and not dying. I remember being excited, though. We 
                                                      
40 ‘Trail running’ is similar to cross-country running; the terrain is usually remote and rugged, 
with more ascents and descents, and may be on rocks, gravel or dirt trails, grass, through rivers 
and so on. 
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trotted along, avoiding stumps, jumping fences, got a little lost, and doubled back 
through various parts of grassland and bush.  
Thoroughly enjoyable. But so what? How can ‘everyday’ encounters such as this help 
us think about national parks, or nature, or the place of humans in the world?  
We might typically think of this activity as “going for a run in Namadgi”. We think of 
the human activities (driving, running, jumping) as occurring within an already 
established and ontologically given area (Settlers’ Track in Namadgi). Thinking of 
practices in this way denies the way in which cultural geographers in particular have 
been conceptualising place for decades now – a conceptualisation in which practices 
and movements of all kinds are partially constitutive of place, and where, in turn, place 
is partially constitutive of a (temporary and shifting) subjectivity – I was a Namadgi 
runner. Although perhaps more complicated and more difficult to understand, this 
understanding of the relationship between embodied practices and landscape opens 
new ways for us to think about national park practices that should not be overlooked 
in favour of the more simplified version of inert landscapes populated by active human 
agents.  
This simpler understanding of practices is problematic, particularly in relation to 
national parks, as it reinforces an idea of human activity taking place above, or against, 
nature. This is based upon an idea of humans as an element in the world which is 
antithetical to nature (unless engaged in some sort of conservation practice, in which 
case it’s totally fine to be a human). This is precisely the understanding of the 
relationship between humans and nature that this thesis aims to problematise by 
attending to the complexities of encounters between humans and nature, and indeed 
by problematising the legitimacy of those categories themselves.  
My introduction to thinking through these tensions of bodies and landscapes came 
about through reading John Wylie’s evocative work on walking (Wylie 2005; Wylie 
2004; Wylie 2009). Moving away from more traditional notions of a discrete human 
subject moving through an external environment (Lutzenhiser 2002), Wylie contends 
that bodies and landscapes are co-constituted through mobile practices. In his work on 
walking the West Coast Trail, Wylie takes us through the ways that bodily experiences 
– the pleasures of breathtaking views, the pains of blistered feet and tired legs – can be 
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understood as events that result from relations between a constellation of human and 
nonhuman elements of eyes, light, air and ocean currents, compacted soil, rubber soles, 
lactic acids and so forth. Conceptualising experiences and events in this relational way 
challenges the notion of a discrete, bounded human subject and an external 
environment devoid of agency or capacity.  
The subject of national parks in Australia can be approached in multiple ways, but 
central to the questions I am asking here is how processes and flows constitute national 
parks beyond their discursive and legal definition. In line with Deleuzian notions of 
wildlife that emphasise movement (Lulka 2004), the emphasis on mobile practices is 
useful in thinking about the becomings of national parks outside of representational 
scientific modes of enquiry. 
Perhaps largely due to their seemingly rigid discursive and technological boundaries, 
we have come to think of national parks as fixed parcels of land which we can enter 
and exit, come and go, leave or stay. But as Ingold has put it, “a place in the landscape 
is not ‘cut out’ from the whole, either on the plane of ideas or on that of material 
substance. Rather, each place embodies the whole at a particular nexus within it, and in 
this respect is different from every other” (1993 p.156). And yet, our current 
understandings of national parks are precisely what Ingold is saying they are not: we 
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typically think of national parks as ‘cut out’ from the whole in terms of regulation, 
legislation, purpose, and materiality. Ingold suggests, though, that we should perhaps 
think national parks in terms of what kind of nexus they form, which enables us to 
pose a different problem of national parks – what is gathered, and what is excluded 
from national parks, and how do these gatherings and exclusions form national parks? 
Moving away from an understanding of practice as something that a fully discrete 
human rational subject enacts upon an inert environment allows us to think about 
events in terms of the relations and transformations of bodies as they encounter each 
other. There are many ways in which we could do this, but I want to attempt to avoid 
ingrained assumptions of practices as different sets of particular movements (beating 
feet, swinging arms, raising cameras, and so on) and think more in terms of what 
practices do. This section is an experimental exploration of the practices of walking and 
interviewing in relation to Tim Ingold’s taxonomy of lines.  
Ingold begins Lines: a brief history with the premise that “it only takes a moment’s 
reflection to recognize that lines are everywhere” (2007, p.1). Look around you. This is 
true. This simple point at the beginning of Lines has repeatedly come to the fore in my 
thinking during this research. Whether I have been walking through Namadgi or 
Mulligans, reading information in Tidbinbilla, or making notes on literature, this 
simple observation pops up: lines are everywhere. My first reaction to this point was 
probably similar to yours: so what? Ingold does not take long to explicate the 
importance of lines in the world by pointing out that colonialism “proceeds first by 
converting the paths along which life is lived into boundaries in which it is contained” 
(2007, p.2). In addition to attending to a world of lines in terms of the macro-scale 
processes of colonialism, we can also attend to smaller-scale embodied encounters with 
landscapes of all kinds through line-thinking.  
Below is one of many encounters in the course of this research that can be drawn out, 
poked and prodded a little to explore the complexities of encountering landscapes, and 
the ways that lines can reveal the nonlinearity of temporal ‘lines’. I play with tenses in 
this section to try to show that this essay is not just a recounting of ‘research’, but a 
creation of new relations between events that, although they occurred in the past, 
extend into the present and future – extensions that transform the past.  
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One of the moments in which Ingold’s Lines popped into my head was during an 
interview with John. We meet in the café at the National Library of Australia. I only 
had a vague idea of what he looked like from a brief internet search. But I knew him 
when I saw him. He is bronzed by the sun and crinkly with age, but he is lithe and he 
walks fast. He shakes my hand and I feel I have met a lovely, gentle man. He dedicates 
his time to helping others become comfortable in the bush through a brilliant blog 
outlining each of his walks, connecting people to landscapes in novel ways through 
virtual lines – online lines, if you will. John also leads regular walks with the Canberra 
Bushwalking Club. He affectionately refers to his fellow walkers as ‘artists’ when it 
comes to walking: 
They really are, the way they can navigate, read the land, read the features, walk along 
the ridges and spurs and things (Interview, 03/10/2013). 
 
John speaks with particular admiration of Matthew, a cultural heritage historian and 
fellow expert bushwalker41.  
I chatted to Matthew in my family home over a cup of tea a month earlier. He lives 
near me and it was a very friendly encounter, although, being my first interview for 
this research project, I was very nervous and found it hard to direct the conversation. 
Matthew, an extremely practised oral historian, was very much in charge of that 
                                                      
41 The same Matthew who also features in this essay, although John was unaware that I had also 
interviewed Matthew for this project. 
Photo credit: Julia Jasonsmith. Reprinted with permission. 
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interview – he retold stories of innumerable walks around the ACT high country, and 
he spoke most fondly of his solo journeys in the 1990s locating and cataloguing the 
original markers of the ACT border. Matthew says he rates his bushwalking days “by 
how much detritus there is in your pockets, because they just get full of leaves and 
little branches and stuff and you know you’ve been pushing through the bush when 
you come home like that” (Interview, 02/10/2013). He spoke so casually of navigating 
such difficult bush terrain I started to feel a little embarrassed about my own poor 
navigational skills, and my tendency to stay on marked tracks. This brief remark still 
comes back to me when I walk sometimes, and I question the ‘authenticity’ of my own 
walking experiences against Matthew’s knowledge and experience.  
When John mentions Matthew’s navigational expertise he sparks another connection 
for me – linking me and him and Matthew and Ingold’s Lines. Lingering on Matthew’s 
dedication to the cultural history of the ACT border, John comments “10 years after 
that, I’m sort of retracing his steps”. Lines. More lines. Lines of memories and lines of 
tracings and retracings. John is recalling a landscape traversed by his friend’s feet a 
decade earlier, sharing this diffuse and distributed memory with me, enrolling me in 
the landscape anew. This interview encounter is not simply a recollection or a shared 
conversation about a static landscape, encountered and remembered differently by 
different people. Rather, the landscape is being created anew in a set of memories, 
which are not quite the property of one body or one person, but rather, they are 
impersonal memories, connected and structured in the surprising setting of the café in 
the National Library of Australia.  
We may think of these two men as conducting feats of fitness and endurance in a 
landscape whose only agencies are limited to how difficult the terrain happens to be 
for human bodies, but we rarely think about what movements such as John’s walking 
may do in the world. His walks may seem ephemeral or insignificant in the grand 
scheme of things, but part of the ethos employed in this thesis is attending to things 
that are not immediately or clearly “important”, an ethos underpinned by that sticky 
Spinozan call – that we do not know what bodies can do (Spinoza 2001). 
This is part of the reason I find Ingold’s ‘Lines’ approach to the world so intriguing – 
that, as the epigraph of this section outlines, lines are made wherever things go. Lines 
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are the traces and the predictors of movements and moments, and it is critical that we 
attend to them in our understandings of place as constituted through such movements. 
Lines are what movements make or leave in the world – whether they are perceptible 
materialities, or whether they exist in the enigmatic world of memories.  
Ingold’s work on lines also offers us a way to think of life and liveliness outside of 
restrictive biophysical definitions that are explored in more detail in the next section. If 
we take it that movements and stillnesses constitute places, then we can perhaps say 
that these movements are life, regardless of the type of bodies that perform or are 
engaged in movements. But movements are transformations, and transformation is the 
push of life, with animals, plants, humans, geological formations, and so on as the 
expression of life.  
If we move towards this understanding of life as the vitality of transformation in the 
world then lines become, again, more significant than perhaps many of us have 
imagined. As Ingold puts it, “Life will not be contained, but rather threads its way 
through the world along the myriad lines of its relations” (2007, p.103). 
113 
 
When I ask John about his general preferences for walking, he says “We like to walk 
off track usually. We usually don’t use tracks, or we use them to get quickly and 
further into places. So mostly we like off track”. 
I have Lines on my mind at this point, and when I push John to articulate what it is he 
likes about walking off track, he responds:  
It’s probably all those things. Something new that fewer people have been to. Now I 
know you can get the same satisfaction from walking on a track but to basically be like 
a snail, in the sense that you’ve got everything on your back. And particularly because 
my wife’s not very well, so I usually only day walk. I can rarely get away for overnight 
trips. (Interview, 03/10/2013) 
 
What made him bring up his wife? I wonder. I squirm a little at this point in the 
interview, briefly trying to decide whether to stop the recording and express my 
sympathies. Before I responded, however, John continued, articulating his pleasure in 
feeling independent and going somewhere very few people have been (‘Making your 
own lines’, I told myself, and made a note of it).  
Tim Ingold is not alone in his theorisation of lines. In conversation with Clare Parnet, 
Deleuze (2002) also draws out the conceptual fecundity of ‘lines’ by outlining three 
different sorts of lines that constitute individuals: segmentary lines; molecular lines; 
and lines of flight42. Although I do not want to go into each of these complex concepts 
in depth here, we can perhaps think of segmentary lines as the kinds of lines we 
commonly use to define or delineate individuals43. We might think of segmentary lines 
as where we live, how we move, which kinds of bodies we connect with, and who we 
are disconnected from. These are the relatively visible ‘lines’ of division upon which 
much social science is founded. But Deleuze also introduces us to ‘molecular’ lines that 
are less visible, less rigid, more to do with ‘fluxes’ than divisions. We might think here 
of a line of thought which comes to mind unbidden – a disturbing vision of a family 
tragedy, or a happy memory – transitions that act upon our bodies, affecting us in 
ways of which we may or may not be consciously aware, and that may be invisible.  
                                                      
42 The ‘line of flight’ has been briefly explored in ‘Fencing’, and returns throughout both the 
‘Ecologies’ and ‘Politics’ chapters. 
43 Of course, an individual is not necessarily a human, but for my purposes here this is the type 
of individual to which I am attending. 
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Bissell (2014a) puts Deleuze’s ‘constitutional lines’ to work both conceptually and 
methodologically. The conceptual use of this line is important in drawing out the 
spatial and temporal complexities of connections of bodies, landscapes, walking, and 
interviewing. But the ‘molecular’ line is also methodologically important here, as the 
‘line of enquiry’ I take in this section, and indeed in this thesis more broadly follows 
Bissell in that I am “particularly interested in this second sort of ‘supple’ line because it 
points to the transitions taking place that do not necessarily map directly onto the more 
‘visible’ lines which we are more used to accounting for” (2014a, p.193).  
We are ‘used to accounting for’ many of the segmentary lines of national park 
encounters44. But we have not paid any attention to the more ‘supple’ lines of 
transitions and transformations that also constitute national parks and our connections 
with them. 
John’s sudden change in direction in our interview made me pause. It signalled that a 
transition had occurred in him – something had happened upon his supple line. I still 
feel guilty that I never asked after his wife’s health. Although I am very familiar with 
the transcript of John’s interview, the scene that still sometimes plays involuntarily in 
my mind is his downward glance, his shift in his seat, his hand around his coffee cup 
as he says softly, ‘particularly because my wife’s not very well’. 
4.6 Discoursing 
There are still intellectual and political gains to be had from insisting that nature is not 
simply natural: that in both discourse and practice it is socially made, not ontologically 
given (Castree 2003, p.205). 
 
Turning to a section on the ways discourse bring national parks into being in certain 
ways may feel counterintuitive in a thesis so focused on nonrepresentational theory45. 
But shying away from discourse makes little sense here, particularly given that one of 
the main motivations for undertaking this thesis was my frustration over the stagnant 
discourses around national parks. There was a period when it seemed to me that what 
                                                      
44These may be to do with attending to the physical and mental health benefits of walking in 
national parks, or the cultural significance of certain areas to certain people, or the political 
gambles being taken with the future ecological health of the country. 
45 As I noted in ‘Contexts’, the relationship between nonrepresentational theories and social 
constructivism, to which discourse analysis is usually tethered, is a complex problem and 
deserves more attention than it has received to date. 
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was being said about national parks was that they were beautiful or they were ‘locked 
up’ (Hockings et al. 2013), or that we should spend more on them, or make more 
money from them, or that specific areas were not ‘pristine’ anymore because once upon 
a time they were used for grazing or logging – this last point, of course, ignores the 
thousands of years of land management performed by Indigenous Australians (Head 
2012).  
I stopped reading news about national parks, frustrated with the omission of the 
plethora of complexities erased in these utilitarian debates. When that did not ease my 
resentment, I started only reading news about national parks, taking strange pleasure 
in my frustration with the omission of the complexities erased in these utilitarian 
debates.  
Given the common apprehension of national parks as firmly established and defined 
places, we can perhaps be forgiven for mistaking human practices of naming, 
bordering, and governing as the ways by which national parks are created and the 
manner in which they exist. In this understanding, debating the ways national parks 
should be put to work for humans makes sense. That is to say, when we enter into 
discourse and debate around the administration of a particular national park, it seems 
as though the place we discuss is an entity that we can describe, know, and control. We 
assume we know how this particular national park has materialised: through the 
actions of an environmental lobbying group, allocation of funding, and negotiation 
with several different stakeholders. But is ‘national park’ really such an unproblematic 
classification that it requires no deeper inquiry? Does inscribing lines on maps and 
building fences really define an area as ‘nature’? Should these bounded spaces only fall 
under the purview of ecological sciences?  
These questions go to the heart of the problems I explore throughout this thesis in 
various ways and scenarios. And these were the questions dominating my mind when 
I had a lucky break in my research activities. Sometimes, luck strikes just when you 
need it to. In early October 2014, I bumped into Matthew, one of my interview 
participants, on the street. He mentioned that the World Parks Congress, a once in a 
decade gathering of thousands of professionals (such as ecologists, park rangers, policy 
makers, and so on) involved in national parks, was taking place in Sydney in mid-
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November 2014. To reiterate: once every ten years, occurring just months from my 
planned submission date, just a few hours from home. This was an opportunity not to 
be missed! 
I was excited and apprehensive on my way to the Congress – I have never felt 
comfortable in Sydney, and I didn’t know anyone else who was attending; I would be 
one of seven thousand delegates from all over the globe. I chose to sit in on two days of 
discussion of just one of dozens of concurrent streams taking place at the conference. 
The stream was entitled ‘Reaching Conservation Goals’. The underpinning 
assumptions behind this title piqued my interest and, honestly, frustrated me. 
“Reaching” conservation goals? Is there really an end point where we can stop 
conservation activities because nature is all good now? It seemed ‘conservation goals’ 
were like a jar of cookies on a shelf just out of humanity’s reach, with the implication 
being that one day, with the right tools, we can and will reach the cookies. After a 
sleepless night in a dodgy motel in Sydney, I made my way to the Congress. Hungry, 
tired, and tardy, I found the location of the stream and took a seat at the back of the 200 
or so white plastic seats.  
I am normally a more involved person, rarely sitting surreptitiously at the back of large 
rooms, but I felt anxious in this environment.  
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I felt invasive and unwelcome – although no one paid me any attention. Here is the 
first (unedited) note I made as the session started:  
Sitting in the first session, two different streams running parallel in one big hall, 
separated by curtains. I’m hearing two talks but listening to neither.  
 
Gradually I acclimatised to the confusing aural atmospherics and settled into paying 
more attention to the content of the talks I was sitting in. My next two unedited notes:  
Formulas, graphs, and tables is a language I don’t speak, so maybe I’m missing out on 
the nuances of the talks, but lots of the language is “better”, “worse”, “less good” and 
so on.  
 
“Wildlife outcomes” - I wonder if anyone else finds that term ridiculous? “Outcomes” 
seems to be antithetical to the wildness of wildlife?? 
 
This beginning to the notes I took over my time at the Congress is a good indication of 
my disposition at the time: I was apprehensive, reactive, and extremely critical of the 
way this collective of ecology researchers was conceptualising ecological problems and 
solutions. By way of explication, I have compiled this list of unedited quotes from 
various talks, questions, and comments throughout the sessions that indicate the 
overall tone of the session that, for lack of a better phrase, pissed me off46: 
• “you would think we would know what works best…but we still don’t have an overall picture 
of what makes parks effective, and whether they’re effective”.  
• “better management strategies and outcomes” 
• “We need more data!” 
• “we go on and on and on….until the world stops falling apart” 
• “How much space is enough for nature?” 
• “Capacity of protected areas to deliver on objectives”  
• “Reaching conservation goals” - stream I spent time in at WPC. The “goals” are 17% land 
mass and 10% ocean.  
• “we have a major crisis on our hands, and protected areas are a tool or a response to this” 
• “Biodiversity outcomes” 
• “Invasive species is a key threat to biodiversity outcomes. It’s a global challenge” 
• “Solution: Key Biodiversity Area standard” 
• “We need to increase conservation until biodiversity loss is halted. Then we’ll have 
sustainability”  
 
Articulating precisely what it was about these particular phrases that made me bristle, 
roll my eyes and type furious notes is difficult, particularly when, throughout this 
                                                      
46 I make use of this semi-expletive deliberately here in order to emphasise how 
uncharacteristically irked I was by this form of discussion. Sometimes only the semi-profane 
can articulate the roughness of frustration and resentment (Riley 2005).  
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thesis, I have been striving for an ethos of openness to ideas, and to different ways of 
thinking. This feels paradoxical. Despite the calls of a Deleuzian ethos to be open to 
many modes of thought, not just my preferred ‘nonrepresentational’ mode of 
approaching problems, I was so closed and so reactive to the ways almost every 
speaker discussed their topic; I was the picture of Nietzschean ressentiment47. Perhaps 
it was that I felt inadequate or that this venue inflamed insecurities that my own work 
is not “rigorous research” – this has indeed been a constant anxiety in my research 
process. Whatever it was, at the lunch break on the first day I gathered myself and 
tried to decide to be more open to the work being discussed in the stream.  
Returning to the session, I paid attention to other elements of the discussions. I have no 
further quotes from speakers because I stopped paying attention to what speakers 
were saying. I paid more attention to the speakers themselves. Almost immediately I 
recognised in them a frustrated energy that I feel myself when discussing my work. I 
wrote the following:  
People are so excited about the work they’re doing - in the world of critique and social 
theory it’s easy to overlook the passion that lies behind so-called ‘dead geographies’. 
People are animated by this work, they’re excited and active - I can see that they feel 
about their work how I do about mine. It’s challenging and I think they’re doing it at 
least a little bit out of a strong belief that it will make a positive difference in the world.  
 
I felt guilty, and that my character is inadequate to actually be affirmative and open to 
ideas in the way I find so appealing in this ‘Deleuzian’ research ethos.  
 
But I found my affirmation through paying attention less to the information being 
conveyed in the session, or the language used to deliver arguments, and more to the 
energy of the speakers. As in most conferences, a few speakers were somewhat 
lacklustre, but some were positively electric. One speaker in particular seemed to move 
the dark tired room into an effervescent atmosphere. The audience reacted to his 
humour and obvious verve: backs straightened, eyes brightened, heads lifted, and 
phones were put down.    
Discourse, according to Potter and Hepburn “is most simply defined as texts and talk 
as parts of social practice” (2008, p.276). But discourse does not simply take place 
                                                      
47 That is, I was hostile, disposed to criticism more than consideration – I resented the mastery of 
the speakers, most likely due to a sense of my own inferiority as a scholar. 
119 
 
through symbolic systems suspended outside of lived realities. We encounter texts in 
material bodies of books, newspapers, online forums, images, and so on. We talk, and 
we encounter talk as fleshy bodies, slouching in hard plastic chairs and of volatile 
disposition, or bouncing on our toes, upright and open. While the representational 
economy of discourse is a well-trodden path of theorisation, there is also a need to 
acknowledge that the affective capacities of discourse are equally important in the 
production and dissemination of knowledge. 
Adopting a method of discourse analysis to agitate and deconstruct pervasive 
ideologies may seem like a natural turn to take here, as discursive approaches are 
united by a strong constructionist epistemology, and a conviction that “discourse is of 
central importance in constructing the ideas, social processes, and phenomena that 
make up our social world” (Nikander, 2008: 413). However, turning to discourse may 
also feel counterintuitive, as the constructionist pedigree of discourse analysis tends to 
be pitted against post-phenomenological epistemologies such as theories of affect 
(Crotty, 1998). I would contend that this is a false dichotomy that hampers both 
explorations of affect and discourse analysis, as there is a significant intersect between 
constructionism and affect in the materialities of discourse, fertile for further 
exploration (Wetherell 2013). 
There has been a generally accepted move from discourse as a representation of the 
real world to a practice that brings particular worlds into being (Castree 2013), 
changing relations with the materialities they purport to represent. Given this, it is 
important to attend to how discourse folds into and transforms relations with national 
parks. This might include moments like my resistance to the speakers at the World 
Parks Congress, and how this resistance abated when I made a distinct decision to try 
to be open to their work – a decision informed by my exposure to nonrepresentational 
methodological literature. This, surely, shows us that discourse is much more than a 
set of symbolic texts and is a more performative element in the world than, perhaps, we 
tend to think (Dewsbury 2010).  
 Another scene in which we can think about the performativity of discourse, 
particularly in research practices, is my state of mind early in this research project. My 
frustration with the way national parks had been discussed in various outlets moved 
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me to undertake doctoral research. During that research I found that in my 
explorations of national parks (or, “fieldwork”, if we are being methodologically 
generous!) I often found myself in a state of hyper-awareness: paradoxically, and 
somewhat idiotically, searching out affective intensities whenever I popped out for a 
bush walk.  
My reactions to discourse affected my bodily attentions – instead of only looking for 
birds and animals, or bright flowers or interesting rocks, I paid attention to 
topography, maps, fences, emotions, pains, pleasures, and so on. Encountering 
nonrepresentational theories in concert with feeling so very despondent about 
contemporary debates around national parks transformed my corporeal experience of 
the familiar activity of walking, riding, or running in nature reserves.  
We tend to think of debates around national parks as entirely reasonable, rational 
arguments articulated from different value systems: we see clean, edited, persuasive 
opinion pieces in newspapers, we hear catchy sound bites on morning television news, 
or impassioned pleas from activist or advocacy groups, usually along with affective 
images of charismatic animals (J. Lorimer 2007), or glorious landscapes lit by sunrise or 
sunset representing the area the public is supposed to care about (Waitt & Head 
2002). And although these texts are indeed representations of particular places or 
species, they are also performative materialities in the world that have the capacity to 
transform encounter with these worlds in multiple ways.  
In a social constructivist view, national parks are brought into being through social 
practice and discourse; parks are not ontologically given, or simply reflected in 
discourse. This is an important perspective that has been covered in a variety of 
different approaches. Most notably, feminist scholars have pointed out the paternalistic 
characteristics of discourse (Holmes & Marra 2010; Wilkinson 1995), and 
postcolonialist scholars have highlighted the colonial logics in the acts of defining a 
chunk of land and claiming it as ‘belonging’ to the state (Adams & Mulligan 2003). 
Revealing these tendencies in discourse helps us to be more attentive to the power 
relations underpinning discourses and practices around national parks. This is an 
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important line of critique that continues to inform thought around national parks in 
significant ways48.  
However, there is another story, a different story around discourse and practice, and 
how we imagine that to occur through attending specifically to the materialities that 
carry this representation of national parks, and the ways in which they do not simply 
represent an ontologically given area, but also work to bring about particular realities in 
connection to those areas. These materialities take multiple forms: the repetition of 
imagery on postcards; the red, green and blue lines moving erratically across scientific 
graphs; the repetition of passionate, but problematic tropes such as ‘pristine 
wilderness’ or ‘untouched natural beauty’. These imaginaries come to us thick and fast, 
through messengers of varying levels of perceived authority.  
We tend to think of environmental politics as a cerebral activity – rationally evaluating 
the benefits and drawbacks of certain ways of relating to the environment49. This 
tendency is reflected throughout parts of social and political life that deal with 
environmental issues such as policy, newspaper articles, public discussions and 
debates, and environmentally minded social and political movements. In this 
framework, attributes of national parks such as ‘beautiful’ or ‘unique’ are deployed as 
essential qualities of certain places, ignoring that beauty arises through particular 
systems of thought, or that every place in the world is – literally – unique.  
However, we rarely pay attention to the affective intensities of messages about the 
environment, or the role of nonconscious affect in eliciting feelings, sentiments, and 
opinions about places generally, and national parks in particular. Here, we can look to 
nonrepresentational approaches to help articulate complexity in ideas of discourse and 
knowledge construction that have been largely obscured by a focus on cultural and 
political significance. For knowledge, as I have argued, is produced as much through 
affective intensities as through conscious rational or emotional engagement. 
… 
                                                      
48 Including in terms of returning land ownership of national parks to traditional owners, an 
ongoing project in Australia. 
49 The next chapter, ‘Ecologies’ critiques this notion at length. 
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Coda 
After completing these essays, and seeing how they fit into the rest of the thesis, I have 
agonised over whether to provide another ‘conclusion’ to this chapter, beyond the 
micro-conclusions at the end of each essay. On one hand, I do not want to labour the 
point too much that places are processual, that national parks are constantly being 
brought into being in ways far more complex and fleeting than administrative 
processes. On the other hand, tying these essays together more firmly around the core 
theme of ‘Encounters’ seems appropriate.  
After these deliberations, I have settled on a ‘Coda’, an echo of ‘Introducing 
encounters’ that serves to give you a small reminder of this chapter’s enterprise, and an 
indication of how it leads into the next.  
Although I have focused on particular types of encounters here that arose through the 
empirical work I have done for this thesis (mapping, fencing, tracing, and 
Discoursing), and connected them quite explicitly to conceptual lures (representation, 
materiality, encounter, and affective intensities, respectively), I want to make it clear 
that this is just one of infinite possible ways to construct these essays. Rather than 
aiming for generality (‘discourse around national parks is always frustrating’) or 
certainty (‘mapping is always about representation’) I hope I have showed that the 
specificity of these empirical encounters and their conceptual pairings is precisely what 
makes them special, generating new connections of all kinds.  
These ‘new connections’ are part and parcel of the ‘vibrance’ that is so central to this 
thesis, and indeed, central to the next substantive chapter, ‘Ecologies’, which picks up 
from here and problematises the ways we tend to think about national parks and 
nature.   
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 [ Interlude two: turbulence over Namadgi ] 
I’ve only recently become what you might call a nervous traveller. Slowly, and yet at 
the same time, suddenly, I started registering effects of tension during and after flying 
or traveling as a passenger in a car. It’s not so much that I was conscious of being 
‘afraid’, but I started becoming aware of aching legs and clenched teeth, particularly 
when descending and landing in planes.  
I flew fairly regularly between Melbourne and Canberra in the early stages of my PhD 
candidature. Canberra can be devilish to fly into. Come in from the north and you feel 
as though you could reach out the window and touch Mount Ainslie. Approach from 
the south and the Snowy Mountains almost always gift you with some rather epic 
turbulence during your descent.  
During one of these terrifying southerly descents into Canberra, it struck me that we 
were (sort of) flying over Namadgi.  
I thought to myself, ‘We are being jiggled around in our seats, and this feels like a 
somewhat undignified manner in which to plunge to our certain horrific deaths. My 
fellow travellers and I all pretend that reading the in-flight magazine whilst dropping 
out of the sky is a completely appropriate activity in the context of what we tell 
ourselves is a totally unremarkable experience.’  
In the heavy cloud, it was impossible to ascertain our altitude. At some point during 
my plunge into the unknown, a thought flashed to mind. Who knows how or why it 
surfaced at that point. ‘Oh my god!’ I thought, ‘this turbulence is part of Namadgi, and 
it is so transformative of my body and my experiences!’ 
I admit that at the time, my mind did not turn itself to the burgeoning fields of 
aeromobility (Adey 2008; Adey 2009a) and ‘vertical geopolitics’ (Graham 2004). But 
upon reflection I am comforted by the fact that these theorists have spent a lot more 
time in planes than me, and lived not only to ‘tell the tale’, but to produce important 
work about the significance of verticality.  
This idea of vertical aeronautical ecologies of Namadgi is, in all likelihood, inaccurate. 
It seems to me that turbulence is much more complicated than just a reflection of the 
124 
 
topography of the ground. But it sticks with me, this idea that Namadgi was stretching, 
reaching up into the sky and shaking the Canberra-bound plane like a play-thing. 
Thankfully, Namadgi placed us carefully on the ground, letting us fly another day, and 
letting me realise that my PhD needed a little more work.  
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5. Ecologies 
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5.1 Introducing ecologies 
Early in 2012, I had just purchased a camera for fieldwork photographs. I decided to 
take it out for a spin to Namadgi National Park. I was hanging around the visitors’ 
centre, feeling self-conscious and excited. I pretended to look at the large map in the 
middle of the centre. I was glancing around nervously, as though I was conducting 
some kind of covert participant observation (I wasn't). A friendly volunteer 
approached me, all green polo shirt and fuzzy beard under a broad-brimmed hat. He 
looked like my dad. We got to talking about why I was there: 
Volunteer: “What’s your PhD in?”  
Me: “Oh, it’s in sociology” 
Volunteer: “Sociology? You sure it’s not biology?” 
Me: “…Pretty sure!” 
 
Thus started my empirical research. At the time, this brief encounter seemed like 
nothing special or notable; somewhat anticlimactic. But its significance has crept 
through the last few years and now, I think, illustrates a core concern of this thesis: the 
limited modes of thought through which we evaluate national parks specifically, and 
the 'natural world' generally.  
In response to this concern, this thesis aims to provoke different ways of thinking, 
experimenting with different objects and modes of enquiry, and modes of presentation 
of research.  
This chapter picks up from the previous chapter, ‘Encounters’ in which I argued that 
national parks are not simply segments of land, separated from the everyday 
happenings in human society by governance systems, and that common 
understandings of national parks as neutral 'containers' of nature encourage a 
somewhat parochial understanding of place that ignores complex productive capacities 
of landscapes. Taking national parks as mutable, transformative spaces, as lively places 
in flux demands rethinking how we evaluate parks. What questions can we pose that 
are faithful to the complexity of these lively places? In this chapter, I argue that a single 
mode of evaluation simply does not suffice in dealing with the complexities and 
dynamisms that push the world to change.  
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And yet, as I argue in this chapter, the dominant mode of evaluation of national parks, 
namely, ecological sciences, holds a problematic monopoly over the kinds of 
knowledge being generated about national parks. So ingrained is the habit of thinking 
about ‘nature’ through the physical (or natural) sciences, that undertaking a 
sociological PhD research project that deals with national parks is met with general 
bewilderment and surprise: “Sociology? You sure it’s not biology?” Beyond the anecdotal, 
consider the importance of “evidence-based policy” in relation to national parks, 
where the evidence base is composed of scientific environmental assessments. 
Challenging the taken-for-granted notion that a scientific paradigm is the only way (or 
at least, the first and foremost way) through which we can encounter and apprehend 
the natural world calls for careful consideration of how that paradigm renders the 
world: what kinds of problems does a scientific paradigm generate? What assumptions 
are made in its ways of working towards solutions to such problems? What other types 
of problems to do with national parks (conceptual, political, emotional) are obscured 
by scientific renderings? I argue that through considering these questions, we can 
begin to understand some of the hazards of our current methods of evaluating and 
analysing national parks. 
In order to redress the dominance of the scientific paradigm in determining the value 
of national parks, I argue that we must disrupt our all-too-comfortable (scientific) 
structures of thought by thinking experimentally, and, crucially, by being open to 
experimental thinking ourselves. This section aims to prompt such a disruption 
through an essay, ‘Beyond scientific evaluation’ dealing with several major themes. 
First, I outline what I mean by the ‘scientific paradigm' in the context of national parks, 
including its goals, and the types of problems it has the capacity to pose (namely, 
scientific problems), and answer in specific ways. I also argue that our increasing 
reliance on the scientific paradigm is a problematic, habitual way of thinking. In 
particular, I focus on the hazardous tendency to rely on logics of representation in 
ecological sciences, and how these logics affect our approaches to core environmental 
problems such as biodiversity and sustainability.  
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I attend to these issues by pointing to different ways of thinking through ecology with 
the complementary conceptual lures of ‘machinic thinking’ and assemblage, paying 
particular attention to the temporalities and immaterialities of ecological assemblages.  
Through these sections, this chapter develops the core argument that we need to be 
more critical of the habits of thought that inform our thinking about environmental 
problems and explore new (or re-newed) ways of thinking. Such explorations can 
mitigate the hazardous tendency to reduce 'nature' to a (solvable) scientific problem. 
5.2 Beyond scientific evaluation 
The claims of scientific knowledge do not exhaust the sources of expertise or authority 
to which society may turn in seeking guidance for the decisions that must be made 
(Hulme 2013, p.80) 
 
As you peruse this chapter, I would ask you to please keep the following two empirical 
moments in mind: the first is an unedited reflection on an early interview with Sam, 
the ecologist who specialises in reintroducing species to areas they used to inhabit; 
second is an excerpt from an interview with Julia and Sophie about their hiking 
experiences. The first ‘moment’ is an elucidation of a sense of frustration I had with my 
inability to articulate what, precisely, my problem was with conservation. The second 
is important because, although it was a passing topic in an interview, it is a simple 
example of the complexities of encountering national parks. These two events are 
germane to the issues I think through in this chapter, and I will remind you of them 
several times in different modes.  
The empirical moment 
There’s one really cool thing called shifting baselines. And so say like my great 
granddad… he expected a certain standard of the environment than say my father. He 
expected a lower standard because he never witnessed, like, even myself I never 
witnessed bettongs. I never witnessed all these other animals that lived in this ACT 
environment. So there’s like this lowering of standards… It’s pretty cool that we should 
actually, instead of just being like, let’s put up a fence and let it be a reserve, we’re 
actually saying no, we’re asking more of the land and really pushing to restore it to 
what it used to be, instead of just being like oh we’re just happy for it to just have 
some trees in a paddock. And having that higher, um, higher expectations of what we 
actually can achieve in a woodland. Just because that’s what was here when I was here 
doesn’t mean that’s what it should be like (Interview with Sam, 03/10/2013) 
 
Reflection on interview, 03/10/2013 
As Sam speaks, my mind floods with the types of questions I’ve been grappling with 
recently: where do we get off setting ‘standards’ for the environment? What, precisely, 
would “higher expectations” look like? By setting such standards and expectations
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aren’t we just reducing the life and lives of various environments to numbers? What 
does it mean to impose key performance indicators on the environment? Do we really 
get to tick ‘unsatisfactory’ on nature’s report card? Who do we think we are anyway? I 
surprise myself how quickly I resort to the human/nonhuman binary I am trying to 
challenge. It’s an overwhelming moment, full of the force of tangled dogmas. 
 
I stumble into the next question – something about the discourse of restoration and 
human intervention in pristine environments. 
 
The other empirical moment 
Julia: I can understand why you would want to be up there riding horses, like I would 
feel very connected to the landscape. It would make me feel very happy to be on a 
horse up there [in Namadgi], riding around, even though it potentially has impact. 
Maybe not as much in a car… 
 
Cathy: Yeah, but what do you mean by impact? 
 
Julia: Um, so my understanding is that there is an argument from some groups that 
wild horses and riding horses up there causes erosion and turbidity in the water ways 
that would otherwise not occur because those horses and other foreign animals are 
cloven hoofed or have hoofs, as opposed to the cute little Australian mammals that 
have furry paws and have much less impact. So, I know that there is an argument that 
says that riding those horses there is foreign; it has an impact that wouldn’t happen if 
there weren’t otherwise any horses. 
 
Sophie: Mmm, but one interesting thing we came to decide, well maybe not decide, but 
that like, you look at the Australian marsupials, and they just look so much like they 
belong. Like, they’re utterly indistinguishable from a stump. But one thing I found really 
beautiful but quite surprising really, is just how right and fitting the brumbies look. Like 
not just, they’re just so well suited to those alpine plains, those high plains. They just 
look incredible moving through the tussock that we just trudged through. But they also 
just look like they evolved there. They blend in. They camouflage. They look like shrubs 
or granite boulders, or, they look like they belong there.  
 
Julia: Mmm, and all their different colours, they really do. 
(Interview with Sophie and Julia, 25/04/2014) 
 
Scientific paradigm 
There have been numerous theorisations of the relationships between the social world 
and various kinds of ‘ecologies’. To name but a few examples: industrial ecology 
attends to the design of industrial processes and products that have minimal 
environmental impact (Lifset & Graedel 2002); ecofeminism challenges the masculinist 
tendencies of practices and attitudes that cause environmental degradation (Gaard 
1997); and urban ecology, which aims to “understand the full complexity of the 
relationship between the biological community and the urban environment due to the 
interaction between human culture and the natural environment” (Douglas et al. 2014, 
p.3).  
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Although each of these modes of theorising ecologies have been crucial in developing 
different understandings of the relationship between social relations and 
environmental well-being, they each share two core problems. First, in trying to read 
ideal social formations based on the configurations of ‘nature’, there is an assumed 
essential world ‘out there’, to be interpreted by humans. A continued division between 
(human) subject and (nonhuman) object has, as Halsey has pointed out, “led to all 
kinds of disastrous projects on the basis that they are designed to do ‘what Nature 
intended’” (Halsey 2007, p.31, 32).  
A second problem here is that, despite decades of social theories of ecology, very few 
of these theories have questioned or problematised the constricting set of principles 
through which the discipline examines the world. This is a much broader problem than 
the ways social science has understood and taken up the discipline of ecology50. Rather, 
this is a problem to do with the system of thought through which science is produced, 
and the ways scientific knowledge is taken up in the world. It is to this problem of the 
scientific paradigm that I turn to in the rest of this chapter.  
Although there are multiple forms of ecology that inform contemporary environmental 
thought, they are nevertheless similar in that they are based on a scientific 
understanding of life in the natural world. So, although industrial ecology may argue 
that environmental problems stem from different economic and social structures to, for 
example, ecofeminism, both of these approaches take for granted the categories of the 
natural world set out by a scientific paradigm. In this section I will outline what I mean 
by a ‘scientific paradigm’, and argue that relying solely upon scientific understandings 
of natural life in the world is inadequate in thinking through core processes of national 
parks – namely, representation, biodiversity, and ecological sustainability. I should 
make it clear from the outset that this section and chapter are not criticisms of science 
as a way of finding out about the world. Rather, my key argument here is that national 
park stakeholders (such as decision-making bodies, researchers, park managers and 
                                                      
50 It is worth noting that for my purposes, ‘ecology’ here simply means the scientific discipline 
that examines how living things interact with each other and their natural environment 
(Welchman 2008). I am aware that ecology, like any discipline, has multiple and complex 
debates as to the extent of its object of study, as well as numerous sub-disciplines (such as 
behavioural ecology, industrial ecology, community ecology and so on). The thrust of this 
chapter, though, would not change were I to attend more closely to these sub-disciplines. 
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users) should exercise caution in relying too heavily on scientific knowledge at the 
expense of other equally valuable modes of generating knowledge that are developed 
throughout this thesis. 
‘Paradigm’ is a loaded term in the physical sciences; while social scientists may think of 
‘paradigm’ as a particular frame or structure of thinking, a ‘paradigm’ in physical 
science refers more to universal natural truths. Thus, a ‘paradigm shift’ in the physical 
sciences is a cataclysmic event – a monumentally powerful change in the way everyone 
encounters the world. Einstein’s theory of relativity is a good example of the order of 
magnitude the term ‘paradigm’ holds for physical scientists (Kuhn 2012). Scientific 
moments such as these are seen as great leaps forward, a bound along a progressive 
line towards a better understanding of the world. Such teleological thinking underpins 
science: that through developing more knowledge and better observational tools, the 
world can be known. If there is something we do not know about the world, it is 
because we have not yet developed adequate tools to make accurate observations – 
unknowns in the world are attributed to human shortcomings, which can be overcome 
through further scientific endeavours.  
Given the admirable intentions and abilities of science, developing a critique of science 
as the predominant way of thinking about national parks has been the most 
intellectually and emotionally challenging part of this thesis. So deeply ingrained is our 
reliance on, and trust in, a scientific approach to all things environmental that working 
through what, precisely, is problematic about a scientific monopoly on thinking 
nature51 has been a source of great discomfort. I have found myself hesitant to share 
my thoughts with research participants, friends and family for fear of seeming 
unappreciative of the important work that ecologists, geographers, wildlife managers 
and conservation advocacy groups do in terms of investigating, maintaining, and 
defending national parks. In spite of my hesitations, the shortcomings of relying solely 
(or, at least, too heavily) on scientific apprehensions of nature that I raise in this chapter 
demand renewed critical thinking. My aim here is to put forward an affirmative critique 
                                                      
51 I have omitted ‘about’ deliberately here, as I am gesturing towards the notion that thinking 
nature is a performative verb, bringing nature into being in a multitude of ways, rather than 
thinking about a nature that is already in existence. 
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– a critique which appreciates the contributions of scientific enquiry to the world, but 
also questions possible problems those contributions may give rise to.  
The scientific promise is an exciting one: that around us lies a beautiful, terrifying, and 
complex natural world and that, given the right tools, we can know the world’s beauty, 
terror, and complexity. We have long understood natural sciences to enjoy a special 
connection to the natural world wherein the natural world is ontologically 
unproblematic – a given, physical entity, whose secrets are waiting to be revealed 
through the scientific method of observing, testing, and experimenting (Crotty 1998). 
This method has produced knowledge that bends the mind (there is an exoplanet on 
which rain of molten glass falls sideways) and warms the heart the way only useless 
information can (who knew the sour lemon is a member of the sweet berry family?) 
Science has the capacity to render seemingly banal parts of the world amazing – dust 
under a microscope is breathtakingly beautiful. These contributions to human 
knowledge and experiences of the world are so seductive. Science excites us, and the 
notion that worlds await discovery is responsible for inspiring incredible scientific 
pursuits.  
Science can give rise to passionate relationships with the world (Lorimer 2008; Bowker 
2000; Kohler 2003). And although we might sometimes think of science as quite a 
clinical, diagnostic pursuit, the scientific acts of exploring, guessing, guessing again, 
are brimming with transformative capacity. Indeed, we can think of the scientist-body 
itself as a site of transformation, responding to the pleasures and pains of producing 
knowledge.  
In addition to the creation of such passions, however, scientific knowledge renders the 
world in particular ways, creating and reifying assumptions about the capacities of 
nonhumans, and the ability of humans to grasp (and manipulate) these capacities. 
Recent explorations into controlling numbers of wild brumbies in national park areas, 
for example, have focused on rounding up and injecting wild brumbies with 
medications that severely slow or stop their desire to breed (Axford & Brown 2013). 
This is a process of human decision-making on the part of park managers that relies 
heavily upon quantitative understandings of ecological ‘balance’ and leaves little room 
for appreciating unique and specific lives. While this intervention is touted as more 
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humane than simply killing the brumbies, it comes along with an attitude that it is our 
right, and indeed, our environmental duty, to halt part of the life cycle of another 
species. (‘Aren’t we just reducing the life and lives of various environments to numbers?’) 
There are, of course, troubling associations between an attitude of stewardship and 
authority over the environment and colonialism (Livingstone 1995; Driver 1992). These 
associations are well-documented in the context of national parks in Australia, where:  
National parks arose from intellectual understandings of wilderness which marginalised 
and then excluded indigenous people. Historically the rights of indigenous people to 
resource use on their traditional lands in national parks have been curtailed, with little 
or no consultations, in favour of … the protection of endangered and vulnerable plant 
and animal species (Lawrence 1996). 
 
This summary of one problem of holding up scientific enquiry as a bastion of 
knowledge production is also closely linked to the problematic imaginaries of the 
Australian landscape as ‘pristine’ and ‘untouched’ before the moment of colonisation 
(Head 2012). This, of course, either further excludes the role of indigenous peoples in 
shaping Australian environments, or imagines them as part of the natural 
environment, erasing their humanity (Gibson 1999). This perspective is even more 
severe when we consider that exempting humans from the environment has been 
fundamental in establishing tropes of authority and control over the environment in 
the first place (Botkin 1990)! 
Indeed, we can think of the many ways ‘human exceptionalism’ (Dunlap & Catton 
1994) is expressed in relation to other animals; we are supposedly rational, reflexive, 
intentional, wilful human subjects52. These qualities are generally assumed to be 
exclusively human, and give rise to the attitude that the world external to humans can 
and should be bent to our will, even on the scale of the reproductive rights of wild 
brumbies. The permissions we allow ourselves from this perspective are precisely what 
frustrated me so much: ‘Do we really get to tick ‘unsatisfactory’ on nature’s report card?’  
Interestingly, in fields of study dedicated to exploring the ethics of animal-human 
encounters, such as ‘animal studies’ (Waldau 2013; DeMello 2012; N. Taylor & Twine 
2014), the question of encountering other non-animal forms of life is largely absent. 
Arguing for the vitality of animal forms of life while continuing to apprehend other life 
                                                      
52 This is precisely the understanding of ‘the human’ that I aim to disrupt throughout the thesis. 
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forms such as grasses, trees, and other forms of flora as inert and uninteresting seems 
to be establishing a kind of ‘animal exceptionalism’ in which floral life serves only as 
sustenance to animal lives. A notable exception to this type of prioritising animal life is 
Lesley Instone’s work on situating human-grass relations through her own encounters 
with native grasses in an urban Australian park (Instone 2010).   
Thinking through encounters in which the environment moves or affects us in 
particular ways (such as the painful and pleasurable sensations I opened with in 
‘Introducing the thesis’) challenge ingrained assumptions (Milton 2002). We do not 
only encounter the world in the way science envisages – as rational, reasonable, 
removed observers – but as fleshy, corporeal materialities. Nevertheless, ‘scientism’ 
underlies many aspects of the world, especially in policy-making, research agendas (in 
social and physical sciences) and in the ways we are encouraged to investigate the 
‘natural world’ (‘Sociology? You sure it’s not biology?’). This reliance on scientific 
structures of thinking is borne out of a deeply ingrained belief that “the scientific mind 
enjoys some special ability to speak the language of material nature” (Lessl 1996, 
p.381). But this epistemological claim is weakened when we consider its ontological 
assumption that “if the only cognitive life is the scientific life, then natural objects must 
be amenable to scientific ways of knowing exclusively” (Lessl 1996, p.381).  
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The ontological attitudes that accompany such alluring scientific promises have had 
significant effects on how we approach many types of problems in the world. We have 
constructed an understanding of the world as a world that is there to be discovered, 
that can be discovered. In this view, the world itself is a scientific problem: what is it 
that lies ‘out there’, and by what means can humans apprehend it?53  
Scientific habits of thought 
Thinking about the world in this way shapes how environmental problems are defined 
and the logics through which solutions are developed. Reliance on the scientific 
method – of hypothesis, observation, testing – in matters of the environment is 
particularly apparent in research and management practices in national parks. The 
promise of ecology is enticing: that we can reveal the workings of ecosystems in 
national parks. Through such revelations, we can identify species and areas that 
require more or less of different modes of management in order to maintain healthy 
and productive ecosystems (‘riding those horses there is foreign, it has an impact that 
wouldn’t happen if there weren’t otherwise any horses’). We can save some areas from the 
worst of human contributions to the world: pollution, noise, industry, crowds, stress, 
ugliness, and so on. We can save species from extinction, reintroduce species to areas 
from which they have long been stamped out by human activities (‘we’re asking more of 
the land and really pushing to restore it to what it used to be’), and we can enjoy nature for 
ourselves. And we do on occasion achieve these ends through various interventions.  
This way of thinking reinforces the problematic understanding of humans as 
exceptional, as separate from nature, as a differentiated species that can control the 
complex workings of a ‘natural world’ that is observable and knowable54. Ecology, like 
other intellectual pursuits, is a discipline that has developed (and continues to do so) in 
particular historical, social and political conditions that shape its assumptions, goals, 
and limitations (E. Kirksey 2015; Takacs 1996). In particular, ecology emerged “at a 
time when the tenets of modernity – faith in scientific reason, acceptance of the 
                                                      
53 This view of how we dwell in the world has been thoroughly challenged by reconfiguring 
understandings of the constitution of humans, nonhumans and places, as in ‘Practices’, and 
drawn out further in ‘Politics’. 
54 We can also see this pernicious habit in the dominance of certain social scientific approaches 
that mimic this understanding through an exceptional social researcher, supposedly exempt 
and removed from their study. 
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ontological legitimacy of categories dividing organisms, desire for rational and 
detached observation – were heavily entrenched” (Halsey 2006, p.11). These modernist 
ways of thinking about nature give rise to categories upon which ecological science is 
founded (such as species, biological, geological, organic, inorganic), and which have 
become familiar terms more broadly. Think of the ease with which you would 
differentiate between a brumby and a kangaroo in Namadgi. They are members of 
different species, one is invasive, the other native. These differentiations rely on 
scientific categorisations that, although rigorously developed, are not the only ways we 
encounter these bodies (‘But [the brumbies] also just look like they evolved there. They blend 
in. They camouflage. They look like shrubs or granite boulders, or, they look like they belong 
there’).  
Scientific categories and assumptions are not inherently good or evil. But they are 
limited in their adherence to an essentialist categorisation of bodies. Such rigidities 
invite us to pose problems both within and in excess of scientific ways of 
understanding relations and encounters of bodies of all kinds. Asking ‘what kinds of 
problems can ecology pose? And what kinds of solutions are possible in a scientific 
ecological paradigm?’ should be considered equally valid and valuable to asking ‘what 
kinds of problems can’t ecology pose? And what kinds of solutions are possible outside 
of a scientific paradigm?’ While I do not seek to undermine, refute, or reduce 
complexity in research being undertaken in ecological science, it is vital that we explore 
and recognise its limitations. In teasing out some epistemological and ontological 
assumptions that inform the task of conservation, we can open up ways of thinking 
about national parks that have perhaps been obscured by the issue of ‘maintaining 
ecological health’ in Australia’s national reserve system.  
My point, simply put, is that we do not only encounter the world in the terms defined 
by scientific thought (the ‘impact’ of brumbies on a habitat), and that there are other ways 
to think through the environment that do not rely on objectivist definitions of the 
nonhuman world as an unproblematic object of enquiry, or of humans as 
unproblematic observers. We are moved, affected, and transformed by the colours and 
movements of brumby bodies through tussocked landscapes. Even ephemeral 
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encounters such as spotting a brumby are part of a secretion of transformation in the 
world, where our own bodies are important sites of change.  
That current debates over national parks draw heavily upon ecological arguments is 
unsurprising, given that although they also fulfil recreational and aesthetic goals, the 
primary role of national parks in Australia, according to the National Reserve System 
website, is “sustaining the ecological health of the country” (Commonwealth of 
Australia n.d.). In this utilitarian terminology, national parks are conceptualised as 
storage containers for nature55. In this understanding, it follows that national parks are 
evaluated in ecological terms, as ‘ecology’ is the science that stakes its claim as the set 
of scientific methods through which we can understand natural processes and evaluate 
ecological health. We make use of knowledge generated by ecological sciences to set 
goals for national parks, and measure their successes and shortcomings against these 
targets. Information from ecological studies helps make the case for particular courses 
of wildlife management such as culls, breeding programs, weed maintenance, or the 
establishment of new trails in national parks. The debates central to ecology as a 
discipline, therefore, are rolled into conflicting views on national parks. The costs and 
benefits of management practices such as breeding, culling, alpine grazing, hunting, 
and others are scrutinised in terms of their ecological costs and benefits.  
In this mode of thought, individual bodies are grouped according to various categories 
– species, native, invasive, endangered, pest, and so on. Such categories are ascribed 
different values according to various contexts; a native species can be considered a pest 
if it impinges too much on the livelihood of a more ‘endangered’ species, or on human 
activities. For example, the regular culling of kangaroos throughout the ACT is 
legitimated through the ecological argument that their numbers exceed what we have 
deemed suitable for the extent of their habitat (Lawson & McIlroy 2015). This is the 
problem of exploration being confined by the discursive practices of the very 
knowledge such exploration creates. This problem is perhaps most famously teased 
out in Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, where, in dealing with science and 
knowledge, he makes the point that “there is no knowledge without a particular 
                                                      
55 A conceptualisation I have refuted in ‘Encounters’. 
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discursive practice”, and subsequently, a discursive practice “may be defined by the 
knowledge that it forms” (Foucault 2003, p.201).  
Within these circular discursive confinements, then, national park management 
becomes a task of balancing a budget of ‘good’ (native, endangered) and ‘bad’ 
(invasive, pest) elements of an ecological system. Individual bodies are understood in 
terms of their (apparently) unchanging essences (‘…an impact that wouldn’t happen if 
there weren’t otherwise any horses’), rather than their context-dependent capacities (‘they 
just look incredible moving through the tussock’), and individual lives are often reduced to 
their role as ‘part’ of a species. In this calculative style of management, individual lives 
can only ever be understood in quantitative terms of ‘ecological health’. This limits 
questions to quantitative terms – how many kangaroos live in how many square 
kilometres? How many Tasmanian devils are infected with deadly facial tumours? Are 
there enough predators? Is there enough prey? How many native animals are killed by 
invasive species? Although generating this type of knowledge is important, it has 
implications in terms of how we understand the world.  
Should our modus operandi be trying to get nature back in the black?  
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Representation in science 
Such calculative logics of ecosystems are part of the problem of ecological science’s 
acceptance of and reliance on representational logics that can only afford the posing of 
specific sorts of questions. In ecological analyses, individual bodies are always taken as 
representatives of a species – specific areas (Mulligans Flat, for example) are taken as 
representative of a type of habitat (such as grasslands). Categorising species and types of 
habitat are essential to scientific projects that ask questions of the state of species, their 
rates of reproduction, their resilience to threats, and so on. While these projects are not 
problematic in themselves, we tend to think of these methods as the way through 
which ecosystems can be known - through categories established by apprehensions of 
essential bodies as always primarily belonging to a particular species, and in relation to 
other species, with their distinct and peculiar evolutionary histories (‘horses and other 
foreign animals are cloven hoofed or have hoofs, as opposed to the cute little Australian 
mammals that have furry paws and have much less impact’).  
Indeed, one of the core stated objectives of the National Reserve System in Australia is 
developing a comprehensive, adequate, representative (CAR) reserve system, which 
aims to establish protected areas that are thought to represent other places that have 
been deemed ecologically similar and significant. Take this brief explanation from the 
Australian Government’s Department of the Environment website (I have added 
emphases to highlight representational terms): 
The National Reserve System is underpinned by a scientific framework to ensure that 
Australia progressively extends protection to examples of all our ecosystems. 
 
The scientific framework has a clear objective: to develop a ‘comprehensive, adequate 
and representative’ system of protected areas – commonly referred to as the ‘CAR’ 
reserve system. 
 
Specifically CAR means: 
1. Comprehensive: the inclusion in the National Reserve System of examples of 
regional-scale ecosystems in each bioregion 
 
2. Adequate: the inclusion of sufficient levels of each ecosystem within the protected 
area network to provide ecological viability and to maintain the integrity of populations, 
species and communities 
 
3. Representative: the inclusion of areas at a finer scale, to encompass the variability 
of habitat within ecosystems 
(Australia n.d.) 
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The CAR objective of the National Reserve System seems relatively unproblematic: we 
should aim to establish national parks that protect habitats and species that represent 
the full suite of ecosystems in Australia56, and we should aim to protect enough of 
them to ensure their ongoing viability. This objective is based on a deep trust in 
representation: that ecologically similar habitats can be treated as ecologically identical 
and therefore interchangeable habitats. Perhaps it makes protecting one area and not the 
other easier to stomach if we think of them as copies or examples of a type of 
ecosystem; the area may be lost to industry or development, but an example of the 
ecosystem remains safe, tucked in the pocket of a national park elsewhere. In an 
ecological scientific paradigm that accepts such representational logics, this is indeed a 
sensible way to go about protecting Australia’s biodiversity, but it comes at the cost of 
recognising the singularities of different places, and erases their unique historicities 
and affordances that make them special. This is particularly significant given the 
conceptualisation of national parks as processual places I offered in ‘Encounters’. 
Representation is an essential part of ecological science, but it also creates hazardous 
alignments and divisions that “recast the deep disparity of the world in terms of its 
similarities and resemblances” (Halsey 2011, p.230). In such representational logics, a 
national park becomes a segmented place that represents nature, a synecdoche filled 
with copies of members of species, rather than with individual lives.  
This understanding of national parks as representative of a broader scheme of nature is 
so frequently repeated, and in such unproblematic settings (such as policy documents, 
national park websites, tourism material, and so on), that thinking national parks in 
this way has become habitual. This repetition of thinking national parks limits 
capacities to think them outside such representational terms of reference, giving rise to 
an ‘inclination’ to think within refrained terms of reference (Massumi 2002; Deleuze 
2004).  
This is not to say that thinking representationally is ‘bad’, or that scientific modes of 
evaluating national parks should not be pursued; representation is clearly essential in 
                                                      
56 It is noteworthy that ‘Australian ecosystems’ are understood as static, entities closed to ‘new’ 
or ‘introduced’ species, specifically those introduced since European colonisation. 
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scientific thought. However, the critical point here is that habits of thinking ecosystems 
in representational terms can be hazardous because, as Halsey has put it:  
Where copies abound…it no longer matters if a particular part of this field is ‘lost’ (to 
the workings of a chainsaw), for it can always be found. And the place to which late 
capitalism returns to find ‘Nature’ is in its 'representative' system of parks, reserves and 
gardens (Halsey 2011, p.230). 
 
Halsey’s point here is an important one: that we should exercise caution in deeming 
individual lives of animals and trees as representatives of broader schemes (such as 
species, invasive, noninvasive, and so on) because in a way, this permits us to do as we 
wish outside of protected areas, so long as there are ‘comprehensive’ and ‘adequate’ 
representatives of these broader schemes.  
Interestingly, ecologists disagree on whether protected areas such as national parks do, 
in fact, ‘provide ecological viability’ through the preservation of biodiverse habitats 
(Lockwood et al. 2012). Ecologists have therefore developed methods to evaluate the 
effectiveness of protected areas in protecting and preserving biodiversity. “Matched 
pairs” is one such contemporary statistical method of assessing the impact of protected 
areas on particular species and relies heavily on logics of representation and sameness. 
Matched pairs in this case refers to a situation where two areas are deemed ecologically 
similar, where one area is inside a protected area and one area is not (Sandercock et al. 
2011).  
Many ecologists are excited about this method due to its contribution to a core debate 
in ecology over whether national parks are effective in protecting biodiversity and 
ensuring sustainability (Flannery 2012). National parks are criticised for various 
shortcomings in relation to the primary aim of sustainability: parks are not well 
connected to each other; parks are established in habitats that are not ‘representative’ 
of biodiverse ecosystems; parks are too managed; parks are not managed enough, and 
so on. While utilising the representational logic of techniques such as ‘matched pairs’ 
might help us to answer questions associated with these problems (Are parks well-
connected? Are parks established in representative habitats? How much should parks 
be ‘managed’?), they rely upon a reduction of similarity to sameness, obscuring the 
significance of difference in life, and thereby ignoring the dangers of thinking in terms 
of these particular alignments.   
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Scientific biodiversity and sustainability 
Similar representational logics operate in scientific understandings of ‘biodiversity’, 
where individual bodies represent, first and foremost, their species. Rather than 
attending to individual lives, biodiversity focuses more on calculations about different 
species, and the number of individuals within that species. Much research undertaken 
through this calculative logic reveals a significant loss of biodiversity worldwide 
(Kolbert 2014). These pronouncements are having a particularly strong impact on 
discourse in Australia, which is understood as particularly badly ‘hit’ by biodiversity 
loss compared with other places in the world. In combination with Australia’s pride in 
its ‘unique’ flora and fauna, declarations of another ‘age of extinction’ is causing 
significant concern and motivation in ecological conservation debates (Lindenmayer & 
Gibbons 2012).  
Indeed, the core business of ecological conservation at present is preventing further 
loss of biodiversity, as more complex, biodiverse ecosystems are considered more 
resilient to environmental degradation (Groves et al. 2002). Tied in to this global loss of 
biodiversity, conservation advocates have asserted that Australia is facing a ‘crisis in 
biodiversity’ and must invest in various conservation strategies (including the National 
Reserve System) in order to minimise or prevent the impacts of a widespread loss of 
biodiversity (Flannery 2012).  
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At its heart, the problem of biodiversity loss has been defined by research being 
conducted within a scientific paradigm; ‘species’ as the most important category a 
body can belong to has been designated as such by scientific structures of thought57. 
Where the heart of the problem is understood as a numerical figure (How many 
individuals of how many species?), the ‘solutions’ to the problem articulated are 
informed by research conducted in this particular paradigm. The solution becomes a 
matter of balancing the budget – calculating costs and benefits of different human 
decisions and actions. This is how we currently understand ‘sustainability’; as the ideal 
solution to an infinitely complex equation of human and nonhuman life.  
National parks are in part an effort to achieve ecological sustainability. In the simplest 
terms, sustainability is considered the solution to loss of biodiversity through 
extinction, hence ‘ecological sustainability’, understood largely as the preservation of 
biodiversity, is one of the core reasons national parks are gazetted. Halsey has 
summarised ecological sustainability as “uncovering the precise combination of social 
policies, economic principles, cultural practices and legal rules that will ensure the 
viability of ecosystematic processes over the short and long term” (Halsey 2006, p.15). 
Such ‘precise combinations’ aim to find an enduring equilibrium between humans and 
nature. But in order for there to be equilibrium there must be a continuity of conditions 
– nature must stay the same in order to be predictable enough for humans to remain in 
step with the balances of the world. Of course, nature drives changes of all magnitudes 
in all moments, and humans, as part of nature, effect, and are affected by such change.  
This presents the core problem for ecological sustainability: how can we achieve 
equilibrium in a changing world? Modern forms of environmental government 
respond to this problem through the rubric of control: if we can control the ’nature’ 
side of the scales, we can adjust the ‘human’ side accordingly. As such, we “attempt to 
put everything in its ‘rightful’ place. Where once the sole objective was to control the 
insane, the young, the feminine, the vagrant and the deviant, the objective in recent 
times has been to arrest the nonhuman, the inorganic, the inert – in short, the so-called 
‘natural world’” (Halsey 2006, p.5).  
                                                      
57 This is particularly problematic, given that how we define ‘species’ has also been transformed 
by a paradigm shift in which the scientific organisation of life into species began using genetic 
information rather than more visible characteristics (Frankham 2006). 
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Making such ‘arrests’ returns us to the problem of a calculative approach to the 
environment, and ever more deeply ingrained assumptions we use for making 
predictions for futures based on partial understandings of pasts and presents. 
Glimmers of addressing these questions were apparent in one empirical encounter in 
particular. In interviewing Sam about these shortcomings of his discipline, he 
responded, concerned:  
I guess that’s the problem, that when we’re managing these really kind of complicated 
systems we really just don’t know how things are going to react. I mean we like to 
think we know heaps about the environment or heaps about whatever we’re studying, 
but at the end of the day we don’t really know how things are going to interact. 
(Interview, 03/10/2013) 
 
From his tone and his phrasing, it was clear that Sam was anxious about the future 
health and viability of complex ecological systems. But these anxieties are given power 
by the particular goals and aims of a scientific approach to apprehending the 
environment. In this view, inability to predict future interactions are a negative – a 
shortcoming that must be overcome through further scientific research (recall the 
solution to such problems proposed at the World Parks Congress: “we need more data!”).  
But how else might we respond to ‘not knowing’? Could we not understand the 
uncertainty of ecological systems in a more positive way? Can we not marvel at this 
world that, at the smallest and grandest of scales, continually surprises us, resisting 
and exceeding and overspilling attempts to pin down its potential to change and 
transform?  
Constructing lives as scientific data certainly enables us to ask scientific questions that 
demand scientific answers. But national parks (and nature, generally) are not just 
scientific problems to be solved. They are constituted through flows and fluxes, speeds 
and durations, through surprises in excess of human grasp, as well as through well-
established categories. And yet, when thinking about national parks, we inevitably 
overlook the more obscure intensities of national parks, turning first and foremost to 
the ‘species’ category and its subsequent yardstick of ‘biodiversity’. Understanding 
national parks only in terms of species and biodiversity configures individual members 
of species as representative of the category as a whole, as an integer in an ecosystem. 
This relies on a functional understanding of the natural world that reduces complexity, 
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overlooks unknowns, and, crucially, erases difference. In the same vein as ‘dead 
geographies’ (Thrift & Dewsbury 2000) this way of attending to lives and deaths yields 
a very ‘dead ecology’ indeed. What possibilities might open up through an enlivened 
ecology that pays attention to the beauty of brumbies cantering through dusty tussock, 
their earthy colours at home in the ACT high country? An ecology of ideas, thought, 
and aesthetics, as well as species and bodies (Guattari 2000)? 
And yet, we hold up ecological science as the mode through which we aim to reveal the 
secrets of nature. Following ecological ‘discoveries’, we identify ‘problems’ such as 
extinction, invasive species, and habitat decline, and we attempt to develop solutions 
such as breeding programs, culling programs, and habitat restoration programs, 
respectively – solutions which inevitably cause different problems. A relevant example 
here is the unintended effects of the predator-proof fence around Mulligans Flat that I 
introduced in ‘Fencing’.  
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 Recent research has found the fence makes movement to different water sources 
difficult for many (native) reptile species, and is responsible for the death of many 
individuals attempting to navigate the fence to better water sources (Ferronato et al. 
2014)58. We tend to conceptualise such chains of problems as purely scientific – that our 
attempts to resolve problems can be attributed to underdeveloped science or lack of 
funding for particular programs. Rarely do we permit the thought that, perhaps, 
problems are irresolvable or that there may be different kinds of problems to do with 
ecologies that may be social, political, ethical, conceptual, or ontological. We have, in 
short, been careless in our haste to apply scientific methods and structures of thought 
to problems that are not necessarily, or not only scientific.  
The solution to this imbalance, though, is not to simply reject science and its methods, 
as some social science has done. Nor is the solution to reject representational 
knowledge that erases difference in the world. In his reading of Deleuze’s thought on 
matters of representation and difference, Williams points out that Deleuze does not see 
representation as bad, but rather, sees the ‘turn to difference’ as a provocation for 
thought. As Williams has put it, “It is not so much ‘This is wrong, let’s do things 
differently’ as ‘Under what conditions has this occurred?’ and ‘Given those conditions, 
where do we go from here?’” (J. Williams 2013, p.26). So the challenge is to respond 
productively to these problems of the scientific paradigm, to continue opening up new 
lines of thought, rather than trying to denigrate entire modes of analysis.  
Perhaps out of a self-conscious desire to match the authority and rigour of scientific 
enquiry, sociology in particular has had an uneasy relationship with the scientific 
method. While positivist lines of sociological thought attempt to emulate science’s 
deductive model of hypothesis, observation, and testing (Lenski n.d.), feminist 
scholarship sought to reveal the masculinist tendencies of science (Oakley 1981), and 
postmodernism has revelled in challenging the scientific method’s claims to be 
‘objective’, or free of human values (Gubrium & Holstein 2003). However, as I 
articulated in ‘Situating the thesis in the social sciences’, scientism echoes throughout 
many forms of social scientific enquiry, and perhaps in their eagerness to point out the 
                                                      
58 I return to this example and expand upon its implications under the ‘Immaterial ecologies’ 
subheading below. 
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shortcomings of science, feminist and postmodern critiques have reduced the 
significance of science as a wondrous mode of engaging with the world.  
Science has the ability to make people feel the world – whether through wonder, fear, 
scepticism or optimism, science is a way of being in the world that induces powerful 
affects in many, many people. I used to think of science as very dry and boring, filled 
with boring statistics and graphs and mathematics, which I find particularly 
uninspiring. But I have connected to science in different ways throughout this research. 
Science can be fun and clever and playful. I have helped to make peanut butter and 
sesame sandwiches to lay out for bettongs, I have played with radio tracking 
equipment that can only be described as super-cool fun, and I’ve seen scientists speak 
about their so-called ‘dry’ statistics and graphs and mathematics in the frustrated tones 
of trying to find their way through a problem that I recognise all too well. Science is 
playful, experimental, and uncertain, but it seems it has set itself impossible standards 
of benevolent custodianship, and is also confined by misunderstood expectations of 
being able to accurately and fully account for and evaluate the natural world. 
Such affirmative qualities of science are often forgotten, particularly in postmodern 
social science, which has focused particularly on the shortcomings of science as a 
method (Law 2008). There are, of course, notable exceptions to such antagonistic 
caricature of science. As Law has pointed out, “sociology is and always has been 
preoccupied with both technology and science, including its own status as a science” (J. 
Law 2008, p.674). In this thesis I have positioned new materialism as having a more 
conciliatory position on science. But the emerging body of work grouped under 
Science and Technology Studies (STS), which draws from multiple overlapping 
disciplines, including sociology, has a much more considered and balanced critical 
engagement with science (Wajcman 2002).  
In addition to the conciliatory contributions of work in STS, we should also pause to 
note the contribution of individuals who bring with them qualities from all places on 
the disciplinary spectrum. Karen Barad, whose unusual position as a physicist-turned-
philospher grants her a particular ability to appreciate the productive capacities of all 
types of knowledge endeavours. In an interview during the 7th European Feminist 
Research Conference, Barad explicated what she sees as the ethical imperatives of 
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inhabiting such an unusual intellectual space. She describes her ‘diffractive 
methodology’ in Meeting the Universe Halfway (2007) as: 
a method of diffractively reading insights through one another, building new insights, 
and attentively and carefully reading for differences that matter in their fine details, 
together with the recognition that intrinsic to this analysis is an ethics that is not 
predicated on externality but rather entanglement. Diffractive readings bring inventive 
provocations; they are good to think with. They are respectful, detailed, ethical 
engagements (in Dolphijn & van der Tuin 2012). 
 
I note Barad’s words here in order to reaffirm that I offer my arguments in this vein of 
respect and understanding of the many different ways knowledge can be produced.  
I admit that in writing a thesis that argues for nonrepresentational understandings of the 
world, it is tempting to bulldoze the ecological scientific paradigm – which, as I have 
argued, is a prime example of representational logics. This would be a relatively easy 
way to bolster my own arguments. But I find myself unwilling to do so, as ecological 
science so clearly generates information that can be beneficial to the world. Like any 
kind of knowledge production, ecology has its limitations, and I have covered these 
conceptual shortcomings at length already. But ‘ecology’ itself is not the target of my 
criticism. Rather, my quarrel is with our increasing tendency to first and foremost turn 
to the scientific paradigm when evaluating national parks, and nature more broadly, 
when it is quite apparent that this is one small part of the ways we encounter, sense, 
and produce knowledge about the world.  
Think, for example, of the different ways that brumbies are produced and encountered 
through literature such as Banjo Paterson’s well-known ‘The Man From Snowy River’: 
And one was there, a stripling on a small and weedy beast; 
He was something like a racehorse undersized, 
With a touch of Timor pony - three parts thoroughbred at least, 
And such as are by mountain horsemen prized. 
He was hard and tough and wiry - just the sort that won't say die - 
There was courage in his quick impatient tread; 
And he bore the badge of gameness in his bright and fiery eye, 
And the proud and lofty carriage of his head. 
 
And what of Canberra’s recent advertising campaign, ‘CBR’ (which stands for 
Confident. Bold. Ready), featuring a brumby cantering around iconic Canberran 
locations between shots of people dancing and drinking wine (ACT Government 
2015b)? 
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Thinking even further afield, the brumbies of the high country are even produced in 
certain ways through Canberra’s rugby union team, emblazoned on merchandise and 
jerseys.  
These examples may feel a little tangential, but my point here is that brumbies are 
produced and sensed in myriad, sometimes surprising ways. Such encounters are 
enfolded into memories and imaginaries of brumbies, as well as ‘closer’ encounters 
such as Sophie and Julia’s: ‘one thing I found really beautiful but quite surprising really, is 
just how right and fitting the brumbies look…they’re so well suited to those alpine plains’. The 
ways such events are (re)produced and sensed are in excess of knowledge that 
ecological science can produce, but are crucial in how brumby bodies are imagined in 
relation to landscapes.   
Immaterial ecologies 
Extending the complexity of ‘ecologies’ into this immaterial realm of sense, memory 
and imaginary demands a particular kind of intellectual openness and experimentation 
which is not often present in a scientific paradigm. However, exploring ecologies 
beyond relations between material bodies does not call for antagonistic criticism of 
science. Rather, we can respond to the dominance of science without erasing its 
important contributions to the world.  
In The Three Ecologies Felix Guattari could not be more explicit in his attempt to attend 
to environmental degradation. He begins, “The Earth is undergoing a period of intense 
techno-scientific transformations. If no remedy is found, the ecological disequilibrium 
this has generated will ultimately threaten the continuation of life on the planet’s 
surface” (2000, p.27). Thus, Guattari starts with the same problem as other forms of 
ecology that I alluded to earlier in this chapter: the threat to the continuation of life. But 
whereas other forms of ecology posit better scientific understandings of (eco)systems, 
and the manipulation of those systems as the ‘solution’ to this threat, Guattari is 
equally clear that the pursuit of permanent solutions to mutable environmental 
problems is futile at best, and harmful at worst. Rather, Guattari argues:  
the only true response to the ecological crisis is on a global scale, provided that it 
brings about an authentic political, social and cultural revolution…this revolution must 
not be exclusively concerned with visible relations of force on a grand scale, but will 
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also take into account molecular domains of sensibility, intelligence, and desire (2000, 
p.28 my emphasis). 
 
Here, Guattari is pleading that we stop relying so heavily on ‘visible relations’ – which 
are those most important in ecological science because they are ‘observable’. Think 
back to Sam’s explanation of ‘shifting baselines’ at the beginning of this essay: ‘myself I 
never witnessed bettongs. I never witnessed all these other animals that lived in this ACT 
environment’. Despite the invisibility of bettongs and other animals, Sam is reacting to 
the visible effects of the ‘relations of force’ (in this case the most obvious force is human 
settlement), that resulted in a different environmental ‘baseline’.  
The obvious question here, then, is how do we go about attending to something as 
complex as ‘molecular domains’, as slippery as ‘desire’, and as incomprehensible as 
‘relations of force’? 
One way is to turn to styles of thought inspired by Deleuze’s notion of ‘assemblage’ 
that has been prominent throughout this thesis. In thinking through these complexities 
of ‘relations of force’ through the site of national parks (conceptualised here as 
assemblages), it is crucial to remember that ‘assemblage’ refers both to a heterogeneous 
collection of material and semiotic elements “that have been selected from a milieu, 
organised and stratified” (B. Anderson & McFarlane 2011, p.125) and the process of 
assembling – that is, the organisation and stratification of such elements. It makes no 
sense to think of the elements of assemblage without also thinking of the process of 
their assembling. Attending to assemblages as though they are merely a collection of 
things (a laptop-book-desk assemblage) thus ignores the metastability of assemblage 
and the turbulence of transformation. And yet these are precisely the kinds of 
‘assemblages’ that ecological sciences produce (a dirt-fence-bird assemblage).  
Returning to the example of the humble brumby, we can think of the ways that 
brumbies are enfolded in an assemblage that combines scientific knowledge, literary 
history, syrupy advertising, and large men running into each other on a sports field, as 
well as discursive and bodily memories. Bernard Stiegler’s (2010) thought on forms of 
memory that transcend individual bodily experiences adds a layer of temporal 
complexity to encountering such an assemblage. As Bissell has put it, “Stiegler shows 
how the milieus that transcend the lifetimes of individuals have their own agency that 
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cues experience in important ways” (Bissell 2014b, p.1959). In particular, these ‘milieus’ 
disrupt notions of chronological time, as the past is continually informing experiences 
of the present, and shaping imaginings of the future. This brumby assemblage is not a 
fixed collection of bodies and images, but rather, a part of an infinite milieu which is 
unstable in its connections and its capacities; its future delightfully uncertain.  
If we attend to a national park as assemblage, for example, we must not limit this 
understanding to the actual (material and discursive) elements that we perceive, such 
as trees, animals, and fences, but keep at the forefront of our apprehension that we do 
not know the possibilities and potentials of these bodies – we must remember 
Spinoza’s caution that we do not know what these bodies can do (Spinoza 2001; 
Massumi 2002). Of course, knowing what bodies can do is precisely the apprehension of 
things that science purports to wield. The kinds of solutions to problems that were put 
forward in my encounters with the World Parks Congress59, for example, all centred on 
an understanding that we know what (most) bodies can do, and that the project of 
conservation is about calculating precise balances of different types of bodies rather 
than further exploration of the imminent capacities of those bodies, whether living, 
nonliving, organic or inorganic (Bennett 2010).  
Although this may seem a little abstract, there are countless contemporary examples 
where the fact that we simply do not know what bodies can do comes to the fore. I 
want to spend some time emphasising the unknown-ness of the kinds of 
transformations different bodies can effect in the world in a recent event to do with 
protected areas and environmental management in Australia by returning to the 
Mulligans Flat fence example I touched upon earlier. This is intended to provoke 
thought about the value of thinking the environment more-than-scientifically. 
A timely news article entitled ‘Conservation fences killing native species at Mulligans 
Flat in Canberra’s north’ (Walsmley 2015) appeared on my Twitter feed in February 
2015. You might remember this fence from its appearance in the ‘Fencing’ section in 
‘Encounters’. From that fieldwork encounter, I learned many things about this fence. 
The fence has been lauded by conservationists for enabling the reintroduction of 
species such as bettongs and Bush-stone Curlews. This fence has been cut by protestors 
                                                      
59 As discussed in ‘Discoursing’. 
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trying to save the lives of kangaroos marked for culling. This fence has been repaired 
innumerable times. This fence is patrolled twice a day to check for holes through which 
predators could enter the sanctuary. And now this fence has been held responsible for 
the deaths of more than 100 native reptiles over a 16 month period, mostly eastern 
long-necked turtles, as it blocks movement between and around essential water 
sources, as well as making reptiles easier targets for predators outside the fence.  
This is an event where a problem (species extinction and habitat decline) has been 
addressed with a solution (a big fence and conservation interventions such as breeding 
programs), which has subsequently created a problem (dead native reptiles).  
How to respond? (‘It is not so much ‘This is wrong, let’s do things differently’ as ‘Under 
what conditions has this occurred?’ and ‘Given those conditions, where do we go from here?’) 
We can call it bad science (it’s not). We can say that fences are bad (they’re not). We can 
say that fences are good (they’re not). We can say that we should have thought of that 
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as a possible consequence. How so? The ‘solution’ (i.e. the fence) became engaged in a 
problem (reptile deaths) that could only have been revealed through its existence. The 
fence-deaths revealed the movements, and the necessity of those movements, of the 
unfortunate reptiles. But these movements were only observed because they could not 
be completed. This was not a calculation that could have been made ahead of time. (‘at 
the end of the day we don’t really know how things are going to interact’). 
Such uncertainty in scientific analyses, or surprising responses, are seen as anomalous, 
outside of the ordinary. But the world is full of such ‘lines of flight’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1987), including delightful events such as Rowena, the prodigal Bush-stone 
Curlew introduced in ‘Encounters’. Unfortunately, we tend to frame these excessive 
areas of uncertainty as ‘areas for further research’, and we strive to know the 
unknowable. Unfortunate, because in doing so, we miss opportunities to become more 
flexible in a mutable world, more receptive to chance, more sensitive to the unknown, 
and more aware of the transformative forces of materialities of all kinds.  
A scientific reaction to the situation of the Mulligans Flat fence may be to figure out a 
solution to the problem that facilitates reptilian movements whilst keeping the area 
‘predator proofed’. Indeed, this is the course of action indicated by Mulligans Flat staff 
(Walmsley 2015), and it is an understandable aim to try to avoid a repetition of the 
deaths of native reptiles. However, the physical relation between reptilian bodies and 
fence bodies is but one part of the assemblage that gave rise to this particular event60.  
Also revealed through this event is the indeterminacy of material relations, the full 
force of an unknown and unknowable world that, although it may present scientific 
challenges, also brings a profound sense of the power and potential of a ‘world of 
chance’ (Deleuze 1983), and of lives and deaths and all that follows. This should not fill 
us with ominous feelings – we must leave space for the wondrous feeling that ‘at the 
end of the day we don’t really know how things are going to interact’. 
Can we not nestle gently up to uncertainty rather than wrestle with it? 
                                                      
60 Mere days prior to submitting this thesis for examination, Mulligans Flat announced a 
volunteer program of ‘Turtle Patrols’, where registered volunteers take shifts patrolling the 
outside of the fence in question, and alerting Mulligans Flat staff to any wayward reptiles in 
need of passage between their vital water sources. 
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If we are to have effective and productive discussions around the roles and futures of 
national parks and nature reserves, we need to be more open and transparent to their 
indeterminacy. While there are processes that we can observe and ‘know’ in some 
sense (such as parts of ecological networks), there are transformations always 
occurring throughout and beyond protected areas such as Mulligans Flat that we 
cannot necessarily hook into or reveal, but are nevertheless fundamental to the 
processual constitution of national parks. We therefore need to be open to the 
possibility of not knowing, in a ‘scientific’ sense at least, how some of these processes 
might operate. However much we may want it to be, nature is not a given, discrete 
entity that is already ‘there’. And yet, nature continues to be “presented socially, 
legally and politically as something knowable and ultimately controllable in all its 
aspects” (Halsey 2006, p.14). National parks are both emblematic and symptomatic of 
these problematic modernist assumptions. We have fallen into a pattern of discussing 
the ecologies of national parks as though we have grasped the ways in which they 
come into being, and endure. But this is not so. We should continue trying to develop 
these understandings, but we must be simultaneously more open to a conception of 
nature and, subsequently, of national parks as process, never already ‘there’, but 
incessantly mutable. 
Thinking ecologies machinically 
To think the world in this way, as constant flux and flow, is closely associated with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work, particularly on ‘machinic thought’ (Deleuze & Guattari 
1987). For Halsey, machinic thought rejects both modernist and structuralist 
understandings of environmental conflict, as it is “a way of thinking-acting that 
regards as futile all political programmes aimed at the final resolution of the struggle 
between ‘humans’ and ‘Nature’” (Halsey 2006, p.57).  
Machinic thought is critical of constant attempts to establish transcendental 
foundations (in this case, subjectivities) that will help bring about a resolution to the 
problem of balancing human activity with ‘nature’ (often through terms such as 
‘ecological sustainability’). Such transcendentalist goals (and the institutions, laws, 
scientists, environmentalists etc. who maintain it), according to the logics of machinic 
thought, is flawed, as they “portend to know in advance precisely how and why bodies 
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(will) think and behave” (Halsey 2006, p.58). This is precisely how the debates around 
national parks currently operate: that we know that without our intervention, 
particular species will become extinct; that with proper regulation we can carry out 
industrial practices without causing fatal degradation. At present, ecological analysis is 
predicated on the assumption that national parks are static unless transformed by 
human intervention and that we can know the effects of such interventions in advance, 
with little regard for the volatility of national parks and the uncertainties of ecological 
sciences (‘we don’t really know…’).  
In attending to the pressing problem of environmental degradation we should be open 
to new ideas of how this task can be accomplished. Although the scientific paradigm 
has yielded invaluable information about some of the biophysical processes of national 
parks and nature reserves, other possibilities have been obscured in the dominance of 
scientific authority. But nature is not solely the explorative terrain of science, and 
science, as part of a social and political world, is not an authority unto itself. 
Environmental degradation does not occur from or within an unproblematic 
biophysical world. Rather, the world is of multiplicities and flux, and national parks 
are not exempt from this mutable world. Neither are paradigms of knowledge, which 
must also adapt to change with a changing world. In opening ourselves and these 
places up to investigation outside the bounds of scientific paradigms we can perhaps 
begin to think and do national parks in a different way, moving beyond gridlocked 
debates over their uses and abuses that I highlighted in ‘National parks in Australia’.  
Machinic thought and assemblage are but two conceptual tools that allow us think 
differently about ecologies. In the case of environmental ‘problems’, it is important we 
allow ourselves, and each other, the intellectual space to think through such problems 
as productive in that they force us to think more-than-humanly, and call us to 
acknowledge a world of wonder and chance. Certainly, this is a challenging 
proposition, so deeply ingrained are our attitudes to the natural world and how we 
interact with it. If we take ecologies as extensive, expansive ‘assemblages’, human 
involvement in national parks becomes less a question of ‘What should we use national 
parks for?’ and more a question of ‘How might I enter into that assemblage?’ 
156 
 
Thinking national parks specifically, and ecologies more broadly as assemblage asks 
more of us in our considerations of and actions in the environment. Rather than relying 
on forms of analyses that only attend to ‘visible relations of force’, we must try to 
develop sensitivities to complex milieus, to think machinically. At the heart of this 
demand is a reconsideration of habits and systems of (scientific, representational) 
thought that underpin environmental ethics. 
In this chapter, I have focused mostly on our reliance on logics of representation in our 
environmental efforts. But representation operates well beyond how we conceptualise 
environmental problems. Representation is also at the core of the forms of politics that 
attend to the environment. Thus, rethinking representation in environmental sciences 
demands that we reconsider how representation operates in environmental politics. 
The third and final substantive chapter of this thesis, ‘Politics’, takes up that challenge. 
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[ Interlude three: conversations with a climate scientist ] 
Cathy: 
In the bulk of this thesis, I have been at pains to show, following best academic 
practice, the authors of ideas I am drawing from by citing their publications. No 
cheeky plagiarism here, thank you very much.  
But what about the ideas that have shaped and directed my thinking that come about 
in other ways that are not so easily defined by plagiarism guidelines? I am referring 
here to the extraordinary influence of the people in our lives on our research. In my 
case, it has been my absolute pleasure and privilege to have unfettered access to the 
thoughts of a brilliant young climate scientist who happens to be my partner – Sophie 
(you may recognise her from some of the interview excerpts).  
How do I attend to the ways my attitudes towards scientific practice have changed just 
through watching Sophie grapple with the capacities and limitations, and indeed, the 
ontological legitimacies of some of the methods undertaken in disciplines we think of 
as the physical or natural sciences?  
This seems a major oversight in much research – even in nonrepresentational research, 
which aims to move away from some of the prescriptive and restrictive rules and 
regulations of academic practice, that we rarely acknowledge that our intellectual 
development is ontogenetic. I have not just changed my mind about things to do with 
national parks because I have read some stuff (a lot of stuff) about them, but also 
through relations to other people who are changing their minds and changing the 
world.  
I don’t know precisely how sharing my life with Sophie has changed the direction of 
this research. I can’t point to specific conversations or ideas she has shared with me 
that have significantly changed my thinking. But I know that she has been an 
important part of the twists and turns this research has taken – at least as important as 
my supervisor, my colleagues, conferences and scholarly literature.  
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As a little experiment, I asked Sophie to respond to these ideas in her own way. The 
following is her reflection on how our particular intersection of science and social 
science has affected her, in her own words. 
Sophie: 
I have fond memories of a ridiculously nerdy childhood. I discovered a love of science 
from a young age. On the night of Halley’s Comet’s one-in-every-75-year passage 
across our skies, my parents took me stargazing and inspired the passions of my young 
mind.  A mode of inquiry was lit that could not be quenched.  
The whole world awaited me. My brother and I are kindly remembered as “feral 
children” – we roamed the Victorian highlands with great freedom, pockets filled with 
grasshoppers, old bones and tadpoles. It was an infinite world. Each treasure, each 
great discovery did not resolve a question in my mind, but instead reminded me of 
wondrous infinity. The world was complex beyond my understanding, and the past, 
present and future were simultaneously, beautifully unknowable.  
I’ve been a practicing scientist for several years; I spent four years doing a PhD in 
climate science, three years as a postdoctoral researcher and am now steaming towards 
my second year of a research fellowship. My love of science increases monotonically, 
year by year. I will always love science. Regardless of the twisting and turning 
topography of my life, I have always and will always be a scientist.  
But I am a perpetually conflicted scientist. The last reflexive, formal discussion I had 
about science as discipline was as an undergraduate some nine years ago. By our 
orthodox, self-prescribed definition, science accumulates knowledge through the 
scientific method. Science is an enterprise that pursues objective truth and our 
knowledge is reproducible and falsifiable. Scientists are supposed to be the irrelevant, 
disinterested practitioners of science.  
My science, my steady companion, is not this science. I spent four years of a PhD 
reconstructing past changes in our complex climate system from incomplete data 
sources that lend themselves wonderfully to plural interpretations. My research now 
aims to understand current changes in climate using sophisticated computer models 
159 
 
that are possibly unfalsifiable. I have never constrained the fundamental nature of our 
world through careful implementation of the scientific method. I have, however, cast 
light on new understandings of the world by the haphazard approach of data mining.  
I love this science. This is my science, it is imbued with me, it is creative and intuitive 
and it is cognisant of its limitations.  
Superficially, these are simply honest and unproblematic statements about science. But 
they cannot be discarded so readily as such because most formal attempts to constrain 
science and establish the legitimacy of our mode of inquiry will exclude me. By 
uncritically applying the ideas of science I was taught as an undergraduate, I feel I am 
a scientist who does not practice “science”.  
Science is unwaveringly critical. We do not tolerate assumptions. We cast our gaze and 
seek to know further, farther, deeper and wider. But we are infuriatingly content to 
overlook our own incongruities. They are not looked for and hence they are not seen.  
Framing scientific knowledge and practice as creative, or intuitive, or limited, also 
tends to be controversial. My dearest friend is a practising scientist. She believes that 
science is best conducted when scientists are detached from their work, even to the 
extent that PhD projects likely have the best outcomes when a student does not even 
much like her research topic. To simply enjoy science is to prejudice your results. Her 
views are not atypical.  
As a community, we are disparaging of reflexivity. We actively avoid discussion of the 
processes of knowledge acquisition. We joke that “the philosophy of science is as 
useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.”  
As a result, I am a frustrated scientist who is not a “scientist”. My frustrations have 
long simmered; at first vaguely conceived, shadows of ideas and an indistinct 
uneasiness, and then more clearly grasped but poorly communicated. Words and ideas 
have always been symbiotic. Science knows that great expansions in human language 
co-evolved with the expansion of our brain size and capability. They cannot be de-
convolved.   
But Cathy knows a lot of words and a lot of ideas. We met when I was finishing my 
PhD, which was a difficult time for me and for my practice of science. My candidature 
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was an unusually hard, long, circuitous route to a PhD. My research was comprised of 
several tenuously linked elements that were not readily separable from the peaks and 
troughs of my personal and professional experiences. But of course, science is 
supposed to be a dispassionate pursuit and thus, so was my thesis. I was disappointed 
to produce a body of work that so dishonestly reflected my experience of research.  
Cathy and I talk a lot. We drink coffee and talk about science, we walk the mountains 
and talk about sociology, and we drive to Melbourne and back again and talk about the 
problem with problems. Cathy gave me the words to grab firmly hold of the shadows 
of my ideas, to grasp that uneasiness. I like being a scientist who is not a scientist, and 
yet being no more or less of a scientist than 10-year old Sophie roaming the alpine 
plains with a butterfly net. I now revel in this sublime space beyond our self-limiting 
idea of science as a pursuit of absolute truth.  
Just as I have and will continue to co-evolve with my words and ideas, science as a 
collective enterprise is in a state of perpetual flux, infused with a temporality that can 
be redefined at any moment, if we allow it.  Although we are still outwardly critical 
and inwardly naïve, I think we know that there is value in reflexivity, even if we don’t 
know how to begin. At the moment these ideas are barely there, still just shadows on 
our periphery. They will not be forever, though, and I can only hope this re-imagined 
science will be more nuanced. We will be confident in our relevance and our 
limitations and most of all, we will allow ourselves to revel in our beautiful, infinite 
world. 
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6. Politics 
 
  
Parliament House in Canberra, ACT. Beyond, the moody Brindabella Ranges in Namadgi National Park. 
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6.1 Introducing politics 
I have argued for the importance of a nonrepresentational mode of analysis in thinking 
about environmental problems through the site of national parks. Focusing on how 
encounters constitute and transform national parks, and how we can rethink terms 
such as ‘ecology’ and ‘conservation’, I have outlined that nonrepresentational modes of 
thinking have much to offer in terms of reconceptualising nature, and the place of 
humans as part of nature. The vital question that remains to be addressed in this 
chapter is how these ‘modes’ might be put to work in the realm of politics. Indeed, one 
of the main criticisms levelled against nonrepresentational approaches is that this style 
of enquiry is apolitical or anti normative – that nonrepresentational theory lacks 
political conviction, is apathetic and ‘passive’ (N. Smith 2005; Harvey 2006). Alongside 
such critiques, questions often arise as to the ‘utility’ and ‘validity’ of 
nonrepresentational analyses. This has been a core concern that I have grappled with 
throughout this research project, and which I outline in more detail in 
‘Nonrepresentational theory, the environment, and me’.  
Nigel Thrift addresses these concerns directly and outlines the kinds of progressive 
‘politics of affect’ which become possible through nonrepresentational projects (Amin 
& Thrift 2007; Thrift 2004). Thrift notes the relative absence of exploring the role of 
affect in urban life in particular, citing affects associated with major events such as the 
mass hysteria after the death of Princess Diana, as well as the more mundane affective 
atmospheres of yelling road-ragers, or giggling children. Despite the ubiquity of these 
familiar atmospheric elements in urban life, Thrift points out that this ‘affective 
register’ is absent from scholarship on cities. Rather than theorising affect as somehow 
outside of political life, Thrift laments its absence from political theory as “criminal 
neglect”, and that addressing the role of affect in urban life is a crucial political project 
because “the discovery of new means of practicing affect is also the discovery of a 
whole new means of manipulation by the powerful” (Thrift 2004, p.58). We might 
think here of the manipulation of fears around terrorism to enable political agendas, as 
in the case of 9/11 (Kellner 2004), or the redirection of that fear towards hope that 
characterised the Obama campaign (Massumi 2009). 
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Following Thrift, I argue throughout this chapter that performing nonrepresentational 
analyses of environmental issues is in fact a deeply political project. But in order to 
think about what a ‘politics of affect’ might look like in relation to the environmental 
issues I address throughout this thesis, I should clarify to what I am referring through 
the word ‘Politics’ in this context.  
Politics is fundamentally concerned with the distribution and operation of power 
(Foucault 2002). Power enables and constrains bodies (and groups of bodies) of all 
kinds, and whether a body is enabled or constrained may depend on its gender, 
ethnicity, age, species, wealth, size, and so on, as well as what other kinds of bodies it 
enters into relations with. Peter Adey has outlined politics as enablement and 
constraint in terms of mobility, where different kinds of bodies access mobilities in 
different ways according to the powers they are subject to (Adey 2009b). These powers 
may be part of formal governance systems (such as road rules), or they may arise from 
bodily relations (such as the power differential between a truck and a cyclist on a road, 
for example). In terms of environmental politics, we may think of the power 
distributed through different kinds of bodies (human, nonhuman, organisational, 
organic, inorganic, and so on), and how that power may enable and constrain other 
bodies in certain ways. Power affects different bodies differently. So, although ‘politics’ 
is a hugely contested term, for my purposes here I refer to the modes, mechanisms, and 
bodies through which power is distributed, and how that power enables or constrains 
capacities of different bodies.  
In terms of environmental politics, we are accustomed to thinking about a politics of 
representation, where a (preferably) scientifically informed government makes 
environmental governance decisions, and where those decisions are made in the 
interests of representing and balancing the desires and needs of different stakeholders. 
In this view, different levels of government (local, state, and federal), and stakeholder 
groups are understood as the locus of politics. This dominant notion of politics is the 
focus of public discourses commonly found in newspapers, political analysis and 
opinion pieces61. 
                                                      
61 I draw out a recent example of this type of discourse in ‘Representational environmental 
politics’. 
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However, following Foucault’s theorisation of biopower in particular (Foucault 2012), 
we understand that political power does not only reside in government (that is, in 
formal governmental structures and apparatus) but operates through dispersed 
assemblages of power (B. Anderson & McFarlane 2011; B. Anderson & Wylie 2009). As 
Bissell, Hynes and Sharpe have pointed out “[it] is… appealing to suspect: to imagine a 
hidden logic, a structure of control underpinning diverse collective arrangements that 
can be ‘exposed’, a riddle that can be deciphered… or a conspiracy that can be 
unmasked beneath totalising environments of control” (Bissell et al. 2012, p.705). In 
terms of national parks, we might like to imagine that all environmental misgivings 
spring from the source of an apathetic, incompetent, or indeed, corrupt government. 
Apathy, incompetence, or corrupt governments are all serious issues. But considering 
the government as the only significant site of environmental politics is a reductive, and 
in some ways, lazy desire that ignores that government is but one site of politics, and 
that political power is everywhere, diffused through discourse and performed through 
diverse bodies (Butler 1993) including, as I will continue arguing, nonhuman bodies.  
While a more ‘traditional’ conceptualisation of politics may emphasise the nation-state 
as a central location of power (Haugaard 2010), this understanding is at odds with 
nonrepresentational understandings of politics, which align more closely with 
Protevi’s theorisation of ‘political physiology’, which “deals with component processes 
below the level of the subject, in a fully developed political context that eschews 
individualism by recognizing emergent social groups above the subject and 
heterogeneous assemblages that are alongside the subject” (Protevi 2009, p.186). 
Protevi’s approach allows for thinking of politics as diverse cultural, immaterial, and 
physiological forces that enable or debilitate the capacities of different kinds of bodies. 
In its attention to bodily capacities, Protevi’s political physiology is closely linked to 
Thrift’s politics of affect. 
Attending to the potential of multiple and diverse bodies is a way of balancing analyses 
that overemphasise the importance of the state as the most significant site of politics. 
As Foucault puts it “We all know the fascination that the love, or the horror, of the 
state exercises today; we know how much attention is paid to the genesis of the 
state…its power, abuses, and so on” (Foucault 2002, p.220). Foucault goes on to argue 
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that this knowledge, this attention to formal state apparatus is key to 
‘governmentality’, a narrow outlook in which “the techniques of government have 
become the only political issue, the only real space for political struggle and 
contestation” (2002, p.221).  
In this chapter, I argue that performing nonrepresentational research is profoundly 
political because it establishes new sites for political contestation that do not assume the 
dominance of state structures in political life, and builds foundations for different 
political mentalities that exceed (and in some ways precede) a mainstream politics of 
rights and representation. Nonrepresentational theories are coupled with a politics of 
plurality, flexibility, and schizoanalytic thinking (Guattari 1995), where the core 
business is rethinking some of the ontological assumptions that lay the foundations for 
more mainstream politics. Nonrepresentational approaches do not pose problems in 
order to ‘solve’ them in any concrete way, but rather to better articulate and 
understand what, precisely, constitutes any particular ‘problem’. Nonrepresentational 
theory is thus not a refusal of representation per se, but rather, an effort to open 
opportunities to theorise the world beyond a repetition of the same (Doel 2010). In 
other words, the scope of exploration is different for nonrepresentational modes of 
enquiry.  
I am not arguing here that nonrepresentational thinking is somehow separate from, or 
better, or more important than mainstream politics focused on the rights and 
representation of subjects. Rather, in the sections that follow, I argue that 
nonrepresentational theories generate innovative approaches to politics primarily 
through rethinking the relationship between ‘micropolitics’ and ‘macropolitics’. These 
are broad and contested terms, but in relation to the scale of politics of national parks, 
we may usually think of ‘macro’ political problems such as governance, funding, 
resources and ideology. But I am attending more closely to what brings these ‘macro’ 
events into being, namely micropolitical encounters. I discussed a few examples in 
‘Encounters’, such as the visceral effects of feeling ‘lost’ in ‘Mapping’, or the emotional 
and affective intensities that I focused on in ‘Tracing’. In this chapter, I theorise these 
micropolitical encounters as constitutional relations, forces and desires that give rise to 
macropolitical problems. This is a reconsideration of the starting points of 
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environmental problems and politics that allows for an expansion of how we 
understand the constitution of environmental politics, and invites new and different 
sensitivities to how we can engage with and respond to environmental problems. 
Indeed, macro, or ‘mainstream’ politics can be conceptualised from a more 
performative perspective and analysed as an ecology of forces and capacities. Bertelsen 
and Murphie (2010) have shown how powerful this approach can be in their analysis of 
the ‘Tampa affair’62 in Australia in 2001. Resisting the lure of dominant discourses of 
asylum seekers, national sovereignty, and human rights around the event, Bertelsen 
and Murphie focus instead on the power of the repetition “of a red ship – a huge freighter 
– on the horizon” and the way in which this refrained image “did not just illustrate a 
complex political event. It helped bring it into being” (Bertelsen & Murphie 2010, p.6 
original emphasis).  
What Bertelsen and Murphie highlight in this article is that events that we may 
typically associate with macropolitical problems (of nation-states, or sovereignty, or 
human rights, for example), are actually accumulations, compositions, or assemblages, 
of micropolitical moments (such as the line of a red ship against the blue sea or the heat 
of huddled bodies). We should not assume that a ‘micro’ political encounter means an 
encounter that occurs on a small scale. Rather, as Massumi puts it, a micropolitical 
event “can have broad range. What qualifies it as micropolitical is the way it happens, 
not the dimensions it takes. By micropolitical we mean returning to the generative 
moment of experience, at the dawning of an event” (Massumi 2009). Where a 
macropolitical analysis may take the ‘dawning’ of the Tampa affair as problems to do 
with refugees or sovereignty, Bertelsen and Murphie point to a refrained image of a 
red ship and a horizon as an alternate genesis of the ‘broader range’ of experiences 
around the Tampa affair.  
Bertelsen’s and Murphie’s approach in this particular piece of work has had a 
profound effect on how I have tried to rethink problems to do with national parks, 
                                                      
62 In which the Australian Government refused to allow the MV Tampa, a Norwegian freighter 
which had rescued 438 asylum seekers, to enter Australian waters. The Tampa eventually 
disobeyed, and upon entering Australian waters, was boarded by the Australian Navy. The 
asylum seekers were taken to Nauru rather than Australia while their refugee status was being 
determined.  
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nature, and humans in this thesis. Deliberately sidestepping some of the dominant 
discourses of, for example, conservation, biodiversity, and the identity politics of 
environmentalisms, I am trying to carve a new path through the muddy and 
convoluted debates pertinent to national parks in Australia. Through attending to the 
more slippery realm of affective intensities in Practices, and to the elusive problem of 
representational logics of science in ‘Beyond scientific evaluation’, I have tried to carve 
a path that arrives at a new terrain upon which we can think through contemporary 
environmental problems.  
Like Bertelsen’s and Murphie’s unique approach to thinking through the Tampa affair, 
I want to explicitly draw out how the kinds of events I have attended to thus far in this 
thesis help bring complex environmental political events into being. I am 
reconceptualising environmental politics as the perpetual assembling of events which, 
at different points in time, congeal into the ‘environmental problems’ we more 
commonly focus on, such as sustainability, conservation, biodiversity, and so on. 
Unpacking the political implications for this approach does not mean that this is the 
place where I suggest ‘solutions’ to Australia’s ‘environmental problems’, or suggest 
changes to environmental policy. Rather, the thrust of this chapter is that thinking 
creatively about the constitution of environmental problems is inherently political in 
that it reposes what, precisely, an ‘environmental problem’ is, and what forces bring it 
into being: What kinds of repetitions and affects constitute environmental problems? 
What kinds of bodies are demanding definition and discussion of environmental 
problems? What kinds of responses become available when we move away from a 
representational politics of the environment? 
Throughout this chapter, I unpack some of the possibilities of this work of opening up 
such new terrains of environmental politics through four distinct sections:  
First, in ‘Representational environmental politics’ I draw out some of the shortcomings 
of thinking about the environment exclusively through subject-centred politics, as is 
the case currently. This section further develops some of the lines of argument I offered 
in ‘National parks in Australia’, outlining how environmental debates are figured as 
disputes between exclusively human subjects, positioning the nonhuman environment 
as a rather inert backdrop to the actions and decisions of humans.  
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Second, I explore some alternative ways of thinking about environmental politics 
through Hasanna Sharp’s ‘impersonal politics’, which draws heavily on Spinoza’s 
notion of ‘affective bodies’. Sharp’s (2011) work focuses on reconfiguring how we 
understand ‘the human’. Sharp’s reconfiguration has significant implications for 
rethinking subjectivity and action as relations of impersonal forces and distributed 
agencies. In such an understanding, environmental politics becomes less about the 
rights and representations of human subjects (or, indeed, animal, plant, or rock 
subjects), and more attuned to the affects and forces that endow particular bodies or 
collectives with affective capacities and powers, and the effects of these capacities on 
understandings of human action.  
Third, in ‘Political materialities’ I continue reconsidering environmental politics 
through Jane Bennett’s theorisation of ‘vital materialism’ (2010), which emphasises the 
liveliness and vitality of nonhumans. Whereas Sharp focuses on reconfiguring 
understandings of the human, Bennett focuses on reconfiguring understandings of 
nonhumans. This section does not simply argue for endowing nonhuman bodies with 
vital properties, but also deals with the significance of the human as constituted 
through multiple nonhuman bodies and impersonal forces and intensities.  
Fourth, in ‘Nonrepresentational theory, the environment, and me’, I outline my own 
personal struggles with encountering nonrepresentational research. This section is a 
reflection on the performative powers of mainstream discourses around 
human/environment relations, particularly the persistence and pervasiveness of such 
conventional habits of thinking (or, ‘doxa’) and the discomfort that disrupting these 
habits can give rise to. Despite such discomfort, this section affirms multiplicity and 
experimentalism of thought as a response to a ‘dogmatic image of thought’ (Deleuze 
2004) around how environmental political knowledge can, and should, be generated.  
Through these sections, this final substantive chapter reconsiders environmental 
political theory in light of nonrepresentational theories, and discusses some of the 
challenges of conducting qualitative research in these areas. This chapter thus poses 
some pertinent questions in terms of how we might grapple with the complexities that 
this understanding of the world brings with it: If agency is immanent and distributed, 
does it make sense to continue with our subject-centred mode of political engagement? 
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If we take the capacities of matter seriously in political life, what are the implications 
for practices that rely on an understanding of the world as inert or even infirm, and of 
humans as the stewards of this fragile world? If we embrace nonrepresentational 
environmental politics, what are the implications for our more traditional, 
representational modes of understanding and regulating the environment, and how we 
conduct research into these matters?  
Posing these problems can be confronting because in order to do so, we need to 
challenge or suspend deeply ingrained ontological assumptions – of the rational 
human subject, of the world as entirely separate and discrete from humans, and of the 
world as knowable through anthropocentric modes of enquiry. This chapter thus 
disrupts some habits of thought that restrict how we understand and (re)present 
environmental political problems.  
6.2 Representational environmental politics 
On what authority do we assert the forester body to be wholly divorced from that of the 
protestor body? … There is no good reason for thinking the hands which operate a 
chainsaw cannot or will not one day be those holding an anti-logging placard. But 
neither is there good reason for thinking the opposite (Halsey 2006, pp.69-70). 
 
The way ‘environmental politics’ is performed through discussions around national 
parks is based upon a politics that assumes humans subjects to be always at the centre 
of environmental ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’. I have already touched upon how 
national parks tend to be discussed and debated in ‘National parks in Australia’, 
‘Encounters’, and ‘Ecologies’. I want to return to these discursive questions in order to 
draw out the ways in which we talk about national parks construct and perpetuate 
particular notions of human subjectivities, and the relationship of those subjectivities to 
the environment. What kinds of categories do we assume to be true and fixed in 
common understandings of national parks? Specifically, how is human subjectivity 
understood in contrast to the world around us? Addressing these questions through 
human relationships with national parks produces some interesting problems to work 
through.  
This traditional mode of problematising is utilitarian – in that it is searching for 
(re)solutions to discrete problems – and encourages a politics of rights and 
representation that, while extremely important, should not always be our first point of 
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call for working through environmental issues. I argue that, rather than debates 
around national parks being examples of ‘environmental politics’ par excellence, these 
debates actually exclude the environment in various ways, and are thus better 
understood as ‘the representational politics of the environment’.  
To outline what I mean by ‘representational politics’, I will begin with a brief overview 
of common understandings of ‘environmental politics’.  
We tend to conceptualise environmental politics as something that is done, discussed 
and debated solely by different types, or groups, of human subjects. Indeed, prominent 
conservationists have asserted that “conservation interventions are the product of 
human decision-making processes and require changes in human behavior to succeed” 
(Mascia et al. 2003, p.649 original emphasis). This style of environmental political 
thought centres on human activities and frames the environment as inert or infirm 
without human intervention. Further, as Lakoff has put it, the way the environment is 
framed becomes reified “in institutions, industries, and cultural practices” (Lakoff 
2010, p.77).  
Indeed, through a combination of environmental ideology and everyday practices, we 
constitute ourselves – and perceive other individuals and institutions – as different 
types of environmental subjects. For example, I would generally self-identify as 
‘environmentalist’ largely because of my everyday practices: I commute on foot or by 
bicycle; I am conscious of my energy use at home; I recycle; I keep myself up to date 
with environmental issues; I try to minimise flying; I spend a great deal of time in 
nature reserves, and so on. Indeed, these factors align with those used in the 
increasingly popular practice of calculating individual environmental ‘footprints’63 
(Shove & Spurling 2013).  
The nonhuman parts of the world are implicit in these ‘environmentalist’ practices of 
mine, but I (a human subject) would generally be considered as the centre of these 
(political) decisions and practices. Conversely, I might consider someone who drove 
their car unnecessarily, kept heating or air-conditioning on throughout the year, and 
was oblivious to their production and consumption practices as a decidedly 
                                                      
63The very notion of a human ‘footprint’ upon an otherwise balanced earth is a powerful symbol 
of the human exceptionalism I take to task throughout this thesis. 
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unenvironmentalist character64. Environmental politics, of course, plays out far beyond 
the construction of individual identity. As well as understanding my individual 
subjectivity or identity as ‘environmentalist’ through such everyday practices, I 
consider myself an environmentalist largely because my political values align most 
neatly with those of the Australian Greens party, whose dominant focus is 
environmental issues.  
 Environmentalism is commonly understood as closely aligned with the left wing of 
contemporary Australian politics. The Australian Greens’ core platform is based, in 
addition to their obvious environmental focus, on the decidedly left-wing pillars of 
grassroots participatory democracy, social justice, and peace and non-violence (Greens 
2013). The Greens are often attacked or ridiculed by other political parties and figures 
for putting the needs of the environment before human desires (which usually involve 
economic growth). However, far from the ideas of conservation being a product of 
‘green ideologies’, as is sometimes suggested, the core underlying principle of 
conservation – that humans have certain responsibilities as the stewards of the natural 
                                                      
64 I should note there is a certain level of hypocrisy here, and others could consider some of my 
consumption practices unenvironmental. I have been known to drive short distances, purchase 
products containing palm oil, use excessive water, and so on. 
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environment – has historical roots much deeper than ‘green ideologies’ that have 
developed over the last 50 years (Berg 2012).  
Theorists have also noted that the seemingly competing notions that humans have the 
right to utilise natural resources and the duty to care for the natural environment both 
have biblical roots, and the influence of Christianity on understandings of 
environmental domination and stewardship can be traced throughout history (P. 
Harrison 2006). Historically, conservation is thus a nonpartisan effort, belonging to 
neither side of politics. According to William Souder65 “[c]onservation was a hopeful, 
noble and inherently nonpartisan cause, a quest for the betterment of the world” (cited 
in Flannery 2012 np). In contemporary Australian society, however, environmental 
concern generally, and the value of conservation specifically has become closely 
associated with left-wing politics (Levy & Wissenburg 2012).  
It is perhaps because of this connection of left-wing ideology and environmentalism in 
Australia, that we discuss environmental problems so frequently in terms of ‘political 
will’. There is a common assertion that human efforts at the individual and state level 
can solve environmental problems. Tim Flannery, a well-known conservation 
advocate, for example, has asserted that when it comes to environmental conservation, 
“[n]othing is keeping us from success except our failure to be accountable – to 
ourselves and future generations” (Flannery 2012 np). Flannery and other 
conservationists regularly point to community and government programs that have 
successfully restored the health of particular habitats or species to underscore these 
claims of the capacities of political will (and funding). Although there have certainly 
been many instances where intervention into particular ecologies have had the desired 
effects of reducing or reversing a loss of species or habitat, this can result in an 
overemphasis of human capabilities and assumptions that we can develop solutions to 
any environmental problem, given sufficient political, social, and financial support.  
There are numerous examples of national parks apparently being subject to ‘political 
will’. One instance of environmental politics being performed in this way was a speech 
given by then Prime Minister Tony Abbott to the Australian Forest Products 
                                                      
65 The author of Rachel Carson’s (2012) biography On a farther shore: the life and legacy of Rachel 
Carson. 
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Association in March 2014. By way of context, the speech refers largely to a decision by 
the previous Government to heritage list 74,000 hectares of land in Tasmania, 
protecting the areas from forestry and mining. The Abbott government lobbied to de-
list the area, on the grounds that “that 74,000 hectares is not pristine forest. It’s forest 
which has been logged, it’s forest which has been degraded, in some cases, it’s 
plantation timber that was actually planted to be logged” (Abbott 2014)66. One part of 
Abbott’s speech in particular was refrained throughout mainstream and social media 
alike, when the Prime Minister stated that “when I look out tonight at an audience of 
people who work with timber, who work in forests, I don’t see people who are 
environmental bandits, I see people who are the ultimate conservationists” (Abbott 2014, 
my emphasis).  
That the particular phrase “the ultimate conservationists” consumed fierce debate in 
mainstream and social media suggests a particular affective power of ‘conservation’ as 
a mode of environmental engagement. There was a sense that ‘conservation’ as the 
underpinning value of environmentalists was being distorted to suit Abbott’s political 
aims. Members of the Greens responded angrily, with Senator Larissa Waters declaring 
on Twitter that Tony Abbott “hates the environment”; several articles were published 
admonishing Abbott; journalists jumped to their battle stations. I too paid particular 
attention to the speech, feeling rather smug that the Prime Minister had wandered into 
my thesis topic; I added to the discourse in my own way, giving a conference 
presentation based on the performative and discursive power of this very event (Ayres 
2014).  
This is of course a brutally truncated overview of contemporary environmental politics 
in Australia, and I have erased much of the complexity of these debates. However, I do 
so to make the point that on both the left and the right of Australian politics, human 
subjects are placed at the centre of environmental processes – whether those processes 
are considered restorative or destructive to the environment. In terms of national 
parks, collectives of (somewhat) aligned (human) subjectivities with differing priorities 
(or ‘stakeholders’) are placed at the centre of what we often think of as ‘environmental 
conflicts’. Often, these conflicts are presented as two arguments put forward by 
                                                      
66 The motion failed, and at the time of writing, the area still holds its heritage status. 
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cohesive interest groups requiring different access to and resources from national park 
spaces: miners versus environmentalists; four wheel drivers versus horse riders; hikers 
versus hunters, and so on.  
Environmental conflicts are thus understood as disagreements on the purpose of 
national parks between two (or more) cohesive groups (such as hikers, hunters, and 
miners) constituted by collectives of human subjects. Different groups may emphasise 
a particular value of national parks (such as natural beauty, family tradition, and 
economic benefit respectively). In this view, national parks are constructed and 
understood as relatively fixed, inert, and rather functional spaces. Disagreements of the 
purposes of national parks arise, encouraging understandings of environmental 
problems as the competition between collectives of human subjects for utilising the 
same piece of land. When the ‘problem’ of national parks is constructed within this 
framework, the ‘solution’ appears to be finding a balance between stakeholders’ 
desires, ideally with minimal environmental impact. As such, environmental conflicts 
are commonly characterised as battles between groups of humans with differing 
financial and political power. 
Such ‘stakeholder conflicts’ reflect the dominance of a model of political action based 
on consensus (Banton 2012). In the ‘consensus’ style of politics, debates around 
national parks usually attempt to articulate and resolve these conflicts between human 
subjectivities. These resolutions take place on the level of political rights and 
representation of subjects – a core aim of Australia’s representative democratic style of 
government. Balancing the desires of multiple groups of humans with existing 
environmental regulations and pressure from environmental groups plays out in local, 
state and federal politics, and the results of such negotiations are evident in 
experiences of national parks.  
If we return to my conversation with Julia and Sophie about their six-day hike in the 
ACT and NSW high country, these issues of different stakeholders and their competing 
demands on national parks are apparent in national park infrastructure. Sophie in 
particularly noticed that these tensions affected her experience of the hike: 
those [stakeholder] tensions are obvious. Like, um, you know, the walking 
infrastructure is, to our mind, well to mine, confused and potentially inadequate. But 
then you go to a campground where they have a campground specifically built for 
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people to come, in the national park, for people to come and camp with their horses, 
and they have permanent, like, arenas for people to corral their horses overnight, and 
I’m like, you can’t put up a fucking track marker once in a while? (Interview, 
25/04/2014) 
 
The frustrations raised by Sophie here are about safety in navigating the national park, 
but she is also articulating a problem with an environmental politics based on political 
representation and rights that are so easily decided due to the financial and political 
clout of particular groups. In this case, Sophie feels that the desires of horse riders have 
taken priority above the safety of walkers navigating difficult terrain. As such, the 
collectives of walker subjectivities may feel themselves to be under-represented, to have 
fewer rights in terms of national park use than horse riders. Through tensions such as 
these, which are often the focus of public discourse on the matter, the politics of the 
environment are currently understood as the politics of humans in relation to the 
environment. In this way, ‘environmental politics’ quickly becomes ‘identity politics’, 
and brings with it all the complexity of a politics that people hold close to their sense of 
self. This problematically reinforces a combatant form of criticism between members of 
groups who perceive themselves to be against each other; important debates about the 
environment generally, and national parks specifically become gridlocked, pushed and 
pulled between competing subjectivities.  
These subjectivities adhere more or less to different logics of validation associated with 
national parks. In general, national parks are apprehended as spaces for recreation, 
conservation, or natural resources, and debates around national park uses revolve 
around striking a ‘balance’ between these three apparently competing uses. Recreation 
(say, four-wheel driving, horse-riding, camping, or hunting) is impeded by 
conservation efforts or the need for natural resources; conservation efforts are in 
competition with demands from recreational activities in national parks and utilisation 
of natural resources; natural resource use is impeded by conservation regulations, and 
so on. With these competing priorities, it is little wonder that debates around national 
parks seem always to be gridlocked. The gridlock can be understood through these 
logics of validation for competing, yet overlapping priorities for national parks. 
Recreation is perhaps linked to neoliberal logics of personal freedom; conservation 
linked to environmentalist logics of preservation; and natural resource use linked to 
capitalism and economic growth. So one issue here is that national parks are pulled in 
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multiple directions by these different priorities. How we ‘do’ the politics of national 
parks, and indeed environmental politics in general is inextricably linked to competing 
and overlapping subjectivities that prioritise these modes of validation differently 
(Hannigan 2014).  
These issues may feel very familiar. This way of formulating environmental problems 
raises a major question: if environmental politics revolve so closely around human 
subjectivity, at what point does ‘the environment’ enter the problem? Although 
national parks and their associated conservation programs purport to recognise 
intrinsic value of nonhuman species outside of their utility to humans (Commonwealth 
of Australia 2007), the problem that environmental advocates face is emotionally, 
morally, and politically charged. They are tasked with engaging a polity in the 
wellbeing of nonhuman species, and the most effective way to accomplish this seems 
to be to emphasise the benefits for humans, such as the aesthetic pleasures of national 
parks, or their benefits to human mental and physical wellbeing. Or conversely, 
environmental commentators and advocates may attempt to achieve their ends by 
outlining potential ill effects of environmental degradation for humans (see, for 
example, Flannery 2012). There are numerous contemporary examples in Australia of 
advocates appealing to the utility or benefits of a particular course of environmental 
management for human communities.  
A local example from Canberra is the response to the deadly and destructive bushfires 
in Canberra in 2003. The four fires that ripped through southern Canberra had been 
burning out of control in Namadgi and Tidbinbilla for over a week before they entered 
suburban Canberra. The coroner’s report indicated that a poor initial response to these 
fires was a key factor in the extent of injury and property damage (Doogan 2013). In 
response to these findings, significant effort was invested in developing a new strategic 
bushfire management plan, which resulted in developing bushfire management zones, 
building of fire trails throughout Namadgi and Tidbinbilla, and installation of 
infrastructures such as fire trails and access gates in case of future fires (ACT 
Government 2009). The extent to which the Namadgi and Tidbinbilla landscapes have 
been changed by these infrastructures would no doubt have been met with furious 
resistance from Canberrans under different circumstances, before the fires. But 
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concerns around invasive infrastructures pale in comparison to the memory of the 
fires, and amid fears for the future, the adoption of the management plan has been 
relatively uncontroversial. 
In terms of environmental management plans such as Canberra’s fire plan, differing 
values are certainly expressed by different stakeholders. The Greens, for example 
employ very different rhetoric about the environment than, say, the Liberals around 
national parks. But there is striking similarity in how national parks are understood as 
places to be utilised for human purposes; national parks are almost uniformly 
understood as inert, infirm backdrops to human activities.  
In such an understanding of the environment, the ‘problems’ of national parks appear 
to be political problems requiring decisions made according to scientific knowledge, 
human values, and political priorities. But the type of problem that national parks are 
thought to be – namely, a political problem – is a misdiagnosis. Or at least, it is a partial 
diagnosis. National parks are certainly a political problem, but they are not exclusively a 
human political problem. In much the same way that I have argued that national parks 
are in excess of purely scientific problems in the ‘Ecologies’ chapter of this thesis, 
thinking of national parks as problems to be solved by human political processes 
leaves no room for thinking through the complex role of nonhuman capacities, forces 
and intensities in transformation and change in the world. Such a rigidly humanist 
understanding of the world discourages flexibility and creativity in how we can think 
about environmental problems and limits possible responses.  
The first limitation is that environmental politics as they stand assume unproblematic, 
immutable collectives of rational, conscious human subjects (stakeholder groups). 
Stakeholder groups inevitably involve categorisation (as hikers, drivers, horse riders, 
miners and so on), which attempt to predict what certain (subjected and subjective) 
bodies can do ahead of time (Halsey 2006). Claiming such knowledge has been 
thoroughly problematised by nonrepresentational theories (Thrift 2008; Macpherson 
2011; Clough 2008); Spinoza’s insistence that ‘we do not know what bodies can do’ is, 
again, pertinent here. As categories deal in essences, there is no allowance for 
transformation, or, to borrow Deleuze’s term, there is no room for ‘lines of flight’ 
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(Deleuze & Guattari 1987), where bodies may overflow, surpass, or rupture closed 
notions of ‘subject’, ‘object’ and so on.  
Although notions such as ‘subject’, or ‘object’, or ‘national park’ or ‘environment’ 
certainly play important roles in representational modes of analysis that assume such 
categories to already be known, they leave little room to think about the potentials of 
the bodies or collections of bodies they claim to explain. Categories of ‘environmental’ 
(and ‘unenvironmental’) are deeply embedded in representational logics, and insisting 
on their truth invites us to continue the ‘violence of representation’ (Halsey 2006), 
whereby we ignore difference in the world in favour of seeking out the familiar, the 
same, the stable. Rather than engaging individual (human, nonhuman, organic, 
inorganic) bodies in environmental politics, bodies are pulled into alignment with 
assumed and prescribed abilities67.  
Assuming such alignments and abilities as fixed and given prevents posing and 
analysing environmental problems in terms of a world of becoming. In thinking 
through more than adversarial political alignments, thinking through possibilities and 
transition, we can turn once more to Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘machinic thought’ (2004), 
which highlights in the world “an omnipresent volatility to the concepts (ways of 
thinking) and subjectivities (ways of existing) previously understood to be immutable, 
normal, and wholly sufficient to their task” (Halsey 2006, p.69). But a single system of 
thought that leaves no space for lines of flight, or ruptures of concepts and 
subjectivities is clearly not sufficient to address problems of how concepts and 
subjectivities come into being, endure, and transform. That is not to say that 
representational, modernist thinking is completely invaluable or somehow wrong, but 
rather, that we would be sorely mistaken to continue treating it as though it is a total 
system that facilitates posing new problems and new responses.   
A second limitation to creative responses to environmental problems is in continued 
assumption of the centrality of humans in environmental problems and solutions. 
Understanding human activity as the way through which transformation in the world 
occurs, precludes the potentialities, powers and capacities of nonhuman materialities 
                                                      
67 As the epigraph in this section on conflicts between protestor bodies and forester bodies 
suggests. 
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to effect change in the world. This seems particularly hazardous in the context of 
environmental problems. We are increasingly aware of the capacity of the environment 
to transform, sometimes in ways that are dangerous to human (and some nonhuman) 
life, as is the case in extreme climate events linked to climate change (Perkins et al. 
2014). How are we to respond to environmental challenges in productive ways if the 
only way we allow ourselves to think about the environment is as an external entity 
that is either damaged or salvaged by humans? 
A third limitation on responding to environmental challenges is that although subject-
centred representational politics is well-placed to question how particular 
environmental ideologies68 affect decision-making with regards to national parks, this 
understanding of environmental activity has little capacity to think through the 
possibilities of the life and lives of national parks in new ways that may help to 
engender sensitivities to nonhuman forces of transformation in the world. That is, in 
centring the subject, we necessarily relegate everything but the subject (nonhumans, 
affective forces, nonconscious drives and desires, and so on) to the periphery of 
transformation, reinforcing the notion that they are always less important than that 
slippery creature, “the subject”.  
These are not abstract philosophical quibbles about how we explore environmental 
conflict. The types of divisions underpinning contemporary environmental politics  
(subject, object, human, nature) have significant impacts in terms of environmental 
management, conflicts, restoration programs, urban development guidelines, and so 
on. Interrogating these divisions is a fundamental part of poststructural thought which 
holds that such divisions are “not only ontologically problematic, but socially, 
culturally and ecologically damaging” (Halsey 2006, p.57). Damaging, because current 
methods of environmental governance tend to preserve and legitimise binaries 
between divisions (human/nonhuman, organic/inorganic, native/invasive, for example) 
that lead to environmental destruction in the first place (the fundamental premise of 
‘conservation’, for example, is that nature is an unproblematic and ‘pure’ entity under 
attack from humans). As, in the view I have put forth throughout this thesis, there is no 
clear ontological divide between subject and object, how is it that we come to align 
                                                      
68 Ideologies which are, I would argue, the accumulation and congealing of bodily forces, 
desires, encounters, and so on. 
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certain bodies with predetermined capacities? And crucially, what affective capacities 
are recognised (human agency) while others are cast aside (nonhuman agency)?  
Representational environmental politics provides very little space to think through 
these complexities. The problems dealt with in this mainstream mode of politics are 
functional, but due to the conceptualisation of human subjectivity as always at the 
centre of politics, they only have the capacity to pose and answer particular sets of 
questions to do with political rights and representation of human subjects. It makes 
little sense to me to attempt to fit an essentialist, subject-centred politics over the top of 
a processual, affective world and claim the world as ontologically given, and either 
known, or knowable. As Doel has put it, “so obsessed are we with naming, 
categorizing, and defining rigid designators – with pinning-down…the most paranoiac 
and paralyzing question of all: ‘What is…?’ – that we fail to inquire to the fixative 
which produces something or someone” (Doel 1996, p.424).  
Thinking national parks nonrepresentationally means moving beyond this ‘obsession’ 
in order to begin thinking and doing environmental politics differently, in order to 
begin a politics that calls us to appreciate capacities as well as essences, individuals as 
well as species, differences as well as similarities. The next two sections, ‘Impersonal 
politics’ and ‘Political materialities’ deal with how two contemporary theorists, Hasana 
Sharp and Jane Bennett respectively, have carved out terrains through which such a 
new environmental politics may begin. I connect Sharp’s and Bennett’s thought 
specifically to the questions of national parks I have developed throughout this thesis, 
and discuss how these complex places may themselves become valuable openings for a 
new environmental politics.  
6.3 Impersonal politics 
The impersonal is political (Sharp 2011, p.13). 
 
If we recognise that subject-centred politics is not the only way we can conceptualise 
environmental politics, it follows that we need to propose alternative 
conceptualisations. This is not in an attempt to develop ‘solutions’ to existing 
environmental ‘problems’. Indeed, part of the problem of current environmental 
politics is a misguided notion that there are environmental problems that can be solved; 
181 
 
as though there is a secret calculation that, if only we can deduce it, will allow us to 
live harmoniously and sustainably with the natural world. This is particularly 
apparent in environmental problems, where solutions to an environmental problem 
have become further environmental problems themselves. In Australia, we need only 
think of cane toads to understand how such ‘solutions’ can go awry69, or my 
exploration of the Mulligans Flat fence in ‘Fencing’ and ‘Beyond scientific evaluation’. 
Rather, my goal here is to articulate alternative ways of thinking about environmental 
problems, and perhaps posing new problems. This may feel counterintuitive – a desire 
to introduce more environmental problems – but I am thinking about ‘problems’ here 
through a Deleuzian understanding of problems as productive sites for thinking about 
and responding to life. As Deleuze has powerfully put it, “freedom lies in the power 
to…constitute problems themselves” (Deleuze 2006, p.15). 
If we acknowledge that subject-centred politics cannot provide us with productive 
problems in terms of how to respond to environmental concerns, where to turn?  
In line with the emphasis of this thesis on process and becoming, I argue in this section 
that there are political imperatives to be more experimental with how we think about 
our relation to the processes and becomings of the environment, the world. There are a 
heartening number of theorists who also contribute to this ‘current’ of thought; 
posthumanist theorists in particular such as Donna Haraway (1999) and Judith Butler 
(1993) have pushed boundaries in terms of theorising the porosities and the 
possibilities of humans. But in my travels through these sets of literatures, Hasana 
Sharp’s words have percolated in my mind; her writing holds my eye and moves my 
thought. Furthermore, her work draws out the explicitly political terrains 
poststructural thought and immanent ethics can offer. In The Politics of Renaturalization 
Sharp argues that “an impersonal perspective opens up a new continent of political 
theory and practice” (2011 p.13). Sharp’s notion of ‘impersonal politics’ draws heavily 
from Spinoza’s political treatises and also from Ethics in order to, as she notes in a 
footnote, “add water to these alternative currents” (2011, p.11).  
                                                      
69 Cane toads were introduced to keep insects away from sugar cane crops and are now 
considered pests themselves (Seabrook & Dettman 1996).  
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Her ‘impersonal politics’ begins from the point that the act of making humans into 
persons who are conscious of themselves as ‘moral agents’ bestows ‘personhood’. 
Through personhood we begin to understand ourselves as free beings who are “freed 
of natural determination” (p.12 my emphasis).  Sharp thus identifies ‘personhood’ and 
our resultant mainstream politics as ‘important and indispensable’ and is at pains to 
articulate that an impersonal politics is not necessarily in opposition to, but is certainly 
very different from, politics of rights and representation, of the kind I outlined in 
‘Representational environmental politics’. Her two interventions particularly pertinent 
to my purposes here are her theorisations of ‘free will’ and ‘action’ – problems that are 
seldom questioned in representational political thought.  
Rethinking free will 
Sharp’s approach to expanding the remit of what we think of as ‘political’ beyond 
human subjectivities begins with rethinking the particular capacities and abilities we 
associate with being human. This is a challenging and sometimes confronting project, 
as it questions and problematises many deeply ingrained assumptions about human 
powers and abilities we commonly take to separate us from the rest of the natural 
world. Key humanist philosophers, particularly those that emerged throughout the 
Enlightenment such as Descartes, Kant, Locke, and Hobbes, theorised the human 
subject as endowed with qualities of rationality, logic, free will and reason. In light of 
these extraordinary talents, this humanist understanding of human subjects endures, 
and we are still are commonly figured as rational actors, sovereign over environments 
and our own bodies. In this view, our ability to overcome or control affective urges is a 
desired quality, and failing to do so is viewed as a failing, or lack of humanity, where 
‘humanity’ is understood as opposed to ‘nature’. Consequently, as Sharp puts it 
“human viciousness is frequently blamed on affects and passions, understood to be the 
animal eruptions that stain spiritual and rational man” (2011, p.22).  
Moral judgements on individuals’ abilities to overcome such passions and desires are 
rife in social and political life. ‘Willpower’ is considered an antidote to many 
shortcomings as a human. Willpower will enable you to quit smoking. Willpower will 
enable you to lose weight. Willpower will enable you to drink less, exercise more, work 
more productively, be a better friend and lover, write a better thesis, and so on. In this 
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paradigm, humans need only accumulate more willpower in order to succeed in all 
their endeavours. Failure to do so is just a symptom of being weak of will – a mind 
failing in its sovereignty over its body. This perspective is, of course, closely tied to the 
Cartesian dualism that pervades contemporary understandings of human subjects as 
endowed with freedom in the realm of the mind, regardless of material conditions70.  
Sharp argues that such an opposition of mind and matter “disguises an opposition 
between rational and natural life” and, further, that “such an opposition, for Spinoza, 
yields self-hatred, misanthropy, and civil unrest” (2011, p.24). Such self-hatred is 
certainly apparent in common responses to failure to drink less or write a better thesis. 
Indeed, millions of people feeling inadequate around the world may take heart from 
Sharp’s reading of Spinoza, as her project of impersonal politics is based in a 
‘renaturalisation’ of thought, “which begins to disrupt the voluntarist and 
anthropocentric bases of current ethical and political thought” (2011, p.25). These 
disruptions are particularly important in thinking through environmentalisms, where 
humans are consistently figured as a wholly destructive species. Sharp’s politics of 
renaturalisation is not only in the interests of adjusting how we think about 
environmental problems, but also of easing some of the unproductive lines of thought 
that position humans as a cancerous part of the world, only capable of destroying (the 
rest of) nature.  
Rethinking action 
Rethinking human thought as far more reliant on desires, drives and forces clearly 
requires careful reconsideration of human action (D. W. Smith 2011). A traditional 
understanding of action rests upon an assumption of rational decision-making abilities 
of humans. I am not arguing that humans are completely irrational, but rather, in line 
with the thrust of materialist, affective social theories, I understand that “reflective 
thought is just one modality of thinking amongst many others that compose the body” 
(Bissell 2011, p.2649). Keeping this in mind, then, how do we approach the problem of 
human action? For the fact that humans do effect significant transformation of 
                                                      
70 Descartes is seen as the antagonist for many posthumanist thinkers. This hardly seems fair, 
given his demise is by no measure a recent one; he can hardly be blamed for the persistence of 
his ideas in contemporary understandings of humanity.  
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environments is undeniable. Indeed, human activities have transformed the surface of 
the earth so significantly that we are seen as having brought about a new geological 
age, the ‘Anthropocene’71 (J. Lorimer 2015). 
Rethinking the role of humans within the material world does not mean ignoring the 
impacts of human actions on the world, but rather, aims to provide more (and more 
useful) ways of understanding these actions. Sharp takes Spinoza’s theory of affect as a 
comprehensive retheorisation of human action based upon “a notion of agency that is 
in no way exclusively human” (2011, p.5). For Sharp, Spinoza’s notion of affect is such 
that “the conception of the human that emerges is a being around whom lines cannot 
be definitively drawn and whose powers cannot be preemptively defined” (2011, p.25). 
This is because, in Spinozan thought, human capabilities and actions are never entirely 
human. Rather, capacities for action, or ‘affect’, “names those changes in power that 
belong to finite existence by virtue of being connected necessarily to other beings, 
immersed in a field of powers and counter powers that cannot be entirely inventoried, 
anticipated, or circumscribed” (2011, pp.25-26). Action, then, is relational, involving 
diverse material and immaterial conditions including, but not limited to, human 
decisions. 
This notion of agency as the mingling of forces and affects (only some of which are 
ever registered by any body) is particularly challenging in thinking about the politics of 
national parks, which are based on inventories of species, anticipation of ecological 
problems, and circumscription of particular species and processes72. Thinking through 
affect is one way we can attend to the complexities in excess of these measures of 
national parks, which are based on a world of fixed essences. Affect overspills these 
confines and operates instead in processual becomings and transformations that 
constitute the world in flux (Massumi 2002). Sharp’s ‘impersonal politics’ is a politics 
that acknowledges this world of excess, where the political cannot reside within and 
operate between subjects, because these subjects are constituted by, and constitute new 
                                                      
71 The ‘Anthropocene’ is somewhat of a spectre in this thesis, as is the broad and vexed issue of 
climate change. I see these as ghostly underpinnings to which I assume readers will connect, 
but I have refrained from drawing out these connections too explicitly myself for fear of 
tethering my arguments tightly to these important issues.  
72 As I argued in ‘Beyond scientific evaluation’, this is a reductive and potentially hazardous 
framework for thinking about and responding to environmental problems. 
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forces, new desires, new politics. Sharp’s impersonal politics can thus be understood as 
a politics of immanence and transformation, where “impersonal forces include those 
affects that circulate in the social body, enabling and constraining the powers of bodies 
and minds, often without anyone’s awareness or knowledge… impersonal politics is a 
project of composition and synergy” (2011, p.13). Impersonal politics, therefore, can 
never be fully grasped, articulated or understood.  
We can do these lines of posthumanist and poststructural thought more justice, and 
they have the potential to do more justice, if we attend to what this slipperiness means 
in terms of the possible political transformations that are revealed – as Sharp says, ‘a 
new continent of political theory and practice’ (2011, p.13, my emphasis). So in relation to 
national parks, how might this ‘new continent’ be constituted? Precisely what kinds of 
political transformation in terms of national parks are made possible through 
developing sensitivity to its impersonal politics? What, in other words, does an 
impersonal politics offer in terms of environmental politics that is not better addressed 
through traditional subject-centred, representational politics?  
To begin with, an impersonal environmental politics would not attend closely to the 
political clout of various interest groups, or to the successes or failures of a particular 
government to respond to and balance the priorities of these different collectives of 
aligned subjectivities. Rather, “an impersonal lens is trained upon the affects that 
concretely determine individual and collective power” (2011, p.13). This ‘lens’ may 
seek out connections – no matter how ephemeral – or territorialisations and 
deterritorialisations that shift and distribute desires and forces. These shifts in 
compositions of events, atmospheres, and actions, these more subtle lines of 
transformation often go unnoticed or unremarked in subject-centred politics that is 
more attuned to representation and rights.  
The possibilities of what an ‘impersonal lens’ may be trained upon are boundless, and 
deciding which compositions, which events, which atmospheres to attend to has been a 
major methodological and intellectual challenge in this thesis. As I outlined in 
‘Producing the thesis’, I have tried to develop sensitivity to my own affective drives 
and impulses, and these have been significant in my decisions of which bodies of 
literature to draw on and, crucially, which empirical moments I should prioritise in this 
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thesis. Indeed, the empirics of this thesis are crucial in my attempt to draw out new or 
different connections by resisting assumptions about what is ‘important’ in research 
interviews. For example, if you recall my interview with John in ‘Tracing’, the most 
powerful part of that encounter for me, in the sense that it returns and returns to me, is 
the moment when John revealed his wife’s illness. Experimenting with how I have 
attended to the affective intensities of such empirical moments that may appear ‘off-
topic’ or unimportant is vital in drawing out “the excessive dimensions of being in the 
world that can never be predicted or determined in advance” (Bissell 2010a, p.85).  
An ‘impersonal politics’ may be more attuned to different, more subtle lines that may 
often be buried in the busy discourses around national parks and environmental 
problems. Attending to more subtle lines, to affects and bodies and forces is crucial in 
discerning how more distinct events, attitudes, and decisions congeal, and thus, how 
we can respond productively and creatively to complex and perpetual environmental 
problems.  
6.4 Political materialities 
The association of matter with passivity still haunts us today… weakening our 
discernment of the force of things (Bennett 2010, p.65). 
 
In the last section I focused on how Sharp’s impersonal politics can open up 
possibilities for environmental politics to move beyond subject-centred, 
representational politics that relies on ontologically problematic notions of what a 
human is, and what it can do. But exploring the possibilities of a nonrepresentational 
politics of the environment also requires reconsidering how we understand nonhuman 
bodies. While Sharp does address this in her work on the ‘renaturalisation of thought’, 
I will turn in this section to Jane Bennett, whose work drew me into the possibilities of 
posthumanist thought. Although I do not wish to reinforce any binaries between 
human and nonhuman, where the last section focused on the possibilities of attending 
to the ‘impersonal’ in politics, this section will focus on the powers and capacities of 
nonhuman materialities in the world to effect change, to impel humans to act, to be 
political actors in their own right.  
Drawing on poststructural theorists such as Deleuze, Foucault, Spinoza and Bergson, 
Bennett’s project is to explore ways that humans can change themselves and their 
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thinking to better sense and discern ‘the force of things’. Her book Vibrant Matter73 
(2010) argues that common understandings of nonhuman materialities as passive or 
inert is antiquated, and that acknowledging the capacities and vitalism of matter is a 
deeply political and ethical project. Bennett argues that knowing things better – the 
intricacies of the life of metals, for example – can lead humans to appreciate material 
things more, thereby paying more attention to the life cycles of plants, plastics, rocks, 
and humans alike. For Bennett, paying closer attention to ‘the thingness of things’ will 
enable humans to live more sustainably and harmoniously with the world.  
Bennett explicitly states that large-scale environmental trauma and danger, such as 
climate change, has motivated her to question her own conceptions of what politics is, 
where that politics might be located, and how it might operate to effect change. She 
does this by critiquing core assumptions about the capacities of various materialities in 
the world – human, nonhuman, organic, inorganic – to effect change. Specifically, she 
argues for ‘flattening’ ontological relations in order to attend more closely to the 
capacities of matter of all kinds. Flattening traditional hierarchies which place humans 
at the top, Bennett contends, allows us to stop assuming the centrality of exclusively 
human activity in events. Perhaps it is Bennett’s concern with environmental issues 
that I connected with, or perhaps I was drawn to her clear and personably style of 
writing, or perhaps it was that hers was one of the first works in this line of thought 
that I encountered. 
No matter the precise reason, Bennett’s work has been a force in its own right, moving 
me to try to think differently about nature and the environment. Connecting some of the 
main strands of Bennett’s arguments (namely, the capacities of matter of all kinds) with 
my own arguments around national parks invites engaging with national parks not as 
inert environments under the thumb of human management, but rather, as vibrant, 
vital, and capable places which are central environmental political actors.  
Bennett provided my introduction to the reinvigoration of materialist approaches that 
raise fundamental questions about the place of embodied humans in an undeniably 
physical world.  Although we are always surrounded by things – things we build, 
                                                      
73 That the title of this thesis emulates Vibrant Matter is an indication of how significant Bennett’s 
work has been in my own intellectual development; the echo is an intentional homage. 
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things we eat, things we grow, things we wear, watch, produce and consume – 
historically, materialist approaches that attempt to theorise our relations with the 
material have been marginalised in the social sciences in favour of symbolic, discursive 
approaches to analyses of social life (Edwards 2010). Discursive approaches tend to 
privilege human relations and meaning-making, and rarely attend to the significant 
roles of materialities in social relations. In response to these shortcomings, new 
materialism is a project of reappraising what we consider to be constitutive of social 
and political life.  
In order to evaluate the liveliness of matter, new materialism agitates some of the most 
fundamental ontological and philosophical binaries between human and nonhuman, 
living and nonliving, and idealism and materialism. A central tenet of the new 
materialist project is to develop sensitivity to the trajectories and interconnectedness of 
material transformations, including the injury they may cause us. This appreciation of 
not only the existence of materialities, but also of their potential – that is, their power – to 
effect change that may have profound effects for human lives is particularly 
challenging for the current modus operandi of environmental politics. As I argued in 
‘Representational environmental politics’, this can be summarised as the governance of 
the environment under the demands and desires of different human stakeholder 
groups. New materialist thought throws into question the entire ontological premise of 
this mode of politics, in that it refutes that the nonhuman materialities that constitute 
national parks can be governed at all, arguing instead that matter – all kinds of matter – 
is lively, and largely unpredictable (Coole & Frost 2010, p.5).  
The unpredictability of matter is key here, as it is an increased sensitivity to the affective 
possibilities of matter – that is, the capacities of matter to affect and be affected 
(Massumi 2002) – has significant implications for how we understand the politics 
around environmental governance. Indeed, new materialism throws into question the 
very notion of ‘governing’ any kind of body, as affective bodies can act in excess of 
prediction (Clough 2008). My problematisation of the predator-proof fence around 
Mulligans Flat in ‘Fencing’ and ‘Beyond scientific evaluation’ is a pertinent example of 
an infrastructural body – a fence – whose capacities exceeded expectations. 
Apprehending the fence as an inert, functional technology (where the ‘function’ is 
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‘predator-proofing’) is bound up with the cumbersome habit of reinforcing a “static 
notion of materiality that assumes a radical separation of bodies and technologies as 
mutually discrete entities” (Bissell 2010b, p.480).  Such a ‘radical separation’ ignores the 
“dynamism immanent to bodily matter and matter generally” (Clough 2008, p.1) 
theorised so thoroughly in the ‘affective turn’74.  
Recognising the capacities of nonhumans is not to say that we should not consider the 
effects of human activities in national parks, and should certainly not be taken as a 
suggestion that all we need is a more ‘laissez-faire’ attitude to the environment. What I 
am taking to task here is the notion that humans are separate from natural processes to 
the extent that we can predict the capacities of other bodies (or indeed, our own 
bodies). This is the underpinning assumption upon which we assume that we are able 
to govern and manage bodies that constitute the places that we deem adequate to 
perform the function of being ‘nature’. I do not make these points in ignorance or 
apathy towards the dramatic changes human activity has effected in the world; 
humans are certainly powerful producers of change. And yet, these changes occur in a 
field of relations which envelopes innumerable other agencies that contribute to the 
formation of the environment, and we ignore these at our own peril. As Bennett has 
put it, we should “tread lightly upon the earth, both because things are alive and have 
value as such and because we should be cautious around things that have the power to 
do us harm” (Bennett, 2010, pp. 365-366).  
This cautionary message from Bennett immediately invokes issues of ‘sustainability’, 
which is usually discussed in terms of subject-centred systems of governance 
implementing (or not implementing, as the case may be) policies in the name of 
environmental sustainability and conservation (Pellizzoni 2004), reinforcing the notion 
of powerful human agents looking after an increasingly needy environment. This 
worldview is epitomised in national parks, whose very existence assumes a level of 
indigence. New materialism offers environmental politics different terrains for 
understanding and responding to significant (and seemingly mundane) socio-
ecological events (Braun & Whatmore 2010; Whatmore 2013).  
                                                      
74 As reviewed in ‘Nonrepresentational theories and the ontological turn’. 
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If we return to my earlier example of the conflicting interests of horse-riders and 
walkers in Namadgi, new materialist thought allows us to move beyond considering 
these events as competing interests of humans over an inert environment. A new 
materialist analysis of this event would attend to all kinds of bodies, and their own 
performative (yet relational) powers. We might think of horse bodies, sweating in 
corrals and labouring up steep trails; we might think of human bodies, sweating in 
tents and labouring up steep trails. But we might also think of the potential of those 
bodies to coalesce with other bodies and form events that change the world. Although 
these changes may be mundane, banal, or miniscule, they have the potential to impel 
political action, a very different kind of political action, which is more about becoming 
attuned to different forces and capacities of bodies. This kind of political action would 
be more attentive to how bodies are assembled and assembling rather than analysing 
the alignments and disputes of human stakeholder groups.  
Bennett’s vital materialism moves the new materialist venture further beyond 
conventional ideas of structure and agency by reconsidering how we think of life itself, 
emphasising, after Spinoza, capacities to act and affect as ‘life’ more than any 
biophysical qualities a body may possess. In order to conceptualise life as capacity, 
new materialism draws on various philosophical strains, gathering thinkers such as 
Hobbes, Spinoza, Diderot, Nietzsche and Thoreau, who contribute to traditions in 
which “the distinction between life and matter, or organic and inorganic, or human 
and nonhuman, or man and god, is not always the most important or salient difference 
to recognize” (Bennett 2010, pp.62-63). Bennett draws upon many thinkers, but her 
formation of a theory of distributive agency engages Spinoza’s ‘affective bodies’ and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘assemblage’75 in particular.   
In a world of emergent assemblage, humans are not considered autonomous, self-
sufficient actors, but as vibrant and, crucially, relational materialities that partially 
constitute dynamic, processual, amalgamate events. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
consideration of the associative nature of bodies (human and otherwise) is drawn from 
Spinozan ‘conative’ bodies, which are continuously affecting and being affected by 
other bodies. Reconceptualising human relations with national parks through this kind 
                                                      
75 As reviewed in ‘Nonrepresentational theories and the ontological turn’. 
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of assemblage enables responses to national parks that blur reductive divisions of 
social/natural, human/nonhuman, and structure/agency, and indeed, refutes the “a 
priori reduction of social-spatial relations and processes to any fixed form or set of 
fixed forms” (B. Anderson & McFarlane 2011, p.124). Moving beyond ingrained 
understandings of ‘nature’ as one such ‘fixed form’, invites environmental political 
action beyond ontologically problematic notions of ‘protecting the environment’. 
Understanding forms such as ‘nature’ (or ‘human’, ‘subject’, ‘object’, and so on) as 
dynamic and malleable demands an environmental politics of attending instead to how 
power is distributed through various bodies, enabling and constraining the capacities 
of other bodies, and what kinds of interventions may be made into those distributions 
of power.  
Bennett strives to imagine a politics of a world of assemblages wherein the type of ‘life’ 
is not the most salient detail in distinguishing materialities and their powers, where 
divisions between living and nonliving matter are eschewed at the ontological level 
(Bennett 2010). However, the ontological level is not the only sphere of sociality that 
requires attention in sociological analysis, and while Bennett’s elucidation of new 
materialism is remarkable, her treatment of exactly what we should do with new 
materialism is (perhaps intentionally) quite ambiguous. Bennett argues that although  
we should take care not to move too fast from ontology to politics, “attentiveness to 
(nonhuman) things and their powers can have a laudable effect on humans” (2004, 
p.348). Bennett argues that one of the most significant contributions new materialism 
can make to contemporary politics is precisely through encouraging humans to be 
more attentive to material transformations, thereby thinking the environment anew as 
more than a passive, inert field, populated and regulated by human activity, a 
“recalcitrant context for human action” (Bennett 2010, p.111).  
It is at this point where my thoughts on how these materialist lines of thought might be 
taken up in environmental politics departs slightly from Bennett’s. Bennett’s 
proposition – that human attentiveness to material transformations is a possible way to 
solve problems of human consumption and production practices that ignore the 
trajectories or lives of material things – becomes problematic, as she seems to revert to 
a paradigm where human knowledge of things is what can save us from potentially 
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destructive environmental change. Although Bennett is at pains to articulate the 
affective dimensions of material relations, she problematically suggests that a possible 
solution is to anthropomorphise nonhuman things to the point where humans care 
about things as much as they do the lucky few species of animals we have imagined to 
have ‘human qualities’. Bennett argues that this “careful course of 
anthropomorphization” (2010, p.122) can help reveal the vitality or affective powers of 
nonhuman things. Bennett qualifies her argument by acknowledging that such vitality 
“resists full translation and exceeds [her] comprehensive grasp” (2010, p.122).  
Hasana Sharp and Jane Bennett share similar goals, but approach them differently. 
Whereas Sharp focuses on the political possibilities of an impersonal politics, other 
posthumanist theorists suggest other ways of opening up political arenas in order to 
better grasp the place of humans in the material processes of the world. Jane Bennett’s 
work on ‘vital materialism’ is one such alternative way of conceiving the politics of the 
world. Sharp and Bennett both pursue a similar goal in their effort to retheorise politics 
in terms of materialities and processes rather than human subjectivities, rights, and 
representation. However, where Sharp concentrates on how we might reconfigure the 
human by recognising that the powers of humans only arise in their material 
circumstances, Bennett emphasises the political power in nonhuman materialities –
whether organic or inorganic – to effect transformation in the world, including 
transformations in humans. 
Together, theorists such as Sharp and Bennett build a strong case that key 
environmental challenges facing contemporary society (such as anthropogenic climate 
change, pollution, biodiversity loss, and so on) have arisen due to assuming the 
ontological primacy of humans and human agency, which has resulted in a mass 
forgetting or wilful ignoring of the capacities of nonhumans to act in ways that can 
harm humans. This should not be taken to mean that humans are somehow pitted 
against the rest of the world; that our survival can only continue through battling the 
agencies of nonhuman elements in the world. This argument simplistically and 
mistakenly reinforces perception of and division between discrete agents. The 
challenge here is to think past the bodies that we are so used to perceiving as separate 
from us, and acknowledging that our own becoming is co-constitutional. 
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This does not have to involve invoking any quasi-mystical properties of an all-
knowing, balanced Gaia-type conception of nature. Rather, this requires decisions. But 
not just decisions about where to allocate funding for particular management practices 
of national parks. These decisions must also be about how we want to think the world. 
What kind of knowledge production and transformation is productive and affirmative? 
Are we happy to continue with lines of thought that at best, reduce the complexity of 
the world, and at worst, harm us? As Lorimer has put it so clearly, “there are distinct 
politics and ethics to this approach. Appreciating nonhuman agencies and diverse 
intelligences foregrounds both our material connections to the earth and the varying 
ways these can be made to matter. The focus here is on modes of relational and/or 
affirmative ethics and politics that are open to difference (understood as process) and 
the excessive and unpredictable nature of life” (J. Lorimer 2013, pp.62-63). 
Throughout the process of conducting this research, I have been acutely aware of the 
effects that thinking about the materialities of the world in this way have had on me 
and the way I relate to the world. My personal experience of these ‘laudable effects’ 
Bennett speaks of is that they can bring wonder and joy, but also raise uncomfortable 
questions of personal ethics and responsibility in everyday life and in research 
processes. The next section is a reflection on my own experience of struggling with 
materialist theories, and the transformative power of conducting nonrepresentational 
research.  
6.5 Nonrepresentational theory, the environment, and me 
The greatest truths are those expressing those problems in all their aspects and 
applications, avoiding the dangerous illusions of false simple solutions (J. Williams 
2013, p.2). 
 
In his review essay, ‘Nonrepresentational theory and me: notes of an interested sceptic’ 
(2012), Tim Cresswell details his ongoing (sceptical) fascination with 
nonrepresentational theory. At one moment in particular he describes his sensations 
after leaving conference sessions starring nonrepresentational theorists: 
I have sometimes left confused or angry. At other times I have sensed that something 
is going on and that, like Mr Jones in the Dylan song, I don't know what it is (2012, 
p.98). 
 
I can relate.  
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Dealing with the stunningly broad set of histories and thinkers that shape 
contemporary nonrepresentational theory has often been a disconcerting and 
frustrating endeavour. I’ve seethed at the apparent resistance in some corners to 
explain (in plain language) what, precisely, is going on. Then I’ve seethed at myself for 
not ‘getting it’. And I have at times shared Cresswell’s sense that nonrepresentational 
theory is a “disavowal of forty-plus years of attempts to engage with issues of politics, 
injustice, and power” (2012, p.98).  
But alongside these frustrations was a sense of joy that no other ‘body’ (if we can 
gather a set of such diverse work under that label) of work has ever elicited in me. The 
joy won out. I had committed myself to a doctoral degree, and I wanted to enjoy it. 
Three years after Cresswell’s essay, Hayden Lorimer’s response, ‘Non-representational 
theory and me too’ rang equally true. I can also relate to Lorimer’s point: “It’s 
important…that we recognize how ageing and seasoning are processes that act on the 
reception of ideas and how…the maturation of ideas might alter the way you feel 
about self-declared areas of research interest” (H. Lorimer 2015, p.177). 
This is certainly the case now. I do not see nonrepresentational theories and 
approaches as a ‘disavowal’ – just a radically different way of putting the pieces 
together. That’s what I have tried to do here, and, echoing Tim Cresswell and Hayden 
Lorimer’s self-memoir on their encounters with nonrepresentational theories, the rest 
of this final chapter is a reflection on how my own encounters with this body of work 
have challenged and changed the ways I relate to and think about the world.  
Perhaps the most uncomfortable change has been the disruption of an image of myself 
as a self-contained, stable figure, persisting throughout the research process. Rather, 
my ‘self’, so far as I can continue to think of me as a ‘self’, has been the site of 
significant transformations of all kinds – bodily and ethically. This is a personal, 
intellectual, and methodological challenge. 
In the course of conducting interviews, when I asked Sam (the ecologist), on what the 
goals of conservation should be, he looked at me, and fumbled his answer: 
It should be… you know if you want to have this pristine environment, what it was like 
pre European settlement. I mean even that has questions about it, doesn’t it? I mean 
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should it be like before Aboriginal people started using fire…I don’t know… (Interview, 
03/10/2013). 
 
He then thought for a few moments, looked at me, and said: “Like, what is our end 
game in terms of restoring a habitat? It’s sort of a bit of a mind-fuck”.76  
This part of the interview is stuck in my mind. To see a professional and passionate 
ecologist faltering when thinking through the unanswered (and unanswerable) 
questions of his work was a very moving and profound thing to witness. He was quite 
troubled, and continues to ask me for my thoughts on these issues. He has been 
changed by the questions I put to him. He was obviously grappling with important 
issues of colonial attitudes to the history of Indigenous land management in Australia, 
but this moment also highlighted for me some of the shortcomings of current forms of 
politics around the environment that draw arbitrary lines in time and deem these the 
conditions to which we should try to return.  
What is our end game?  
It seems to me that we have convinced ourselves that the ways national parks come 
into being and endure through time is entirely dependent on human action. I want to 
make very clear that I am not arguing that the idea or practice of conservation is 
redundant. But in an ecological scientific paradigm alone, the lives, deaths, fluxes and 
flows that constitute national parks are quantified, measured, and budgeted. 
Conservation becomes about maintaining a balanced budget, so to speak. This yields a 
very ‘dead geography’ (Thrift & Dewsbury 2000) indeed, ignoring complexity, 
dynamism, and nonhuman capacities.  
I have felt acutely aware of the dominance of the scientific paradigm in the politics of 
national parks generally, and ecological conservation specifically. Throughout my 
research I have had several crises of doubt – feeling at times that critiquing or 
problematising ecology and conservation in this way is somehow blasphemous, and 
goes against my personal environmental sensibilities. I still lament diminishing 
environmental protections and despise those responsible for approving and 
developing environmentally dangerous projects. So challenging conservation as the 
                                                      
76 The force of Sam’s expletive here is similar to that in my reflection in ‘Discoursing’ in that the 
acridity of the language was an important part of the affective force of this moment. 
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mode through which we respond to such threats to the environment has, at times, felt 
like scoring an own goal.  
A recurring theme for any thesis in uncertainty, but my uncertainty arose in a series of 
crises of confidence that this thesis would, ultimately, be a reflection of my thoughts, 
values, and responses. And yet, in writing this thesis I have felt on several occasions 
strong urges to not make these critiques or pose these problems because it seemed 
somehow in opposition to my personal environmental sensibilities. Is ecology not a 
discipline precisely interested in environmental health? Is conservation not an 
admirable goal of national parks? Are national parks not my favourite places to be? 
And yet, alongside these anxieties has been a strong sensation that responses to 
environmental threats must take place beyond the scientific paradigm. This belief is the 
result of new habits of thought (affirmative critique, openness to indeterminacy, and so 
on) that I have deliberately and serendipitously encountered and accrued over the 
course of this research, habits which have “offere[d] up possibilities for reaching new 
imaginations of our place in the world, and of how that world works” (Dewsbury & 
Cloke 2009, p.698). Such ‘new imaginations’ are what I am trying to create in this 
work.  
The tensions between my changing beliefs – through exploring nonrepresentational 
theories and my love of national parks – have presented at all stages of this thesis: in 
conception, in empirical encounters, and in the writing process. 
One instance of these tensions occurred during one of my earlier interviews, when my 
notion of the direction of the thesis was very different. As I have noted, I conducted 
very unstructured interviews, simply initiating conversations about Namadgi, 
Tidbinbilla or Mulligans and letting the discussions flow organically. Matthew, the 
interview participant in this case, is a well-respected local historian whose area of 
expertise was the ACT high country (specifically, Namadgi). Matthew directed the 
conversation strongly towards his professional interest in the cultural heritage of 
Namadgi, and the importance of preserving that through better funding of park 
management and prioritising maintaining the high country huts in national parks.  
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Despite being critical of this mode of thinking (in that funding and management 
practices of parks are a tiny part of their constitution), I found myself wholeheartedly 
agreeing with his arguments – not challenging him at all. Upon reflection this feels like 
an opportunity missed, but at the time I remember that in comparison to his forceful 
propositions about the care and management of national parks, my views on 
‘capacities’, ‘forces’, and ‘desires’ seemed very flimsy and ill-defined. I never raised 
any of my own ideas with him in the course of the interview. I never challenged his 
reliance on ecological arguments, and in doing so I missed a chance to test my own 
ideas.  
Without wanting to tether this experience too closely to a particular theorist, I think 
this interview is an excellent example of the ‘doxa’ of thought that Deleuze worked so 
hard to reveal and reject. In his notion of the ‘dogmatic image of thought’, Deleuze 
contradicts the idea that ‘thinking’ is akin to ‘knowing’, where ‘knowing’ simply 
means recognising existing moral or political values (2004b). My failure to ‘know’ the 
same set of knowledge that Matthew possesses generated anxieties around the power 
of my own ideas, of my own processes of thinking – a power with which I am now 
more comfortable and confident. If I conducted another interview with Matthew now, I 
think I would approach it very differently. I have ‘aged’ and I have ‘seasoned’ and I am 
more comfortable in these kinds of tensions that animate nonrepresentational work.   
My attempts to not slip into representational logics, to tell a new story of national 
parks, is constantly challenged through everyday encounter with mainstream 
arguments: I disagree with reversing World Heritage status in Tasmania in order to log 
an extra 74,000 hectares; I think wild dogs, cats and pigs running rampant in national 
parks and impacting populations of native plants and animals is a problem; I want to 
see the Leadbeaters’ Possum habitat in Victoria be deemed a national park in an 
attempt to aid their survival as a species; I think it is alarming and repulsive that there 
is a patch of garbage at least the size of Texas floating in the North Pacific ocean. But I 
also think that ‘natural heritage’ is a knotty concept relying on crude understandings of 
humans as the scourge of the Earth; I also think that the ability of dogs, cats and pigs to 
adapt to unfamiliar environments and thrive is an admirable capability that should not 
be despised based on quasi-racist ideology; I also think that humans could get along 
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just fine if the Leadbeater’s Possum went extinct, along with Mountain Ash trees; I also 
think it is important to recognise that even enormous garbage patches have the 
capacity to afford new forms of life, including new forms of political life.  
But in current modes of doing environmental politics, at least half of the above 
statements would be utterly outrageous coming from one body! Such is the inflexibility 
of the way we do environmental politics currently. The way that we attempt to resolve 
conflicts over use of environmental ‘resources’ – namely through scientific impact 
assessments and (ideally) prioritising funding accordingly – invariably ignores the 
lives and materialities that such conflicts affect, nor do these habits of thought consider 
the potential of those lives and materialities to respond or resist (sometimes in harmful 
or damaging ways). Through developing my understanding of nonrepresentational 
theories these statements become not mutually exclusive, but different outcomes of 
differently-posed (partial) problems. By foregrounding flexibility, acknowledging a 
becoming-world, nonrepresentational approaches have highlighted that thinking in 
terms of capacities and affects rather than categories and essences provides pathways 
through conflicts that arise when different positions collide in our current subject-
centred mode of environmental politics.  
However, the habits of thought that spur such conflicts, and how we usually attempt to 
resolve them, are hard to kick. Part of the problem here to me, is the style of thought of 
problem to solution, with little attention to whether the problem is well-posed, or 
whether, indeed, it is resolvable.  
My point here is that nonrepresentational theories can change us (or as Bennett would 
say, can have ‘laudable effects’ on us), and can change how we think and do 
environmental politics by attending more closely, and perhaps sometimes more 
faithfully, to questions of the constitution of human/nonhuman relations than 
representational theories.  
Thinking national parks nonrepresentationally has changed me. When I think national 
parks, I think them differently than I did to prior to exploring nonrepresentational 
research practices. Might closer attention to the powers of nonhuman things be able to 
take hold more broadly? What kinds of forms and connections might be possible if, 
sometimes, we resist the urge to intervene? 
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At several points throughout the production of this thesis I have felt acutely deficient 
in terms of making ‘useful’ or ‘practical’ interventions into the management of national 
parks. The temptation to make a convincing and prescriptive argument has indeed 
been very strong. And yet is this not precisely the system of thought, or mode of 
engagement with the world that has led to a situation where we ignore the (potentially 
harmful) effects and capacities of nonhuman elements? Is this not precisely what I 
want to challenge in this thesis?  
Perhaps part of the struggle I am trying to articulate is the problem of the proselytiser – 
how to bring a message to people who may not want to hear it? How should I have 
conducted my interview with Matthew in order to challenge his views? Is this an 
admirable goal? Or is this type of work all driven by a desire to do something different, 
to provide the all-important, ‘original contribution’? In a way, though, these are the 
risks inherent in any action, especially in research actions.  
This thesis has been, in part, a personal attempt to reconcile my own environmental 
politics and ethics with the way I live, an attempt to reconcile my own status and 
orientation as human – as part of that species which many who share my 
environmental concerns think of as nature’s antagonist. Through thorough 
interrogation of the place and practices of humans, I can no longer subscribe to the 
ontologically limited view that humans destroy nature. Of course, the environmental 
challenges that drive many theorists to questions of nonhuman agency remain: the 
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climate continues to change in unexpected and dangerous ways; pollution continues to 
cause death and disease amongst humans and nonhumans alike; species are becoming 
extinct at alarming rates.  
These transformations are not alarming because they are different from some murky 
imaginations of an environmentally idyllic past, but rather, because they are 
destructive encounters that all point to the reduction of capacity, of potential, of life. 
How should we orient ourselves without the steadying idealisation of the past?  
Hasana Sharp’s articulation of Spinoza’s suggestions of a ‘philanthropic 
posthumanism’ seems to me a productive orientation, situated in the tensions of what 
it is to be human:  
A view of human nature in opposition to the rest of nature inflames hatred, as we 
expect ourselves and one another to exhibit powers of infinite self-control, acting in 
radical contradiction to our circumstances (Sharp 2011, p.5). 
 
Hatred, particularly self-hatred, is not a helpful orientation for critical thought and 
productive response. Indeed, such ‘sad passions’ (Deleuze 1983) seem to restrict our 
capacity for radical and creative ways of responding to the challenges of life in a world 
of chance. 
And yet, self-hatred, or at least self-species-hatred is foundational in many ways of 
being in the world that we consider ‘environmentalist’. Entire research agendas are 
dedicated to discovering and ameliorating ‘human impact on the environment’ in 
various contexts, the subtext being that humans are unwelcome, a cancer on an 
unwaveringly good ‘nature’. Any transformation of the environment by human hands 
is almost invariably conceptualised as harmful or, in the case of conservation, as 
reparation for past and present harmful practices. Thinking through human relations 
with the environment in these terms would surely compel the most dedicated 
environmentalists among us to remove themselves from the world; an extinction of 
environmentally conscientious people would, of course, in no way help the 
environment.  
‘Doing environmentalism’ should not mean hating our own humanity or negating 
ourselves as outside of nature, but rather, recognising how that humanity can help us 
inhabit the tension more comfortably, and still enter into productive encounters. 
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The representational mode of politics limits us to think through the environment in 
these terms – of groupings and collectives pitted against each other. This is, perhaps, a 
slightly lazy way of thinking through relations with environments, as it reduces the 
number of decisions to be made: if you decide to be a vegetarian, that may prevent you 
from perceiving specific situations in which the consumption of meat is an ethical 
decision; if you decide that hunting in national parks is wrong, that may prevent you 
from perceiving situations in which the taking of a life with a gun is an ethical decision, 
and so on. In other words, such static moralisms preclude the accrual of new habits of 
thought that may allow ethical decisions to be made outside of dogmatic (and 
moralistic) frames of reference.  
None of this is to say that we should do away with our current modes of evaluation or 
enquiry, or even that we should do away with representational social science. This is 
not a call to nonrepresentational arms, but rather, a suggestion that interrogating and 
broadening our habits of thought – particularly with regards to environmental 
concerns – may reveal openings for a different and more affirmative form of critical 
environmental thinking. Representational modes of thinking are not ‘wrong’, but 
proposing these systems as the only modes through which the world can and should 
be evaluated, implying that representational systems can provide complete 
understandings of the world is fundamentally flawed (Dewsbury 2003).  
These lines of thought take seriously the powers and capacities of other entities that 
constitute parks to transform, decentring, but not erasing human involvement. Indeed, 
I have found notions of distributive, relational agency particularly alluring in thinking 
through national parks. Thinking of agency as arising through relations between 
multiple actants, never located in a single body, human or nonhuman seems to me a 
much more faithful approach to figuring out how events arise in national parks, and 
perhaps, how we can productively respond to such events. Emphasising the relations 
between things, thinking national parks as experimental spaces may help us to 
overcome the seemingly endless tangle of problems we encounter in trying to produce 
an unattainable ideal state of national parks.  
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[ Interlude four: a menacing helicopter ] 
I was walking with Sophie down the narrow track in Namadgi. Down, down, back 
towards Corin Dam, returning from a short walk up the steep spur.  
A helicopter rose out of a valley in front of us. Thinking nothing of it, we continued 
walking down the track. The helicopter looped close enough to see us through the tree 
tops. ‘Strange’, I thought.  
The helicopter circled back around, this time flying low enough that the tops of the 
trees bent and swayed wildly. Leaves and dirt kicked up on the track in front of us. The 
helicopter hovered, its nose pointing our way, only just out of reach of the highest 
branches.  
I was scared now. I ran down the track, directly beneath the helicopter, shutting my 
eyes against the dust and debris. I turned to see Sophie hurrying under the helicopter, 
through the detritus storm I had just emerged from.  
I could see the men in the helicopter, their yellow firefighter uniforms and their faces 
looking down at us.  
I was certain the helicopter would fly too low, clip a treetop, and tumble down, 
crashing through branches to the ground before we could get to safety.   
Sophie caught up with me, and we both hurried down the rest of the track, only feeling 
safe when we reached the car park. Hearts racing and knees buckling, Sophie’s 
bewildered face mirrored my own – pale and drawn and wide-eyed.  
What a terrible weapon fear is!  
This was a truly terrifying experience. But it did not stop me loving national parks.  
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7. Concluding the thesis (and…and…and) 
establish a logic of the AND (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p.25). 
 
This thesis has been an experiment, both personally and intellectually.  
Personally, I wanted to see what pushing my love of national parks in different ways 
would do to me. The answer? I am a very different person who interacts very 
differently with landscapes of all kinds than I was a few years ago. I feel at once more 
critical of debates around national parks and the environment and more open to ideas 
and practices I previously would have quickly dismissed.  
Intellectually, this thesis has raised more questions than it has answered. I view this as 
a complete success. As I mentioned in ‘Introducing the thesis’, I did not set out to solve 
environmental problems. Rather, I set out to pose those problems differently, moving 
beyond tired and adversarial debates that rest upon an illusion of human sovereignty 
over nature – an illusion that environmental problems can be solved (Halsey 2006). 
Methodologically, this thesis has also been experimental. I have played with academic 
conventions around data collection, interpretation, and presentation, as well as 
disrupting practices of scholarly writing. This was, I understand, a rather risky 
approach to putting this thesis together, but it was done with clear intentions and a 
commitment to the importance of experimental research (McCormack 2010; Dewsbury 
2010), both of which I hope are apparent throughout the thesis.  
In the ‘Encounters’ chapter, I argued that we must rethink our understanding of how 
national parks come into being, and how they endure through time. The notion 
underpinning conservation, that national parks are inert or infirm places, always in 
need of human assistance is extremely problematic, as is the notion that humans can 
plunder these places without any consequences. And yet these are the positions to 
which debates around national parks are often reduced. This is a sad state of affairs, 
and responding productively to these anaemic discussions has been trying.  
But try I must, such is my love of national parks.  
The performative power of that love has underscored this thesis in a multitude of 
ways. As Wylie has put it so beautifully, “life and love weave together landscape and 
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memory as palpable, haunting presences, registering evocatively in multiple locations 
and times” (2009, p.279). My love for national parks has spurred this thesis along, at 
times grounding me, at times moving me from places where I have become stuck. This 
kind of love has sometimes created a sense of fusion of self and landscape. But the 
same love has sometimes felt like (and I turn to Wylie again here) “a separation or 
rupture – another articulation of distance, absence, dispersal” (2009, p.284). 
Encountering national parks through a ‘research lens’ has served to further intensify 
and complicate these affective intensities. 
The series of short essays that comprised the ‘Encounters’ chapter were designed as 
creative and experimental responses to empirical encounters with participants, with 
diverse literatures, and with places. Through focusing on practices as constitutive 
elements of place, not simply activities occurring against an inert backdrop, I tried to 
emphasise the importance of events and encounters that are often sidelined in favour 
of more ‘practical’ or ‘policy-driven’ debates. Rather than bounded sections of land 
entirely at the mercy of legislation and human resources, I argued that national parks 
are much more complex, in that they are continuously constituted (and re-constituted) 
through the relational practices and movements of bodies of all kinds – whether 
human, nonhuman, organic, inorganic.  
Reconceptualising national parks in this way laid the foundations for the work 
undertaken in subsequent chapters. Understanding national parks as places that are 
fluid and mutable is perhaps a less familiar way to think of them, but this approach 
allows us to pose new problems to do with the complexity of encountering national 
parks. 
The problem I focused on in ‘Ecologies’ is the dominance of the scientific paradigm in 
understanding and evaluating nature. Although this paradigm is most apparent in 
physical or natural sciences such as ecology, I also argued that reliance on scientific 
‘habits of thought’ (Deleuze 2004) affects our perceptions of what forms of social and 
cultural enquiry are appropriate or valid in relation to thinking about problems to do 
with the natural world.  
The central claim of ‘Ecologies’ was that environmental problems are ontogenetic and 
we therefore require more than one mode of enquiry, more than one style of thought in 
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order to generate productive apprehensions of processes of nature beyond scientific 
evaluation.  
If we begin such debates from a fuller appreciation of the processual formation of 
place, for the capacities and powers of transformative practices – whether human, 
nonhuman, or hybrid – we can perhaps move past debates premised on problematic 
claims of a fixed biophysical world. Such rhetoric shows that our current (modernist) 
tactic of attempting to find a single resolution (I am thinking here of the much vaunted 
notion of ‘sustainability’) to socio-environmental decline is insufficient (Halsey 2006). 
‘Ecologies’ argued that we must attempt the difficult move away from structuralist 
accounts of socio-environment relations and begin to embrace thinking of ecologies as 
assemblage, employing ‘machinic thought’ (Guattari 1995) in order to attend closely to 
micropolitics, nonhuman capacities, and biosocial processes that effect transformation 
of the world.  
For transformation is key here. Current conceptions of environmental degradation as a 
consequence of human activities relies on the same problematic human exceptionalism 
that facilitated the unfettered use of natural resources that has contributed in so many 
ways to the pickle in which we currently find ourselves. This understanding is based 
on an imagined (prehuman) world of equilibrium, which has been disturbed by 
humans. In this view, human conservation and restoration efforts are always working 
in a mode of repair – to return (selected parts) the environment to how they were 
before, where ‘before’ is some vague notion of a pristine and perfectly balanced natural 
world (Halsey 2006).  
Moving beyond these assumptions requires a thorough reconsideration of the ways we 
perform environmental politics, and the final substantive chapter, ‘Politics’, gestured 
towards possible shifts in environmental political practices. Returning to the problem 
of ‘representation’ in the different guise of current consensus-driven models of political 
action, ‘Politics’ problematised the representational logics of subject-centred politics 
and reconsidered the constitution of ‘the human subject’ as a site of politics.  
Reconfiguring environmental politics in this way required a few conceptual moves in 
terms of how we think about how what, precisely constitutes a political subject. 
Drawing on Hasana Sharp’s theorisation of ‘impersonal politics’, I reconsidered human 
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subjects as much more diffuse and dispersed than we usually understand them to be, 
and drew out the implication for this conceptualisation in terms of political groups and 
organisations, and the alignments they enter into in order to promote particular 
directions of environmental politics (whether this be ‘locking up’ national parks, 
utilising their natural resources, allowing certain activities to be constitutive parts of 
national parks, and so on).  
Rethinking environmental politics also requires a reconsideration of the political 
capacities of nonhuman things in the world – from the most inert and banal seeming 
objects such as a bottle or a rock formation, to more obviously ‘active’ material 
elements such as carbon. Considering material elements in the world as not only 
capable, but powerful actors in events that demand response allows us to rethink 
political action as not only being the domain of human action, but rather, as processes 
that involve shifting and dynamic agencies that are never fully contained within 
individual bodies or deployed by individual subjects (Bennett 2010; Coole 2005).  
Reconsidering the politics of national parks and the environment in this way has by no 
means been a painless process, and I showed this in ‘Nonrepresentational theory, the 
environment, and me’. This section was a personal reflection on the kinds of 
transformations that have occurred for me throughout the course of this research, and 
the moral and ethical implications of some of the lines of thought I have pursued. Its 
intention was to articulate the changes that research can make in the world – even if 
these transformations occur primarily in the site of the researcher’s own body and 
sensibilities, and perhaps the bodies and sensibilities of others I have encountered. 
However, this section also attempted to show that these transformations are sometimes 
fraught with uncertainties and can have restrictive effects on bodies. Furthermore, I 
acknowledged that the effects of undertaking this research cannot be known in full, 
now or in the future.  
Despite these uncertainties, this thesis has shown that rethinking nature through 
nonrepresentational theories is an opportunity to enter into environmental concerns in 
new ways, to try to put new ideas and concepts to work in order to respond to 
problems productively and creatively, rather than continuing to rely on static ideas 
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about the capacities of the things in the world. I only hope that this work contributes to 
an opening up of thinking about the world.  
I want to finish this thesis with an opening, not with a closure. Although I focused on 
national parks in Australia, and the significance of moments like summiting Mount 
Tennent, the spectres of deep and underlying concerns around broader environmental 
issues such as global climate change, pollution, or the impacts of the Anthropocene as a 
new geological age have informed this whole research project. These big ticket issues 
are an important part of the milieu in which this thesis takes place, but the ways we 
conceptualise and approach those issues are equally important. 
Nonrepresentational approaches such as mine take up the challenge not only of 
answering problems, but thinking differently and creatively about what, precisely, 
constitutes those problems, including (but not limited to) bodies, thought, concepts, 
ethics, sensations, affects and intensities. This thesis has taken up the challenge of 
articulating new ways of thinking about the relationships within and between humans 
and nature, by recognising that these relationships, these ‘problems’ are made of 
encounters, ecologies, and politics of all orders of magnitude. Whether a national park, 
an interview encounter, a sight of brumbies, a fleeting thought, or a thesis, I have 
shown that all of these parts of a changing world have the potential to offer new 
terrains of environmental encounters, ecologies, and politics. 
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